<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Money Outsider]]></title><description><![CDATA[Money Outsider explores financial data. I like finding out how financial systems actually affect ordinary people, whether that’s student debt, pensions, the cost of living, or how public money gets spent. ]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:26:04 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Money Outsider Ltd]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[moneyoutsider@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[moneyoutsider@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[moneyoutsider@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[moneyoutsider@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[The Martin Lewis question]]></title><description><![CDATA[Why Britain trusts a man on the telly more than anyone trained to help]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-martin-lewis-question</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-martin-lewis-question</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 08:01:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e52c6d43-b434-410c-a62f-24e94e060126_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 16 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-concealment-tax">part 15</a> covered money shame and the concealment tax.</em></p><p>Britain treats money as its last taboo. That silence does real damage to the people inside it: the shame spiral that stops people opening their bank statements, and the concealment tax they pay for hiding financial trouble. This part is about where they turn instead, and what that reveals.</p><p>There is a person in Britain who has, almost by accident, become the answer to a question most people don't consciously ask: who do I trust to talk to me about money without judging me?</p><p>In 2023, Quilter research reported by Financial Reporter found that 35% of adults aged 50 and above named Martin Lewis as their most trusted source of financial advice.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Friends and family came second at 30%. Their own online research came third at 29%. Professional financial advisers, the people specifically trained and regulated to give financial guidance, came fourth at 22%. Bank managers, the traditional figures of financial authority, came fifth at 15%.</p><p>The Martin Lewis phenomenon is not really about Martin Lewis. It is about what his popularity reveals. A television presenter with a website is more trusted than qualified professionals, more trusted than friends and family, more trusted than people's own judgement. That is a remarkable statement about the state of financial communication in Britain.</p><p>Part of it is about accessibility. Lewis speaks in plain English, addresses real problems (how to claim a refund, which energy tariff to switch to, how to complain about a bank charge), and doesn't require you to have a prior relationship or pay a fee. But the more interesting part is about shame. Going to see a financial adviser means admitting, to another human being in a room, that you need help. It means filling in forms about your income and expenditure and watching someone else look at the numbers. For someone already in a shame spiral, that is an impossibly high barrier.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>It is the financial equivalent of googling your symptoms instead of going to the doctor.</p></div><p>Watching Martin Lewis on television, or reading his website, costs nothing emotionally. There is no disclosure. No one knows you're doing it. No one will look at your bank statements. The advice arrives in your living room or on your phone screen without requiring you to admit anything to anyone. It is the financial equivalent of googling your symptoms instead of going to the doctor, and it serves a similar function: it allows you to seek help while maintaining the silence.</p><p>The parallel with health is closer than it might appear. The NHS has spent decades trying to get people to present earlier with symptoms, to visit the GP before the lump becomes cancer, before the chest pain becomes a heart attack. The barrier is often the same: people are afraid of what they'll be told, and the fear of knowing is stronger than the fear of not knowing. Financial shame operates identically. People know, on some level, that their debts are growing, that their pension won't be enough, that their spending is unsustainable. They don't want that knowledge confirmed by someone else, because confirmation makes it real in a way that private worry doesn't.</p><p>The FCA's Financial Lives survey data tells a related story. Around 53% of adults did not use any customer support services from their financial providers in the twelve months before the survey.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> Not because they didn't need help, but because seeking help requires disclosure. Among those who did disclose vulnerability to their financial provider, only 57% felt their provider cared about them, and only 58% said any changes were made as a result.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> For people already inclined to conceal their difficulties, this is exactly the kind of outcome that confirms the silence was the right strategy. Why tell someone about your problems if nothing changes?</p><p>The FCA also found that 7.4 million people had unsuccessfully attempted to contact one or more financial services providers in the twelve months before May 2022.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> They tried to break the silence and the system didn't pick up the phone. For people who had overcome the shame barrier to make the call in the first place, a failed contact attempt doesn't just mean they didn't get help. It means the cost of attempting to get help (the emotional energy, the vulnerability, the admission of need) was paid for nothing. Many won't try again.</p><p>This creates a strange situation in which the financial services industry simultaneously offers support that people can't bring themselves to use and fails to deliver when people do overcome the barrier. The CIPD's 2023 research on workplace financial wellbeing found that 57% of organisations said they promoted financial wellbeing to at least a moderate extent. But only 40% of employers asked employees for feedback about pay and benefits even once a year.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> The provision exists. The communication channel is broken. The silence persists on both sides: employers don't ask, employees don't tell, and the gap between provision and uptake goes unexamined.</p><p>What the Martin Lewis phenomenon tells us is that the demand for financial guidance is enormous. People are hungry for it. They just want it delivered in a way that doesn't require them to break the silence. A broadcast medium, a website, a television show: these are one-to-many communications. The person receiving the advice is anonymous. The shame barrier doesn't apply. The limitation is that one-to-many advice is necessarily generic. It can tell you how to switch your energy supplier or reclaim bank charges. It can't tell you whether your specific debt is manageable, whether your specific pension will be enough, or whether your specific anxiety about money is justified. For that, you need to talk to someone. And that is exactly what the culture prevents.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Class, crisis and the widening silence</h2><p>The financial crises of the past fifteen years have interacted with the British silence in a way that has made both worse.</p><p>During austerity, the dominant political narrative was fiscal responsibility. The government needed to "tighten its belt," just as households should. This framing did something specific to the silence: it reinforced the idea that financial difficulty is a matter of personal discipline. If the nation needs to be more careful with money, and you're struggling, the implication is that you haven't been careful enough. The political framing of austerity as a household budgeting problem made it harder, not easier, for individuals to admit they were in trouble.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a></p><p>The cost-of-living crisis of 2022-23 should have broken this pattern. When inflation hits 11% and energy bills double, it becomes obvious that individual budgeting is not the issue. And to some extent, the stigma did ease. Food banks became more visible and more socially acceptable. Media coverage shifted from portraying financial difficulty as a personal failing to recognising it as a systemic problem. The phrase "heating or eating" became common enough to lose its shock value.</p><p>But the shame didn't disappear. It migrated. For people who had previously considered themselves financially comfortable, the middle classes, the homeowners, the dual-income households, the experience of financial pressure was new and deeply uncomfortable. These were people whose class identity was partly built on financial competence. Admitting that the mortgage had become unmanageable or that the credit card balance was climbing was not just a financial disclosure. It was an identity threat. It meant admitting that the class position they had worked to achieve was precarious.</p><p>I've spoken to people in this situation, and what strikes me is the specificity of the silence. They'll talk about the cost-of-living crisis in general terms, as a political issue, as something happening to "people." They won't say "we cancelled the holiday because we couldn't afford it" or "I'm lying awake at 3am doing sums in my head." The general conversation about financial difficulty has become more acceptable. The personal conversation hasn't.</p><p>This produces a peculiar kind of loneliness. You know that millions of people are in the same situation because you've read it in the newspapers. But you don't know that your specific friends, your specific colleagues, your specific neighbours are experiencing it too, because nobody says so. The macro picture is clear. The micro picture remains hidden behind the same polite opacity that has always characterised British conversation about money.</p><p>The class dimension adds another layer. The Savage Great British Class Survey identified seven distinct classes in modern Britain, each with different relationships to money.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> The working-class experience of financial shame is often direct: not having enough, being visibly unable to afford things, enduring the judgements of institutions (the benefits office, the debt collector, the landlord). The middle-class experience is more about maintenance: keeping up appearances, concealing the cracks, performing a level of comfort that may not reflect reality. Both are forms of silence, but they operate through different mechanisms and produce different kinds of damage.</p><p>For the working class, the silence often delays access to help. For the middle class, it prevents acknowledgement that help is needed. Both lead to the same place: people making financial decisions in isolation, without information about what's normal, without support from their social networks, and without the reality check that comes from honest conversation.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>The most feared aspect of debt is not the interest rate. It is the moment someone else finds out.</p></div><p>There is one more aspect of the British silence that deserves attention, and it concerns the relationship between money and morality. In British culture, unlike in many parts of the United States, there is no tradition of seeing wealth as a sign of virtue or God's favour. The British moral framework around money is different: it is not that being rich is good, but that being unable to manage your money is bad. Competence, not prosperity, is the moral standard. This means that the shame attaches not to being poor per se, but to being seen to be poor. A person quietly struggling on a modest income maintains their dignity as long as nobody knows. The moment the struggle becomes visible, the shame arrives. This is why the most feared aspect of debt is not the interest rate. It is the moment someone else finds out.</p><p>The pandemic briefly opened a window. When millions of people were furloughed simultaneously, there was a moment when financial vulnerability became a shared experience rather than a private shame. But the window closed quickly. The furlough scheme ended, the economy reopened, and the expectation of individual financial competence reasserted itself. If anything, the pandemic may have widened the silence by adding a new category of concealment: people who appeared to have weathered the storm but were quietly carrying debts accumulated during lockdown.</p><p>The silence connects back to everything else in this series. Fear is harder to manage when you can't talk about it. Herding is more powerful when you can't share independent information. The fairness instinct is harder to defend when you can't articulate what feels wrong. Narratives go unchallenged when nobody offers their own real story as a counterpoint. The bandwidth tax is heavier when you carry it alone. Each of the psychological forces this series examines is amplified by the silence, and the silence is reinforced by each of them. Shame narrows the tunnel. The tunnel deepens the shame. And the British cultural preference for not mentioning either ensures that the cycle continues undisturbed.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What this means for you</h2><p>If you recognise yourself anywhere in these two pieces, if you've ever avoided opening a bill, lied about your finances to a friend, or felt a flush of shame at a checkout when a card was declined, you are in the majority. Fifty per cent of British adults consider money taboo.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> That means the silence isn't aberrant. It's the norm. The people sitting across from you at dinner, the colleagues in your office, the parents at the school gate, are statistically likely to be hiding something about their financial lives too.</p><p>There are some things worth knowing about this. First, shame thrives in isolation. Gladstone's research showed that shame drives withdrawal, and withdrawal deepens the problem.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> The single most effective thing you can do if you're in financial difficulty is to tell someone. Not necessarily a professional (though that helps). Just another human being. The act of saying it out loud, "I'm struggling," breaks the spiral. It doesn't solve the financial problem, but it removes the additional cognitive and emotional burden of concealment.</p><p>Second, the silence is not evenly distributed. It falls hardest on people who are already under the most pressure. The person on Universal Credit who is too ashamed to tell their family they've been sanctioned. The single parent who buys clothes they can't afford because they don't want their child to look different at school. The recently divorced person maintaining a lifestyle they can no longer sustain because admitting the change feels like admitting defeat. These are all rational responses to a culture that treats financial difficulty as a character flaw, but they are responses that make the underlying problem worse.</p><p>Third, if you're in a position of influence, whether as an employer, a friend, or a family member, you can change the dynamic by going first. Talk about money. Not in grand, confessional terms. Just normally. Mention that you found the energy bills stressful. Say that you've been looking at your pension and it worried you. Admit that you don't understand your mortgage terms. Each small disclosure signals to the people around you that financial uncertainty is a shared human experience, not a private failure.</p><p>The Lloyds survey found that money is more taboo than sex, religion, or politics. But taboos are not laws of nature. They are cultural constructs, maintained by collective silence and broken by collective speech. The Norwegian experiment showed that forced transparency has costs. But voluntary honesty, offered freely between people who trust each other, is different. It doesn't require a government database. It requires a willingness to be the first person to say something real.</p><p>The British silence about money costs us in ways we can quantify: delayed debt advice, underused workplace support, financial products designed for people who won't complain because they won't call. It also costs us in ways we can't quantify: the loneliness of lying awake worrying about money while believing you're the only one doing so. The shame that prevents a parent from asking for help. The marriage that collapses under the weight of undisclosed debt.</p><p>The silence is comfortable. That's why it persists. Breaking it is uncomfortable. But the evidence from every study across these two pieces points in the same direction: the cost of silence is higher than the cost of speaking.</p><p>Norway put every citizen's tax return online and discovered that transparency alone does not fix the relationship between people and money. The happiness gap widened. The comparisons multiplied. Ricardo Perez-Truglia's data showed that visibility without equality just gives people new reasons to feel worse.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a> Britain's silence is the mirror image of Norway's transparency, and neither has solved the underlying problem. The question is not whether to talk about money or stay quiet. The question is whether any society has built the structures that would make honesty bearable.</p><div><hr></div><p>In the next part of this series, we'll look at an area where the silence and the shame converge with particular force: the British relationship with property. Because if there is one financial topic where the gap between public narrative and private anxiety is widest, it is the question of whether you own your home, and what it costs you.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-your-house-is-you">Bricks and identity</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Further reading:</p><ul><li><p>Lea, S., Webley, P. &amp; Walker, C. (1995) "Psychological Factors in Consumer Debt." Journal of Economic Psychology, 16(4), pp. 681-701. Early UK research on the psychological dimensions of debt.</p></li><li><p>Furnham, A. (2014) The New Psychology of Money. Routledge. A comprehensive treatment of money psychology with significant UK focus.</p></li><li><p>Wilkinson, R. &amp; Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone. Penguin. The data on how inequality affects health, wellbeing and social trust across developed nations.</p></li></ul><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Quilter (2023) 35% aged 50+ trust Martin Lewis most.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>FCA (2024) Financial Lives Survey: Vulnerability and Financial Resilience. 53% did not use customer support in 12 months.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>FCA (2024) Financial Lives Survey. Only 57% who disclosed vulnerability felt the provider cared; 58% said changes were made as a result.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>FCA (2024) Financial Lives Survey. 7.4 million unsuccessful contact attempts with financial services providers in 12 months.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>CIPD (2023) Financial Wellbeing: An Evidence Review. 57% of organisations promoted financial wellbeing; only 40% asked employees for feedback on pay and benefits once yearly.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford University Press. Analysis of how fiscal responsibility framing shifted blame from banking sector to public spending.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Savage, M. et al. (2013) A new model of social class. Sociology, 47(2), pp. 219-250.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Lloyds Banking Group (2019) 50% consider money taboo, more than sex (42%), religion (26%), politics (14%).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Gladstone, J.J. et al. (2021) Shame and financial behaviour. Journal of Consumer Research.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Perez-Truglia, R. (2020) Tax transparency and well-being. American Economic Review, 110(7).</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The concealment tax]]></title><description><![CDATA[Money shame, class and the things we don't say]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-concealment-tax</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-concealment-tax</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 08:01:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d5ca7024-7d1d-4951-8511-8c6908cfdc44_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 15 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/designing-for-depleted-minds">part 14</a> covered the cost-of-living squeeze and designing for depleted minds.</em></p><p>In 2001, Norway put every citizen's tax return online. Anyone could look up anyone else's income. You could find out what your neighbour earned, what your boss took home, what your ex-partner declared to the tax authorities. For a country that already prided itself on egalitarian values, this seemed like a logical extension: more transparency, less pretence, a healthier relationship with money.</p><p>The opposite happened. Ricardo Perez-Truglia, an economist at UCLA, studied the effects using survey data spanning 1985 to 2013. His findings, published in the American Economic Review in 2020, showed that making incomes visible increased the well-being gap between richer and poorer Norwegians. The happiness gap widened by 29%. The life satisfaction gap widened by 21%. People started comparing themselves to their friends and neighbours, and those comparisons made the poorer ones feel worse. Transparency didn't reduce anxiety about money. It gave people precise new reasons for it.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p><p>I think about this study whenever someone suggests that the British would be better off if we just talked more openly about money. Maybe we would. But Norway's experience suggests it's not that simple. Norway is one of the most egalitarian societies on earth, with a strong social safety net and a cultural tradition of modesty about wealth (the Norwegians call it janteloven, the idea that you shouldn't think you're better than anyone else). If anywhere was going to handle income transparency well, it was Norway. And even there, the result was greater unhappiness. The silence around money in Britain is often described as a quaint cultural hangover, a relic of Victorian propriety. It's more than that. The silence serves a purpose. It protects people from comparisons they don't want to make and judgements they don't want to face. The problem is that it also prevents them from getting help when they need it, and it allows financial shame to compound in the dark.</p><p>This piece is about what happens when a culture that doesn't talk about money collides with a series of financial crises that affect almost everyone. The silence doesn't just persist. It deepens. And the people most damaged by crisis are often the ones least able to speak about it.</p><p>I should say upfront that I find this the most uncomfortable piece in this series to write. Not because the research is difficult, but because the subject is close. I'm British. I grew up in a household where money was discussed in euphemisms when it was discussed at all. I know the silence from the inside. When I started reporting on personal finance, I was struck by how many of the people I interviewed would talk freely about their health, their relationships, their childhood traumas, but would tense up and change the subject when I asked what they earned. The silence is not abstract to me. It is the water I swam in.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The shape of shame</h2><p>In 2021, a team led by Joe Gladstone at University College London published a study that tried to map what financial shame actually does to people. The research, across six studies with 9,110 participants, used an unusual combination of methods: bank account transaction histories, longitudinal surveys, and identical twin comparisons. What they found was that shame doesn't just make people feel bad about money. It makes them withdraw from financial life entirely.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a></p><p>The mechanism works like this. A person experiences a financial setback: a missed payment, an unexpected bill, a period of reduced income. The setback produces shame, which is different from guilt. Guilt says "I did a bad thing." Shame says "I am a bad person." Guilt motivates you to fix the problem. Shame motivates you to hide from it. The ashamed person stops opening bank statements, stops answering calls from creditors, stops engaging with their financial situation at all. This withdrawal makes the situation worse, which produces more shame, which produces more withdrawal. Gladstone and colleagues called it a "shame spiral," and their data, drawn from real bank account histories rather than just surveys, showed it operating in practice.</p><p>The twin comparison was particularly telling. Identical twins who experienced different levels of financial shame showed different financial behaviours, even controlling for shared genetics, upbringing, and personality traits. Shame wasn't a proxy for poverty or poor education. It was an independent force, acting on financial behaviour through a mechanism of avoidance and concealment. Two people with identical DNA, raised in the same household, could end up on different financial trajectories depending on how much shame they felt about money. That is how powerful the emotion is.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>This maps onto what debt charities see every day. StepChange reported that nine in ten of their clients said they wished they had sought help sooner. More than half had waited over a year before making contact.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> The most commonly cited barrier wasn't lack of information. It was shame. People knew help existed. They couldn't bring themselves to ask for it because asking meant admitting, out loud, to another person, that they had failed.</p><p>There's something about the word "failed" that matters here. Financial difficulty is not experienced, in British culture, as something that happens to you. It is experienced as something you did. You failed to save enough. You failed to earn enough. You failed to plan properly. Even when the cause is entirely external (a pandemic, a redundancy, a partner who left) the emotional register is personal failure. And personal failure, in a culture that treats financial competence as a basic marker of adult capability, triggers shame rather than solidarity.</p><p>The Money and Mental Health Policy Institute quantified the extreme end of this. In their "Debts and Despair" research, they found that 50% of people who had fallen behind on consumer credit bills had experienced suicidal thoughts or feelings in the previous twenty months as a result of the rising cost of living. Half. This is not a statistic about long-term poverty or chronic mental illness. It is about people who missed a credit card payment or fell behind on a personal loan during an inflationary crisis, and whose shame became so overwhelming that they thought about ending their lives.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png" width="1540" height="1379" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1379,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:96598,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Pull quote, fifty per cent of people who had fallen behind&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Pull quote, fifty per cent of people who had fallen behind" title="Pull quote, fifty per cent of people who had fallen behind" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B1Lt!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffc0c9183-0b1f-4b4a-8d46-6e2e76225f9e_1540x1379.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Twenty-four per cent of those behind on payments were being contacted by their creditors every one to two days. Nearly half said they felt harassed by the volume of contact.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> The creditor communications, presumably intended to prompt repayment, were landing on people already in a shame spiral, people who were avoiding all engagement with their finances, people for whom each new letter or text message confirmed what they already believed: that they had failed, and that everyone knew.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>You're not just broke. You're broken.</p></div><p>The distinction between shame and guilt, which psychologists draw carefully, is worth understanding because it changes what kind of help works. Guilt-driven people try to fix things: they call the creditor, they make a plan, they seek advice. Shame-driven people hide. They don't open the letters. They delete the voicemails. They tell their partner everything is fine. The British cultural environment, with its emphasis on financial competence as a marker of character, pushes people toward shame rather than guilt. When your sense of yourself as a capable adult is tied to your ability to manage money, and you can't manage money, the threat isn't just financial. It's existential. You're not just broke. You're broken.</p><p>This helps explain a pattern that debt advisers describe repeatedly: the phone call comes not at the first sign of trouble, but at the point of crisis. Not when the first payment is missed, but when the bailiff's letter arrives. Not when the debt starts growing, but when it has become unmanageable. The shame delays help-seeking by months or years, and in that gap, manageable problems become unmanageable ones. StepChange found that more than half their clients had waited over a year. By the time they called, the situation had often deteriorated to a point where the options were fewer and the damage harder to reverse.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The last taboo</h2><p>In 2019, Lloyds Banking Group commissioned a survey that produced a finding which surprised almost nobody who lives in Britain but which is worth stating precisely because precision makes it harder to dismiss. Fifty per cent of British adults considered discussing personal finances taboo in everyday conversation. Money was rated more taboo than sex (42%), religion (26%), and politics (14%).<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png" width="1540" height="1309" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1309,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:89172,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;British financial taboos ranked&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="British financial taboos ranked" title="British financial taboos ranked" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azEW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa680678c-1f96-462b-9b3a-9cb4813027e0_1540x1309.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Think about that ordering for a moment. We live in a country where people will discuss their sexual preferences more readily than their salary. Where they will argue about God more comfortably than about their mortgage rate. Where they will have blazing rows about Brexit across the dinner table but cannot bring themselves to tell a friend they're struggling to pay the rent.</p><p>Twenty-five per cent of respondents said they had lied to family and friends about their finances. Ten per cent had lied to their partner about how much debt they carried.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> These are not small numbers. In a population of 67 million, ten per cent represents roughly 5.4 million adults lying to the person they share a bed with about how much they owe.</p><p>The question is why. Other countries have financial problems. Other countries have inequality and debt and financial anxiety. But the British version of money silence has a particular texture that seems to come from the intersection of class, propriety, and a specific kind of emotional restraint.</p><p>Mike Savage and colleagues, in the Great British Class Survey of 2013, found that class in Britain is not just about occupation or income. It is about economic, cultural, and social capital combined.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> The elite class had a mean household income of &#163;89,000 and savings that were more than double any other class. But the class system also shapes what you're allowed to say about money. Old money doesn't discuss it because that would be vulgar. New money doesn't discuss it because that would reveal insecurity. The middle classes don't discuss it because they might discover they're not as comfortable as they appear. The working classes don't discuss it because admitting poverty triggers shame rather than support.</p><p>Everyone, in other words, has a class-based reason for silence. The mechanisms differ, but the outcome is the same: a society in which almost nobody tells the truth about their financial situation to the people around them. This creates what you might call an information vacuum. If you don't know how your peers are doing financially, you have no way to calibrate whether your own situation is normal, whether your anxiety is proportionate, or whether help is available and socially acceptable to seek.</p><p>The information vacuum has a specific cost during financial crises. When prices rise sharply, as they did in 2022, people need to make rapid adjustments to their spending. Those adjustments are easier if you know what others are doing. Are other families switching energy supplier? Are other parents buying school uniform from the cheaper shop? Are other homeowners calling their mortgage lender to negotiate? In a culture where these conversations happen openly, information spreads through social networks and people adjust faster. In a culture of silence, each household makes its adjustments alone, often later and less effectively, because they lack the social information that would speed up their response.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>Money was simultaneously the organising principle of British society and the thing you were least supposed to mention.</p></div><p>The historical roots run deep. Victorian Britain developed an elaborate set of rules about money and status. The guineas system priced goods for the wealthy at 21 shillings rather than a round pound, creating a language of consumption that signalled class. "Old money" families treated any discussion of finances as irredeemably common. The phrase "trade" was used as an insult for generations, implying that anyone who earned money through commercial activity was socially inferior to those who inherited it. Money was simultaneously the organising principle of British society and the thing you were least supposed to mention.</p><p>The legacy of this persists in ways that are easy to miss. Job adverts in Britain still frequently describe salaries as "competitive" rather than stating a number. Estate agents describe properties as "offers in the region of" rather than naming a price. Salary discussions between colleagues remain, in many workplaces, practically forbidden by social convention even where they are legally protected. The Equality Act 2010 explicitly protects employees' right to discuss pay, but a legal right means little against a cultural norm that makes the conversation feel impossible. Try asking a British colleague what they earn and watch the physical discomfort cross their face.</p><p>The opacity has a direct economic cost. When people don't know what their colleagues earn, pay discrimination can persist unchallenged. When people don't know what their neighbours pay for utilities, they don't switch. When people don't know that their friends are also struggling, they don't pool information about where to find help. The silence is not just emotionally costly. It is economically inefficient. It prevents the flow of information that markets are supposed to rely on.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The concealment tax</h2><p>Michael Moorhouse and colleagues, writing in the Journal of Marketing Research in 2023, studied what happens when people who are in debt anticipate being judged for it. Their findings give the silence a price tag.</p><p>About 20% of indebted people in their sample reported worrying moderately to extensively about being stigmatised because of their debt. One in five. That is a significant minority, and when you consider that the UK has roughly 10 million adults with problem debt at any given time, 20% of that figure represents two million people whose behaviour is being shaped by the anticipation of judgement. These people didn't just feel worse than other debtors. They behaved differently. They concealed their debt more aggressively: spending money they didn't have in social situations to avoid appearing poor, avoiding conversations about finances, and critically, avoiding seeking help. The concealment behaviours weren't just unproductive. They were actively destructive, increasing spending and reducing the likelihood of getting the advice that might have helped.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a></p><p>Moorhouse ran a field experiment with a financial education company to test whether the social context of help-seeking mattered. It did. Debtors concerned about stigma who received community-based financial education (learning alongside peers in similar situations) paid off $4,370 more debt than a control group, compared to $3,531 more for those who received private instruction.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a> They also reported a 15% increase in well-being, versus 8% for the private instruction group.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-12" href="#footnote-12" target="_self">12</a> Something about being with other people in the same situation reduced the shame enough to change behaviour.</p><p>This is a finding that StepChange and Citizens Advice and the other debt charities already knew intuitively, but rarely had the academic evidence to back up. The hardest part of their job is not the advice itself, which is often fairly straightforward: consolidate these debts, negotiate that payment plan, apply for this benefit. The hardest part is getting people through the door. The barrier is not information. It is the belief that needing help is a personal failure that must be hidden. The same StepChange data showed that 60% of their clients were in employment.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-13" href="#footnote-13" target="_self">13</a> These were not people who had dropped out of the economy. They were working, paying taxes, getting up every morning and going to their jobs. They just couldn't make the numbers work, and they couldn't tell anyone.</p><p>The pandemic made this worse in ways that were initially invisible. Gortz, McGowan, and Yeromonahos, writing in the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics in 2023, found that being furloughed increased the probability of late housing payments by 30% and late bill payments by 19%.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-14" href="#footnote-14" target="_self">14</a><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-15" href="#footnote-15" target="_self">15</a> The aggregate incidence of financial distress rose by 3.38 percentage points.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-16" href="#footnote-16" target="_self">16</a> But furlough also came with an identity problem. Being furloughed meant admitting that your employer had decided they could function without you. For many people, particularly those in jobs that defined their sense of self, this was a shame trigger as well as a financial one. The government was paying 80% of your wages because your work wasn't needed. That is not an emotionally neutral message.</p><p>The result was a generation of furloughed workers who were financially stressed but culturally unable to say so. The dominant narrative of the furlough scheme was gratitude. "We should be thankful we have furlough." "At least we're not losing our jobs." The social pressure to frame furlough as a positive created a secondary silence: even within the general British silence about money, there was an additional layer of silence about the financial anxiety caused by a scheme everyone was supposed to be grateful for.</p><p>The cost of this concealment accumulates in ways that are difficult to measure but easy to see. When people hide their financial difficulties from partners, the partnership suffers. When they hide them from friends, the friendship becomes a performance. When they hide them from employers, they don't access workplace support that might help. When they hide them from GPs, the GP treats the insomnia and the anxiety without understanding the cause. The silence creates a series of broken feedback loops where the people who most need help are the ones least likely to reveal that they need it.</p><p>There's a gendered dimension too, though it doesn't always cut the way you might expect. Research consistently shows that women are more willing to discuss finances with friends and family than men, but also more likely to report financial anxiety. Men are more likely to conceal financial problems from their partners, particularly problems related to debt or gambling. The masculine ideal of the provider, though it has weakened over the past generation, still exerts enough cultural pressure that many men experience financial difficulty as an identity crisis. This may partly explain why men are significantly overrepresented in financial distress-related suicides.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-17" href="#footnote-17" target="_self">17</a> The shame isn't just about money. It's about what money represents in the construction of male identity.</p><p>The concealment tax, as I've come to think of it, is the accumulated cost of all this hiding. It is the interest that accumulates on debts that aren't addressed. The mental health damage of carrying a secret. The relationship strain of financial dishonesty. The economic inefficiency of a population that can't share information about prices, deals, and strategies because doing so would require admitting how much they earn and what they spend. It's invisible because it's made of absences: the conversations that don't happen, the help that isn't sought, the information that isn't shared.</p><div><hr></div><p>The concealment tax is the bill for all this hiding, and it falls hardest on the people least able to pay it. In the next part: why Britain trusts a television presenter more than any qualified adviser, and what fifteen years of crisis have done to the silence.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-martin-lewis-question">The Martin Lewis question</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Perez-Truglia, R. (2020) Tax transparency and well-being. American Economic Review, 110(7).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Gladstone, J.J. et al. (2021) Shame and financial behaviour. Journal of Consumer Research.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Identical twin financial shame study. Source: Gladstone, J.J. et al. (2021) 'Financial shame spirals: How shame intensifies financial hardship', Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 167, pp. 42-56. Twin analysis within the same study.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>StepChange (2024) Statistics Yearbook. 90% wished they had sought help sooner; more than half waited over a year before seeking debt advice.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Money and Mental Health Policy Institute (2023) Debts and Despair. 50% of those behind on consumer credit payments experienced suicidal thoughts in past 20 months.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Creditor contact frequency. Source: Money and Mental Health Policy Institute (2023) Debts and Despair. 24% contacted by creditors every 1-2 days; nearly 50% felt harassed.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Lloyds Banking Group (2019) 50% consider money taboo, more than sex (42%), religion (26%), politics (14%).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Financial dishonesty to family and partners. Source: Lloyds Banking Group (2019) The M-Word: Britain's Biggest Taboo. 25% lied about finances to family; 10% lied to partners about debt.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Savage, M. et al. (2013) A new model of social class. Sociology, 47(2), pp. 219-250.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Moorhouse, M. et al. (2023) Debt stigma and behavioural outcomes. Journal of Marketing Research.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Community vs private financial education. Source: Moorhouse, M. et al. (2023) 'Helping Those That Hide: Anticipated Stigmatization Drives Concealment and a Destructive Cycle of Debt', Journal of Marketing Research, 60(6), pp. 1135-1153. Community settings: USD 4,370 more debt paid off versus USD 3,531 in private instruction.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-12" href="#footnote-anchor-12" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">12</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Moorhouse, M. et al. (2023) 'Helping Those That Hide', Journal of Marketing Research, 60(6), pp. 1135-1153. Community-based learning produced 15% wellbeing increase versus 8% with private instruction.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-13" href="#footnote-anchor-13" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">13</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>StepChange (2024) Statistics Yearbook. 60% of clients in employment.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-14" href="#footnote-anchor-14" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">14</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Gortz, C., McGowan, C. &amp; Yeromonahos, V. (2023) 'Furlough and Household Financial Distress during the COVID-19 Pandemic', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 85(6), pp. 1157-1184. 30% increase in probability of late housing payments.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-15" href="#footnote-anchor-15" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">15</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Gortz, C. et al. (2023) 'Furlough and Household Financial Distress', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 85(6), pp. 1157-1184. 19% increase in probability of late bill payments.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-16" href="#footnote-anchor-16" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">16</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Gortz, C. et al. (2023) Labour market dynamics during pandemics. Oxford Bulletin.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-17" href="#footnote-anchor-17" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">17</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>ONS (2023) Suicide statistics and coroner reports. Men consistently overrepresented in financial distress-related suicides in England and Wales.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Designing for depleted minds]]></title><description><![CDATA[When inflation hit 11%, the whole country got a taste of the tunnel]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/designing-for-depleted-minds</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/designing-for-depleted-minds</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 08:01:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a294c937-cc3c-4a88-9164-295b07c7ee0a_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 14 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/how-scarcity-eats-your-ability-to-think">part 13</a> covered the science of scarcity.</em></p><p>The research of Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir showed that financial scarcity consumes mental capacity, a cost they called the bandwidth tax. Britain's welfare system is built as if that were not true. This part is about what happened when the tax hit almost everybody at once.</p><h2>The cost-of-living squeeze</h2><p>In the autumn of 2022, something happened that had not occurred in a generation. Inflation in the UK crossed 11%, the highest in 41 years. Energy bills doubled. Food prices rose by percentages that people noticed on every shopping trip. The typical annual energy bill went from around &#163;1,200 to over &#163;2,500 in the space of a year. Supermarket own-brand products, the usual refuge of the budget-conscious, saw price increases of 17%. And for millions of households, the bandwidth tax intensified from a chronic drain to an acute crisis.</p><p>The Money and Mental Health Policy Institute had already established the connection between financial difficulty and cognitive impairment. In their 2016 study of 5,500 people with mental health conditions, 93% reported spending more during periods of poor mental health, 92% found financial decisions harder, and 74% had delayed paying bills. The relationship runs in both directions: financial pressure worsens mental health, and poor mental health worsens financial decision-making. Each feeds the other. The researchers called it a "vicious cycle," which is one of those phrases that gets used loosely, but here it's precisely accurate. Financial difficulty reduces cognitive function, which leads to worse financial decisions, which deepens financial difficulty, which further reduces cognitive function. Without an external intervention, the cycle has no natural breaking point.</p><p>The cost-of-living crisis tightened that loop for the wider population. By mid-2023, 82% of UK adults reported being worried about the rising cost of living, and 60% said it was affecting their mental health, according to the Mental Health Foundation.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> These aren't people with pre-existing conditions or long-term poverty. They are mortgage holders watching rates triple after fourteen years of near-zero interest rates. Renters facing 20% increases with no mechanism to challenge them. Parents choosing between heating and eating, a phrase that entered common usage with unsettling speed because it described a real choice that a growing number of families were making every week.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png" width="1540" height="1232" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1232,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:81844,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;pull quote, reduced cognitive bandwidth&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="pull quote, reduced cognitive bandwidth" title="pull quote, reduced cognitive bandwidth" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8IPP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e6be56d-9e6b-4c18-9681-9802d836a066_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>I keep coming back to the everyday arithmetic of it. Before the crisis, a family on a median income could pay their bills on autopilot. The numbers worked. You didn't need to think about whether to buy the branded cereal or the own-brand one, whether to turn the heating on at 6pm or 7pm, whether that jacket for the school trip was affordable this month. After energy bills doubled, every one of those micro-decisions became a bandwidth problem. The cognitive load of managing a household budget increased for almost everyone. People who had never thought about the price of butter were suddenly doing mental arithmetic in supermarket aisles, calculating per-kilo costs and comparing pack sizes, the kind of cognitive work that low-income households had always done but that now spread to millions of people who were unpractised at it.</p><p>The pandemic had already primed this. The furlough scheme, which at its peak in May 2020 supported 8.9 million jobs out of 11.7 million claims, provided 80% of wages up to &#163;2,500 a month. On paper, it prevented mass unemployment and was broadly considered one of the most effective policy responses to the pandemic anywhere in the world. In practice, the experience of being furloughed was not neutral. Research found that furloughed workers were 20 percentage points more likely to cut spending than those who remained working, even though their income loss was only 20%. The gap between the actual income reduction and the behavioural response tells us something about bandwidth. The uncertainty of the situation, not knowing when furlough would end, whether the company would survive, whether the scheme would be extended, consumed cognitive resources beyond what the raw numbers would predict.</p><p>The anxiety effects persisted long after people returned to their jobs. Being told your livelihood depends on a government scheme that might end next month, extended in increments of a few weeks at a time, is a sustained bandwidth drain. People couldn't plan. They couldn't commit to spending. They couldn't make the kind of medium-term financial decisions (fix the roof, replace the boiler, take on a new tenancy) that require confidence about the next six months.</p><p>What the cost-of-living crisis revealed is that the bandwidth tax is not a fixed property of poverty. It is a sliding scale. As financial pressure increases, cognitive capacity decreases, and this happens across the income distribution. The university lecturer whose mortgage payment has jumped by &#163;400 a month is experiencing a version of the same mechanism as the UC claimant waiting five weeks for a first payment. The severity differs enormously, but the underlying cognitive process is the same: financial worry captures attention, narrows the tunnel, and reduces the bandwidth available for everything else.</p><p>The difference is that the university lecturer probably still has enough total bandwidth to absorb the hit. They'll worry more, sleep a bit less, and make some poorer decisions at the margin. But they have a savings buffer, an employer with a sick pay scheme, a professional network that can help if things get worse. The UC claimant, who started with less bandwidth and faces a more demanding system, has no margin left. That is where the real damage accumulates. The bandwidth tax is regressive in the same way that a flat tax is regressive: it takes the same cognitive toll regardless of how much capacity you started with, which means it costs the poorest far more than the richest in relative terms.</p><p>There is something else the cost-of-living crisis did that we're only beginning to understand. It normalised financial anxiety for a huge segment of the population. When 82% of adults report financial worry, it stops being seen as a sign that something is wrong with the individual and starts being seen as the background condition of life.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> The danger is that we adjust to it. That the bandwidth tax becomes invisible because everyone is paying it, and we stop noticing the cognitive impairment because it has become the baseline. A society that is collectively operating with reduced cognitive bandwidth will not make good collective decisions. The irony should not be lost: the thing that prevents good thinking about financial policy is the same financial pressure that the policy should address.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Designing for depleted minds</h2><p>There's a separate scientific debate that feeds into all of this, and it's about whether self-control is a depletable resource. For years, the concept of "ego depletion" dominated psychology. The idea, advanced by Roy Baumeister and others, was that willpower works like a muscle: use it on one task and you have less available for the next.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> This would mean that people facing constant financial decisions are literally using up their capacity for self-control, leaving none for the long-term thinking that financial wellbeing requires.</p><p>The problem is that ego depletion has not replicated well. A major meta-analysis involving 2,141 participants found essentially no effect, and a subsequent multi-lab replication with 3,531 participants reached the same conclusion.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> The clean version of the story, where self-control is a finite fuel tank that financial pressure empties, is probably wrong. This matters because the ego depletion model was enormously influential in behavioural policy for over a decade. If the model is flawed, the policies built on it need rethinking too.</p><p>But this doesn't rescue the "poor decisions are just poor character" argument. What the scarcity research shows is something different from ego depletion. It's not that willpower runs out. It's that attention gets captured. The tunnel effect doesn't require a depleting resource. It requires a dominating concern. Financial scarcity dominates attention the way a loud noise dominates a conversation. You don't need to invoke willpower at all. The mechanism is attentional, not volitional. This is an important distinction because it changes what kind of intervention might help.</p><p>If the problem were willpower, the solution might be to simplify choices or reduce temptation (which is essentially what "nudge" policies try to do). Nudge theory, popularised by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, has been hugely influential in UK policy since the formation of the Behavioural Insights Team in 2010.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Default options, simplified forms, and strategic framing have all been deployed to help people make better choices. And they've had some successes, pension auto-enrolment being the most cited. But if the underlying problem is attentional capture by financial scarcity, nudges can only do so much. You can redesign the choice architecture all you like, but if someone's attention is locked on the electricity bill that's due on Friday, the redesigned form still won't get read. The nudge assumes you have the bandwidth to notice it. That's a questionable assumption when directed at people whose bandwidth is already fully committed to staying afloat.</p><p>The solution, according to scarcity theory, is to reduce the source of capture itself: the financial pressure. This is a very different policy prescription from "help people make better choices." It says the choices aren't really the problem. The context is the problem.</p><p>Some practical examples make this concrete. Automatic enrolment into workplace pensions works partly because it removes a decision from the bandwidth queue. You don't have to research pension providers, compare fees, calculate contribution rates, and fill in forms. You're just in. The participation rate jumped from 55% to over 90% after auto-enrolment was introduced in the UK.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> That is a bandwidth-saving design. It works because it asks nothing of the person at the moment of maximum bandwidth pressure (starting a new job, managing new expenses) and lets inertia do the work.</p><p>The five-week UC wait is a bandwidth-destroying design. It creates a financial emergency for every new claimant, which consumes cognitive resources at exactly the moment they need them most to comply with the system's requirements.</p><p>The lesson from scarcity research is not that poor people can't think. That framing would be patronising and wrong. It's that poverty creates conditions that make thinking harder for everyone, and that systems can either amplify or reduce that effect. Place a billionaire in a system that requires them to log in daily, calculate variable taper rates, and navigate a 50-page online portal while waiting five weeks with no income, and their cognitive performance would suffer too. The bandwidth tax is about context, not capability. The current welfare architecture in Britain mostly amplifies it.</p><p>Consider what a bandwidth-conscious design might look like. Payments would arrive quickly, ideally within days of a claim. Scotland's pilot of the Scottish Child Payment, which processes applications and pays out within a matter of days, shows this is administratively possible.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> The compliance requirements would be minimal during the initial period, when cognitive resources are most strained. Taper rates would be simple enough to calculate without a spreadsheet. Communications would be short, clear, and written for someone who is stressed and distracted, because that is exactly who will be reading them.</p><p>None of this is radical. It's basic user-centred design applied to a system that affects millions of lives. The private sector has understood this for years. Technology companies spend billions optimising their products for cognitive ease: reducing friction, simplifying choices, making the next step obvious. Amazon's one-click purchase exists because every additional step in a checkout process causes a percentage of customers to abandon their basket.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> The welfare system, which serves people with far less cognitive bandwidth than the average Amazon customer, imposes more friction, more complexity, and more penalties for confusion. If a private company designed an app this way, it would go out of business. But the welfare system doesn't face competition, so its users absorb the cost.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What this means for you</h2><p>The bandwidth tax is something I suspect most readers will recognise, even if they've never been anywhere near a benefits office. If you've ever had a month where money was tight and found yourself unable to concentrate on anything else, unable to make decisions you'd normally handle without thinking, unable to plan beyond next week, you've felt a mild version of what Mullainathan and Shafir described. The fog that descends when the bank balance drops. The way everything else in your life seems to go slightly wrong at the same time, not because the universe is cruel but because you don't have the mental bandwidth to manage it all.</p><p>The research doesn't say you're broken. It says your brain is doing what brains do under scarcity: narrowing focus, conserving resources, prioritising the immediate threat. That's a survival mechanism, and it works well for acute dangers. Run from the lion, worry about dinner later. The problem is that modern financial pressure is chronic, not acute. The mortgage payment comes every month. The energy bill comes every quarter. The UC assessment period rolls around again before you've recovered from the last one. The tunnel never fully opens up.</p><p>There are some practical things worth knowing. First, if you're making a big financial decision during a period of high stress, you are probably operating with reduced bandwidth. That doesn't mean you shouldn't decide. It means you should be aware that your cognitive resources are stretched and, where possible, delay decisions that can wait. Sleep on it is not just folk wisdom. It is bandwidth management. If you can't delay, find someone to think alongside you, a friend, a family member, a free debt adviser at a charity like StepChange or Citizens Advice. Two minds in the tunnel see more than one.</p><p>Second, the complexity of financial products is not neutral. Every unnecessary form, every baffling fee structure, every 47-page terms-and-conditions document is a bandwidth cost. It falls heaviest on the people who can least afford it. If you're struggling to understand a financial product, the problem may not be your financial literacy. It may be that the product was designed without any consideration for the cognitive state of the person using it. The FCA's Consumer Duty, introduced in 2023, requires firms to ensure their products deliver good outcomes for customers. Whether this standard will be applied to cognitive accessibility remains to be seen, but the principle is right.</p><p>Third, be wary of judgements about other people's financial decisions. The payday loan customer, the person who didn't switch energy provider, the parent who bought the slightly more expensive school shoes because they couldn't face comparing four websites while managing three children after a ten-hour shift. These are not failures of character. They are predictable outcomes of the bandwidth tax. If you've never experienced the tunnel, you cannot know what it's like to make decisions from inside it.</p><p>The broader point is political as well as personal. Systems that are designed for people with abundant cognitive resources will fail people who don't have them, and then blame those people for the failure. Scarcity research suggests we should flip that logic: design for the most depleted user, and the system will work better for everyone. We do this for physical accessibility. Ramps help wheelchair users, but they also help parents with pushchairs and delivery drivers with trolleys. Cognitive accessibility works the same way. Simpler forms help the bandwidth-depleted, but they also help everyone else who would rather not spend forty minutes on a task that should take five.</p><p>The bandwidth tax is real. The exact size of it is debated, and honest researchers disagree about the magnitude. But the direction is clear. Financial pressure reduces the cognitive resources available for dealing with financial pressure. That is a trap, and the way out of it is not to tell people to try harder. It's to stop building systems that make the trap deeper.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>The mall study lasted an afternoon. For millions of people in Britain, the experiment never ends.</p></div><p>Think back to those shoppers in the New Jersey mall. The ones who were told their car repair would cost $1,500 performed measurably worse on a cognitive test that had nothing to do with cars or money. They hadn't lost anything. They had merely contemplated a financial problem. Now multiply that by every bill, every rent payment, every energy price notification, sustained not for the duration of a psychology experiment but for months and years. The mall study lasted an afternoon. For millions of people in Britain, the experiment never ends.</p><div><hr></div><p>In the next part of this series, we'll look at what happens when the bandwidth tax meets something even more corrosive: the British reluctance to talk about money at all. Because the tunnel of scarcity doesn't just narrow what you can think about. It narrows what you're willing to say out loud. Thanks for reading.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-concealment-tax">The British silence</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mental Health Foundation (2023) Cost of Living and Mental Health Survey. 82% of UK adults worried mid-2023; 60% reported mental health effects.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mental Health Foundation (2023) Cost of Living and Mental Health Survey. 82% of adults affected; 60% reported mental health effects from rising costs.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Baumeister, R.F. &amp; Vohs, K.D. Willpower and self-control.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Hagger, M.S. et al. (2016) 'A Multilab Preregistered Replication of the Ego-Depletion Effect', Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(4), pp. 546-573 (2,141 participants, no effect); Vohs, K.D. et al. (2021) 'A Multi-Site Preregistered Paradigmatic Test', Psychological Science, 32(10), pp. 1566-1581 (3,531 participants, same result).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Thaler, R.H. &amp; Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge. Yale University Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Behavioural Insights Team / DWP (2012-2025) Auto-Enrolment Evaluation. Participation rose from 55% under opt-in to over 90% under opt-out default.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Scottish Government (2021) Scottish Child Payment delivery data. Applications processed within days, compared with weeks for equivalent UK-wide benefits.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Thaler, R.H. &amp; Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge. Yale University Press. Commercial application of friction-reduction principles in choice architecture.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[How scarcity eats your ability to think]]></title><description><![CDATA[The research showing that money worry consumes the mind, and the welfare system built as if it didn't]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/how-scarcity-eats-your-ability-to-think</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/how-scarcity-eats-your-ability-to-think</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 08:01:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2b4df211-fc9f-4051-8f30-20af21224fd2_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 13 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-new-storytellers">part 12</a> covered what narratives cost.</em></p><p>In 2013, a team of researchers led by Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir walked into a shopping mall in New Jersey and asked people how they would handle a car repair. Some were told the repair would cost $150. Others were told $1,500. After contemplating the scenario, everyone took a cognitive test.</p><p>Among shoppers with comfortable incomes, it made no difference. The $150 group and the $1,500 group scored about the same. But among those on lower incomes, the expensive repair scenario caused a measurable drop in cognitive performance. Just thinking about the $1,500 bill was enough to impair their reasoning, equivalent to roughly 13 IQ points.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> That is the difference between normal and borderline cognitive function. It is the gap between a good night's sleep and pulling an all-nighter. And nobody had actually presented them with a bill. It was hypothetical. The mere idea of an expense they couldn't easily cover was enough to consume cognitive resources needed for an entirely separate task.</p><p>The researchers, Anandi Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Jiaying Zhao, published their findings in Science. Then they went further. They travelled to the Villupuram district of Tamil Nadu in India and tested 464 sugarcane farmers before and after harvest.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> These farmers earned most of their annual income in one lump sum. Before harvest, they were relatively poor. After it, relatively comfortable. Same people, same education, same communities, same diets. The only thing that changed was how much money they had in the bank.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>Being poor doesn't just mean having less money. It means having less mind.</p></div><p>Before harvest, when money was tight, the farmers performed significantly worse on cognitive tasks. After harvest, performance recovered. The effect was not subtle. Mullainathan and Shafir called this "the bandwidth tax": the idea that financial pressure doesn't just cause stress, it actively reduces the cognitive resources available for everything else. Being poor, they argued, doesn't just mean having less money. It means having less mind.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>I remember reading about this study for the first time and feeling two things simultaneously: recognition and unease. Recognition because anyone who has been through a financially rough patch knows the fog. The way you can't concentrate at work because the direct debit is going to bounce. The way simple decisions, what to cook, which bill to pay first, whether to fill the car with petrol or just put in a tenner, become exhausting. And unease because the implications are uncomfortable. If poverty reduces cognitive capacity, then every policy that assumes poor people just need to make better choices is built on a false foundation.</p><p>This piece is about what happens when that bandwidth tax gets applied to an entire population. Because the financial crises of the past fifteen years, from the 2008 crash through austerity, the pandemic, and the cost-of-living crisis, haven't just made people poorer. They've made it harder for people to think clearly about being poorer. And the systems designed to help them have, in many cases, made it worse. We have built a welfare state that demands the most cognitive effort from the people who have the least cognitive bandwidth to spare.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The science of scarcity</h2><p>Mullainathan and Shafir laid out their broader theory in a 2013 book called Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. The central argument is that scarcity of any resource (money, time, social connection) captures attention in ways that are both useful and destructive.</p><p>The useful part is what they called "focus dividend."<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> When you're running low on something, your brain gets sharper about that specific thing. Deadline pressure makes you more productive in the final hours. Running low on cash makes you a more careful shopper, at least for the immediate purchase. Studies of low-income households have found they are often more precise about the cost of everyday goods than wealthier people, who can afford not to pay attention. There's a reason the person counting coins at the checkout knows the price of milk to the penny while the person behind them couldn't tell you within fifty pence.</p><p>But the destructive part is what they called "tunnelling."<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> When scarcity captures your attention, it narrows your cognitive field. You focus intensely on the immediate shortage and lose sight of everything outside the tunnel. A person scrambling to cover rent this Friday isn't failing to plan for retirement out of ignorance or laziness. They literally cannot allocate the mental bandwidth. The Friday problem has consumed it.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>The tunnel has walls, and those walls are made of immediacy.</p></div><p>This helps explain behaviours that are often attributed to poor character or bad choices. Why does someone take out a payday loan at 1,500% APR? Because at the moment of decision, the tunnel contains only one thing: the bill that's due tomorrow. The long-term cost of the loan exists outside the tunnel. It's not that they don't know the interest rate is terrible. It's that knowing and being able to act on that knowledge require bandwidth they don't have. The tunnel has walls, and those walls are made of immediacy.</p><p>Mullainathan and Shafir drew on a range of experimental evidence to support this. In one set of studies, they had participants play a game show where some were given generous time budgets and others tight ones. The time-scarce players focused more intently and performed well on individual questions, but they "borrowed" time from future rounds, leaving themselves even more pressed later. Scarcity creates its own momentum. The immediate focus comes at the cost of the larger game.</p><p>The analogy to financial behaviour is direct. Someone juggling multiple debts often pays intense attention to the most pressing one while accidentally ignoring one that then generates late fees, which worsens the overall position, which increases the pressure, which narrows the tunnel further. This is not irrationality. It is the entirely predictable behaviour of a mind operating under bandwidth constraints.</p><p>What makes scarcity theory powerful is that it reframes poverty as a cognitive state, not just an economic one. The standard policy assumption has been that if you give people information (about budgeting, about interest rates, about pension options) they will make better decisions. Financial literacy programmes are built on this assumption. Annamaria Lusardi, one of the leading researchers in financial education, has noted that knowledge alone is often insufficient.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> When Stanford researchers tested narrative-based financial education alongside traditional fact-based approaches, they found that combining psychological awareness with practical knowledge was considerably more effective than knowledge alone. But if scarcity has already consumed the bandwidth needed to process that information, even good programmes can't work as intended. You're trying to run software on a machine that doesn't have enough memory.</p><p>The sugarcane farmer study brought this home with particular force. The same person, in the same village, with the same family and education, performed meaningfully worse on fluid intelligence tests when money was scarce. The effect size was comparable to losing a full night of sleep. And it wasn't about nutrition or physical exhaustion. The researchers controlled for caloric intake. The farmers weren't hungrier before harvest. They were poorer. That was enough.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png" width="1540" height="1155" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1155,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:87580,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Cognitive performance of Tamil Nadu farmers pre/post harvest&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Cognitive performance of Tamil Nadu farmers pre/post harvest" title="Cognitive performance of Tamil Nadu farmers pre/post harvest" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!axMY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffd0df606-819d-4fa1-90aa-5d7463ec2311_1540x1155.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Think about what that means for a country where, since 2010, real wages stagnated for the longest period since the Napoleonic Wars. Where household debt has risen steadily. Where the cost of housing has consumed an ever-larger share of income, with the average first-time buyer now spending over a third of their take-home pay on mortgage payments, and renters often paying more.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> The bandwidth tax is not an exotic concept relevant only to the very poorest. It is a description of what happens to cognitive function when financial pressure becomes the dominant feature of daily life. And for a growing number of British households across the income distribution, that is exactly what it has become.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The replication question</h2><p>Good science requires uncomfortable honesty, and the scarcity story has a complication. In 2021, a team led by Gavin O'Donnell attempted to replicate the mall experiment. They ran 20 pre-registered replications across multiple countries with samples roughly 2.5 times larger than the originals. Of their 18 key tests, only four produced statistically significant results.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> The headline finding, that contemplating expense scenarios impairs cognitive performance for low-income people, was weaker than the 2013 paper suggested.</p><p>This is worth sitting with. It doesn't mean Mani and colleagues were wrong, but it does mean the effect is probably smaller and more variable than the original study implied. That's a common pattern in psychology: first studies, often with small samples, tend to overestimate effect sizes. Replications bring them back toward something more modest. The "13 IQ points" figure, which made for excellent headlines, may be closer to the upper bound of the effect than the average.</p><p>The original authors pushed back. In a 2023 response, Jiaying Zhao and colleagues argued that O'Donnell's methodology differed in important ways.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> The scenarios were presented differently. The cognitive measures weren't identical. The populations differed. And critically, running replications during a pandemic, when everyone was under financial stress, may have compressed the gap between income groups. If even comfortable-income participants were worried about money in 2020 and 2021, the differential effect would shrink. You can't measure the cognitive impact of financial worry on low-income people versus high-income people if everyone is worried about money.</p><p>Both sides have reasonable points. This is what real scientific debate looks like, and it's worth paying attention to because the policy stakes are high. If the bandwidth effect is as large as the original study suggested, it's an argument for radical redesign of welfare systems. If it's smaller and more context-dependent, the argument shifts toward more targeted interventions, but it doesn't disappear. Even a modest cognitive cost, if it's imposed on millions of people simultaneously, has enormous aggregate consequences.</p><p>What we can say with confidence is this: financial worry occupies cognitive resources. The exact magnitude is debated, but the direction is not. Multiple streams of evidence converge on the same basic finding. Pierrette Butterworth and colleagues, working with 431 adults in an Australian longitudinal study, found that financial hardship was associated with smaller hippocampal and amygdalar volumes.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a> These are brain structures involved in memory, emotional regulation, and stress processing. The relationship held even after controlling for depression and other factors. This is not a self-report survey about feeling stressed. It is structural brain imaging showing measurable differences in the tissue associated with cognitive function.</p><p>Butterworth's neuroimaging work suggests the bandwidth tax isn't just metaphorical. Chronic financial pressure appears to leave physical traces in the brain. Whether the mall experiment perfectly captures that process is a methodological debate. Whether poverty makes thinking harder is not really in dispute among researchers working in this area. The question is what we do with that knowledge.</p><p>I find this kind of scientific disagreement more useful than a clean, tidy result would be. It would be easy to say "poverty costs you 13 IQ points" and leave it there. A newspaper would print that headline. A politician would cite it in a speech. But the real picture is messier. The effect exists, it varies across contexts and populations, and the original estimate was probably too precise. That's how science actually works, when it's working well. The danger is in treating either the original finding or the replication critique as the final word. The truth is somewhere in the middle, which is exactly where scientific understanding usually lives after the first wave of excitement fades.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The machine that eats bandwidth</h2><p>If financial pressure taxes cognitive bandwidth, then the design of the welfare system is a question of cognitive architecture. And in Britain, the system that millions of people rely on was redesigned in the 2010s in ways that appear to increase the bandwidth cost rather than reduce it.</p><p>Universal Credit, the UK's flagship welfare reform, merged six separate benefits into one monthly payment. The stated aim was simplification. The previous system was admittedly a mess: Housing Benefit, Income Support, Jobseeker's Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Working Tax Credit, and Child Tax Credit all had separate application processes, different assessment criteria, and different payment schedules. Combining them into a single payment made conceptual sense. In practice, it introduced a series of design features that collectively impose enormous cognitive demands on claimants.</p><p>Start with the five-week wait. New claimants receive no payment for at least five weeks after applying. The reason is structural: UC is assessed and paid monthly in arrears, so the first assessment period must pass before a payment can be calculated.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a> For someone who has just lost their job or left a relationship, though, five weeks without income is not a period of administrative processing. It is a crisis. During that wait, people must make dozens of urgent decisions about which bills to pay, which to defer, which debts to take on to bridge the gap. Each decision consumes bandwidth.</p><p>The Trussell Trust reported distributing 3.12 million emergency food parcels in 2023-24, with 1.14 million going to children. Food bank use has tracked UC rollout areas consistently, and a significant proportion of referrals cite the gap between application and first payment as the trigger.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-12" href="#footnote-12" target="_self">12</a> An advance payment is available, but it is a loan, repaid through deductions of up to 25% from subsequent payments for the next 24 months.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-13" href="#footnote-13" target="_self">13</a> So the solution to the five-week bandwidth crisis creates a further bandwidth drain: reduced payments for two years, with the deduction calculated automatically and often not well understood by claimants.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png" width="1540" height="1617" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1617,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:159809,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;bandwidth cost of Universal Credit&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="bandwidth cost of Universal Credit" title="bandwidth cost of Universal Credit" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oa1g!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe989d477-02cb-4172-b4c8-a64b8717c521_1540x1617.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Then there's conditionality. UC claimants must demonstrate they are looking for work by logging into an online journal, recording their job search activities, and attending appointments at the jobcentre. Missing a journal entry or arriving late to an appointment can trigger a sanction: a reduction or complete suspension of payment for a period that can extend to months.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-14" href="#footnote-14" target="_self">14</a> The system is designed around compliance, and compliance requires sustained cognitive engagement with an online platform that many claimants find unintuitive.</p><p>For someone in the tunnel of financial scarcity, this is exactly the wrong demand. They are being asked to maintain a complex administrative routine at the precise moment their bandwidth is most depleted. It is like asking someone who hasn't slept in 36 hours to fill out a detailed form, then penalising them for mistakes.</p><p>The system is also digital by default. Claims must be made online, managed through an online portal, and updated digitally. This was presented as modernisation, and for many claimants it works adequately. But for those without reliable internet access, without digital literacy, or without the cognitive bandwidth to engage with another online system, it adds a layer of difficulty that didn't exist with the old paper-based process. A 2019 National Audit Office report noted that some claimants were spending an average of eight hours a week managing their UC claim.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-15" href="#footnote-15" target="_self">15</a> That is a full working day devoted to navigating the system that is supposed to help you find work.</p><p>The marginal deduction rate compounds all of this. For every pound earned through work, UC claimants lose up to 55 pence of their benefit. Add council tax reduction withdrawal and other tapers, and the effective rate can reach 75 pence per pound. This means claimants face a calculation problem that would challenge an accountant: how much will I actually take home if I work an extra shift? The answer requires understanding taper rates, earnings thresholds, and assessment periods. These calculations change monthly because UC is assessed on a monthly cycle, and earnings that fall in different assessment periods produce different payment amounts. A claimant paid weekly can see their UC payment fluctuate significantly from month to month depending on whether four or five paydays fall within the assessment period.</p><p>Sophie Wickham and colleagues published a study in 2020 that tracked mental health outcomes across 197,111 observations of 52,187 people. They found that the introduction of Universal Credit was associated with a 6.57 percentage point increase in the prevalence of psychological distress, and a 6.04 percentage point increase in the proportion reporting that their condition limited daily activities.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-16" href="#footnote-16" target="_self">16</a> The effects were concentrated among people in the middle of the income distribution, exactly those who might be expected to interact most actively with the system's requirements. They were not the poorest, who might have been on benefits under the old system too. They were people newly encountering the system during a period of financial transition.</p><p>This matters because it suggests the problem isn't just poverty itself but the cognitive architecture built around poverty. A system that genuinely aimed to reduce the bandwidth tax would front-load payments, simplify compliance, and minimise the number of decisions claimants must make under pressure. Universal Credit does the opposite in several respects.</p><p>StepChange, the debt charity, reported in their 2024 statistics yearbook that more than 50% of their clients had waited over a year before seeking help. Sixty per cent were in employment. Twenty-seven per cent were single parents, a fourfold overrepresentation relative to the general population.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-17" href="#footnote-17" target="_self">17</a> These numbers describe people who are working, who are trying, and who are still sinking. The bandwidth tax helps explain why: making good financial decisions requires cognitive resources that their circumstances have already consumed. Asking someone to comparison-shop for a better energy deal while they are simultaneously managing a UC claim, working variable hours, and trying to ensure their children eat properly is not a reasonable expectation. It is a demand made by people who have never experienced the tunnel.</p><div><hr></div><p>That is the machine as it was built. The tax it collects did not stay confined to the benefits system: in the autumn of 2022, inflation reached 11% and the bandwidth tax reached almost everyone. In the next part: what the cost-of-living squeeze did to the national attention span, and what a system designed for depleted minds would look like. Thanks for reading.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/designing-for-depleted-minds">Designing for depleted minds</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mullainathan and Shafir mall experiment. Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E. &amp; Zhao, J. (2013) Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function. Science, 341(6149), pp. 976-980.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Sugarcane farmer study. Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E. &amp; Zhao, J. (2013) 'Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function', Science, 341(6149), pp. 976-980. Villupuram district, Tamil Nadu; 464 farmers tested before and after harvest.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mullainathan, S. &amp; Shafir, E. (2013) Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. Allen Lane.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mullainathan, S. &amp; Shafir, E. (2013) Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. Allen Lane. Concept of the 'focus dividend' where scarcity sharpens attention on immediate needs.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mullainathan, S. &amp; Shafir, E. (2013) Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. Allen Lane. Tunnelling describes how scarcity narrows cognitive bandwidth.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Lusardi, A. Narrative-based education more effective than fact-based alone.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>ONS / UK Finance (2024) mortgage affordability data. Average first-time buyer mortgage payments exceed one-third of take-home pay.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>O'Donnell, G. et al. (2021) 'Financial Scarcity and Cognitive Function: A Pre-registered Replication', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 20 replications with 2.5 times larger samples; 4 of 18 results significant.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Zhao, J. et al. (2023) 'Response to O'Donnell et al.: Methodological Differences and Pandemic Context'. Response defending original scarcity findings; pandemic compressed income group differences.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Butterworth, P. et al. (2012) Reduced brain volume and financial hardship. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(5), pp. 563-568.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>National Audit Office (2019) 'Universal Credit: Rolling Out to All Claimants'. UC is assessed and paid monthly in arrears, creating a minimum five-week wait for new claimants between application and first payment.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-12" href="#footnote-anchor-12" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">12</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Trussell Trust (2024) End of Year Statistics 2023-24. 3.12 million emergency food parcels in 2023-24; gap between application and first payment cited as a key driver.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-13" href="#footnote-anchor-13" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">13</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>DWP (2018) Universal Credit advance payment policy. Deductions of up to 25% of standard allowance over 24-month repayment period.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-14" href="#footnote-anchor-14" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">14</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>DWP (2023) Universal Credit: Conditionality and Sanctions Guidance; House of Commons Library (2022) CDP-2022-0230. Claimants must maintain an online journal, record job search activities, and attend jobcentre appointments. Missing entries or late attendance can trigger sanctions: payment reductions lasting from 7 days to 6 months.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-15" href="#footnote-anchor-15" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">15</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>National Audit Office (2019) 'Universal Credit: Rolling Out to All Claimants'. Claimants reported averaging 8 hours per week managing their claims.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-16" href="#footnote-anchor-16" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">16</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Wickham, S. et al. (2020) Mental health in Universal Credit. The Lancet Psychiatry, 7(8).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-17" href="#footnote-anchor-17" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">17</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>StepChange (2024) Statistics Yearbook. 60% of clients in employment; 27% single parents (versus 7% of the general population).</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The new storytellers]]></title><description><![CDATA[Financial advice moved from the bank branch to the ring light, and the stories got more expensive]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-new-storytellers</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-new-storytellers</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 07:01:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/516355af-9e0a-4870-9d99-2ab49ffb9fc8_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 12 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-stories-we-tell-ourselves">part 11</a> covered narratives as epidemics.</em></p><p>Robert Shiller has argued that financial narratives spread through populations the way epidemics do. The psychoanalyst David Tuckett calls the investment stories that feel, to the person inside them, like a love affair "phantastic objects". This part is about who gets to tell those stories now.</p><h2>The new storytellers</h2><p>In 2023, Barclays published research on the influence of financial content creators on social media.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> The findings were striking. Four in ten young people were turning to social media for investment guidance. Among Generation Z, 46 per cent used TikTok specifically for financial advice. Just under half, 48 per cent, said they felt pressure to act quickly on social media advice, double the national average. And 42 per cent of those who had acted on social media investment content admitted to losing money as a result.</p><p>The trust figures were the most revealing. Among young followers of financial influencers, 74 per cent said they trusted the advice. More than half, 53 per cent, did not always verify the reliability of what they were told. And 58 per cent said they were more inclined to follow tips from influencers who appeared to have made a lot of money, which is to say, influencers who were themselves the most visible beneficiaries of the narrative they were promoting.</p><p>The FCA has recognised the problem, slowly. In March 2024, it published guidance on financial promotions via social media.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> In 2025, it led an international crackdown involving nine regulators. In the UK alone, the operation resulted in three arrests, criminal proceedings against three people, interviews with twenty finfluencers under caution, and fifty warning alerts.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> The FCA's own data showed that 62 per cent of 18-to-29-year-olds followed financial influencers, and that nine in ten of those followers said their financial behaviour had been influenced as a result.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a></p><p>These numbers describe a structural shift in who tells financial stories and how those stories spread. A generation ago, the dominant financial narratives in Britain came from a small number of sources: broadsheet newspapers, television news, high-street bank branch managers, and financial advisers who were regulated and, in theory, accountable. The narratives could still be wrong, as the pre-2008 story about self-regulating markets demonstrated. But there was, at a minimum, a layer of institutional mediation between the story and the audience.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>Instead of a broker in a suit, it's someone in a ring light.</p></div><p>That layer has largely disappeared for younger investors. A 22-year-old considering their first investment is more likely to encounter financial advice on TikTok than in a newspaper. The adviser they follow may have no qualifications, no regulatory oversight, and a direct financial incentive to promote whatever they're promoting. The narrative structure is identical to what Tuckett described: a phantastic object, a story about easy returns that dissolves uncertainty and makes the world feel simple. The delivery mechanism is different. Instead of a broker in a suit, it's someone in a ring light. But the psychological function, the creation of a narrative that makes risk feel manageable and doubt feel unnecessary, is exactly the same.</p><p>What makes this different from previous eras of bad financial advice is the incentive structure. A traditional financial adviser who gave bad advice faced regulatory consequences, complaints to the ombudsman, potential lawsuits. A finfluencer who promotes a failing investment faces no consequences at all, provided they include a small disclaimer that is never read. Their incentive is to produce content that gets engagement, which means content that is exciting, emotionally compelling, and action-oriented. The most effective finfluencer content creates exactly the kind of phantastic object that Tuckett described: a story about easy, inevitable returns that dissolves the anxiety of uncertainty. The regulatory gap is not just a technical problem. It is a psychological one.</p><p>The issue is not that all finfluencer content is bad. Some of it is genuinely useful, particularly basic financial education for people who receive almost none through formal channels. The issue is that the regulatory and institutional structures that used to (imperfectly) filter financial narratives have been bypassed. The FCA can fine a regulated firm for misleading promotions. It has much weaker tools for addressing the viral spread of unregulated financial stories through social media. Put plainly: the narrative infrastructure of modern finance is unregulated, and the people most vulnerable to compelling stories are those with the least experience to judge them by.</p><p>Sarah Hoff and Catherine Happer's research, published in Journalism in 2023, looked at how the cost-of-living crisis was framed in the UK press.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Using keyphrase analysis drawing on Raymond Williams's concept of "keywords," they showed that the phrase "cost-of-living crisis" itself became a site of ideological struggle. The framing determined what was visible and what wasn't: energy company profits were covered differently from household budgets, government policy choices were presented as necessities rather than decisions, and the structural causes of rising costs received less attention than their immediate symptoms. The narrative shaped not just what people thought about the crisis, but what they thought the crisis was about. This is the key insight: narratives don't just distort information. They determine what counts as information in the first place. When the story is about household budgets, the relevant facts are food prices and energy bills. When the story is about corporate pricing power and energy market design, the relevant facts are profit margins and regulatory failures. Same crisis. Different narrative. Different facts. Different responses.</p><p>I think about Annamaria Lusardi's research on financial literacy here. Lusardi, who has spent decades studying how people understand money, has consistently found that knowledge alone is insufficient.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> People who score well on financial literacy tests still make decisions that look irrational from the outside, because decisions are made inside narrative frameworks, not outside them. Lusardi's more recent work, including studies at Stanford, suggests that combining factual financial knowledge with narrative and psychological self-awareness is more effective than either alone. People need to understand compound interest, yes. But they also need to understand why the story they're being told feels so compelling, and who benefits from their believing it.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The story changes</h2><p>There is a pattern in the narrative history of British financial crises that is worth naming plainly, even if it's uncomfortable.</p><p>When a crisis arrives, the initial narrative tends to be accurate. Banks caused the 2008 crash. The pandemic was not anyone's economic fault. The energy price spike of 2022 was driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and decades of insufficient investment in domestic energy. In the immediate aftermath, the public response matches the narrative: anger at banks, solidarity during lockdown, fury at energy companies.</p><p>Then the narrative shifts. And the shift follows a consistent direction: away from structural causes and toward individual responsibility. The 2008 crash becomes a story about people living beyond their means. The pandemic's economic aftermath becomes a story about workers not wanting to return to the office. The cost-of-living crisis becomes a story about household budgets and shopping habits, not about corporate pricing decisions or energy market design.</p><p>This is not a conspiracy. It doesn't require a secret meeting where powerful people decide to change the story. It happens because the people who benefit from the structural status quo have more access to media platforms, more resources for shaping public discourse, and more incentive to shift blame downward. Mullen's research showed this clearly: elite sources dominated the newspaper coverage, and the narrative reflected their perspective. The mechanism is not deliberate manipulation. It is the natural consequence of unequal access to the means of narrative production.</p><p>The cost of living crisis offered a particularly clear example. When energy prices rose sharply in 2022, the initial public reaction was directed at energy companies and, to some degree, at the government's failure to insulate the UK from global price shocks. But within months, the media narrative had fragmented. Coverage focused on how households could cut their bills: switching energy tariffs, eating less meat, turning the thermostat down. The framing implied that the crisis was something individuals needed to manage, not something the system had produced. Hoff and Happer's keyphrase analysis documented this shift: the phrase "cost-of-living crisis" simultaneously acknowledged systemic failure and directed attention toward individual coping.</p><p>I want to be careful not to overstate this. Media coverage of crises is not monolithic. There were journalists who consistently covered the structural dimensions of austerity and the cost-of-living crisis. There are editors who pushed against the prevailing narrative. The point is not that no one told the truth. The point is that the dominant narrative, the one that reached the most people and shaped the most behaviour, tended to follow the pattern: structural problem in, individual responsibility out.</p><p>And this matters for the psychology of financial crisis. When the dominant narrative says that a crisis is your problem to manage, rather than a systemic failure to address, it changes how people respond. Loss aversion hits differently when you believe the loss is your fault. Herding behaviour changes when the herd is being told to tighten its belt rather than demand structural change. The narrative doesn't just describe the crisis. It shapes the psychological experience of living through it.</p><p>This is why the narrative chapters of financial crises matter so much, and why they receive so much less attention than the economic chapters. The economic story of austerity can be told in numbers: spending cuts, benefit freezes, local authority budgets reduced by 40 per cent. The narrative story is harder to quantify, but it shaped how people experienced those numbers. Did they feel angry at a system that was failing them, or ashamed of their own inability to cope? The dominant narrative pushed toward shame, and shame is one of the most economically destructive emotions a person can feel.</p><p>Consider the specific case of pension decisions during the 2022 market downturn. UK pension holders, many of them approaching retirement, watched the value of their defined-contribution pots fall as interest rates rose and equity markets dropped. The narrative available to them, from media coverage, from their pension platforms, from the general culture, was about individual financial responsibility: are you in the right fund, have you diversified properly, should you move to a safer allocation? The narrative that their pension design itself might be the problem, that a system in which individual retirees bear all the investment risk during market downturns is a policy choice rather than a law of nature, was much harder to find. The story shaped the response, and the response reinforced the story.</p><p>There's something else at work in the specific British context, something that connects the narrative question to herding behaviour. Britain has a particular cultural relationship with financial narratives: a tendency to adopt them late, hold them tightly, and abandon them violently. The property narrative is the clearest example. The story that house prices always rise became so embedded in British culture that it functioned less like an investment thesis and more like a national religion. When that narrative was threatened in 2008, the response was not proportionate adjustment but something closer to the grief that Tuckett described. And when the narrative reasserted itself, as it did within a few years of the crash, the relief was palpable. The story was back. Normal service had resumed. The possibility that the story itself was the problem was too uncomfortable to entertain.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What narratives cost</h2><p>The financial cost of narrative contagion is measurable, at least in part. The Investment Association fund flow data shows &#163;18.4 billion flowing into equity funds during the 2020-21 rally and &#163;18.2 billion flowing out in 2022.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> Behind those numbers is a narrative: the rally narrative said stocks were going up and you'd be foolish to miss it; the crash narrative said get out while you still can. Each narrative was emotionally compelling and financially destructive.</p><p>But the deeper cost is harder to measure. It is the cost of living inside a story that tells you the problem is you.</p><p>When the austerity narrative became dominant after 2010, it didn't just change government policy. It changed how millions of people understood their own financial difficulties. If the story says that the country needs to live within its means, then your individual struggle to pay rent or heat your home becomes a version of the same problem: you, too, need to live within your means. The structural causes, frozen wages, rising housing costs, cuts to public services, retreat into the background. What remains is a story about personal failure, and that story has psychological consequences.</p><p>The Money and Mental Health Policy Institute found in 2016, in the largest study of its kind with roughly 5,500 respondents, that 93 per cent of people with mental health conditions spent more when they were unwell, and 92 per cent found financial decisions harder.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> Seventy-four per cent delayed paying bills. Seventy-one per cent avoided creditors. These are not signs of irresponsibility. They are symptoms of a feedback loop in which financial stress worsens mental health, and worsened mental health impairs financial decision-making. The narrative of individual responsibility obscures this loop, because acknowledging it would require acknowledging that the system, not the person, needs to change.</p><p>The Trussell Trust reported that in the 2023-24 financial year, it distributed a record 3.12 million emergency food parcels, of which 1.14 million went to children.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> StepChange, the debt charity, reported in 2024 that over half of their clients had waited more than a year before seeking help.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a> Sixty per cent were in employment. Twenty-seven per cent were single parents, a group that makes up only 7 per cent of the UK population but is four times overrepresented among people in serious financial difficulty. These numbers don't describe individual failure. They describe a system producing predictable outcomes that the dominant narrative insists on framing as personal problems. And the narrative matters because it determines policy. If the story says that food bank usage is caused by poor household budgeting, the policy response is financial education. If the story says that food bank usage is caused by benefit levels being too low to live on, the policy response is different. The narrative isn't neutral. It has consequences.</p><p>Peter Butterworth and colleagues showed in a 2012 study in the journal Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience that financial hardship was associated with smaller hippocampal and amygdalar volumes, brain structures involved in memory and emotional processing.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a> The study examined 431 middle-aged adults using structural MRI. This is not a metaphor for financial stress damaging the brain. It is a literal, measurable observation. Chronic financial hardship corresponds to structural differences in the brain regions that govern how people process risk, remember past experiences, and regulate emotional responses to threats. The narrative that says "make better decisions" is being directed at people whose capacity for decision-making has been physically affected by the conditions the narrative ignores.</p><p>I keep returning to a question that Tuckett's work raises by implication, even if he doesn't ask it directly. If investors form phantastic object relationships with investments, treating them as sources of psychological safety rather than financial instruments, do ordinary people form similar relationships with economic narratives? Do they hold onto the story that the economy is fundamentally fair, that hard work leads to security, that the system works, in the same way that a dot-com investor held onto a failing stock? Because if they do, then the shattering of that narrative during a crisis is not just an intellectual adjustment. It is a psychological loss, as real and as painful as the financial loss that accompanies it. And the people promoting a new, misleading narrative (austerity as household budgeting, the cost-of-living crisis as a personal responsibility) are not just distorting the facts. They are offering a replacement phantastic object, a simpler story that makes the world feel manageable again, even if the story is wrong.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What this means</h2><p>Financial narratives are not an optional layer on top of economic reality. They are part of the reality. They determine which risks people notice and which they ignore. They determine whether a crisis feels like a shared problem or a personal failure. They determine, in the end, how much pain people are willing to endure and who they blame when things go wrong.</p><p>The regulatory system treats narratives as outside its scope. The FCA regulates individual claims, specific promises, measurable misleading statements. It does not regulate the background narrative that tells young people crypto is a path to wealth, or the dominant media framing that turns structural economic problems into stories about individual budgeting. The tools don't exist, and even if they did, regulating stories would raise obvious questions about free speech and state control of information. I don't have an easy answer to this. I'm not sure there is one.</p><p>But I think the first step is to stop pretending that narratives are separate from economics. Every part of this series deals with a psychological mechanism, loss aversion, herding, cognitive load, shame, that the current system treats as an individual problem. The narratives that surround those mechanisms determine whether they cause personal distress or collective action, whether they produce atomised anxiety or shared political demands for change.</p><p>Shiller was right that narratives spread like epidemics. But epidemics don't happen in a vacuum. They happen in populations with specific vulnerabilities, in environments that enable transmission, and they affect some people far more severely than others. Financial narratives spread fastest among people with the least information and the fewest institutional protections. They are amplified by platforms with no accountability and consumed by people with no training in evaluating them. The information asymmetry that Tuckett described between fund managers and markets has a parallel between ordinary people and the narratives about money that saturate their lives.</p><p>Newton lost a fortune in the South Sea Bubble because he fell in love with a story. Three hundred years later, millions of people are still falling in love with stories about money, property, crypto, the promise that the economy works for everyone, the promise that austerity is just belt-tightening. Some of these stories are told by finfluencers in ring lights. Some are told by prime ministers at dispatch boxes. The delivery mechanism varies. The psychological function is the same: a phantastic object, a story that makes the uncertain feel certain and the risky feel safe. Understanding this, truly understanding it, is the first step toward building an economy that doesn't depend on people believing in fairy tales.</p><p>But understanding is not enough on its own.</p><p>David Tuckett's fund managers, the ones he interviewed in 2006, did not think they were in the grip of a story. They thought they were making rational decisions based on available evidence. The phantastic object does not announce itself. It feels like clear thinking. It feels like confidence. It feels, as Tuckett described, like being in love. That is what makes financial narratives so dangerous, and so resistant to correction. You cannot argue someone out of a love affair. You can only wait for the loss that follows, and hope that next time, they recognise the feeling for what it is.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png" width="1540" height="1232" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1232,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:95462,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Sources of financial advice by age group&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Sources of financial advice by age group" title="Sources of financial advice by age group" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YCLp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fad2485aa-5281-41f7-8aa9-16715b77d589_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png" width="1540" height="1232" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1232,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:69062,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Pull quote, narratives determine what information gets attention&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Pull quote, narratives determine what information gets attention" title="Pull quote, narratives determine what information gets attention" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1y8D!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94d3807a-6c55-40d8-a82a-6a72c499a5a4_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><p>The stories are only half of the problem, because believing a bad story takes so little effort and checking it takes so much. In the next part, what scarcity does to the thinking mind, and why the people with the least money end up paying a cognitive tax on top of everything else. More soon.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/how-scarcity-eats-your-ability-to-think">The bandwidth tax</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Barclays (2023) Finfluencer Trust Survey. 46% of Gen Z used TikTok for financial advice; 42% reported losing money following finfluencer tips.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>FCA (2024) Guidance on Financial Promotions on Social Media, March 2024.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>FCA (2025) International Finfluencer Crackdown. Nine regulators coordinated; 3 UK arrests; 20 finfluencers interviewed under caution; 50 warning alerts issued.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>FCA / Barclays (2023) research. 62% of 18-29 year-olds follow financial influencers on social media.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Hoff, S. &amp; Happer, C. (2023) Keywords of cost-of-living crisis. Journalism, 24(11).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Lusardi, A. &amp; Tufano, P. (2015) Debt literacy, financial experiences, and overindebtedness. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 14(4), pp. 332-368.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Investment Association (2022) Fund flow data. GBP 18.4 billion equity inflows 2020-21; GBP 18.2 billion outflows 2022.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Money and Mental Health Policy Institute (2016) Money on Your Mind. 5,500 respondents; 93% spent more when unwell; 92% found decisions harder.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Trussell Trust (2024) End of Year Statistics 2023-24. 3.12 million emergency food parcels distributed; 1.14 million to children.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>StepChange (2024) Statistics Yearbook. More than half of clients waited over a year before seeking debt advice.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Butterworth, P. et al. (2012) Financial hardship and brain structure. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(5), pp. 563-568.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The stories we tell ourselves]]></title><description><![CDATA[How financial narratives spread, and how Britain's story about the crash got rewritten in eighteen months]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-stories-we-tell-ourselves</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-stories-we-tell-ourselves</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 07:01:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2b52ef76-04c8-4eae-845d-9f9cbb4776c1_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 11 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/furlough-the-partial-restoration">part 10</a> covered furlough, and what rebuilding trust looks like.</em></p><h3>Financial narratives and how they spread</h3><p>In 2006, David Tuckett, a psychoanalyst at University College London, began interviewing fund managers. Not about their portfolios or their risk models. About their feelings.</p><p>Tuckett had spent his career studying unconscious mental processes, the kind of work that happens in a consulting room, not on a trading floor. But something about the dot-com crash and its aftermath had drawn him toward finance. Smart people, experienced people, people paid enormous sums specifically for their judgement, had held onto investments that were plainly collapsing. They held on past the point where any rational analysis justified it. They held on past the point where their own colleagues were telling them to sell. And when Tuckett asked them why, they didn't talk about valuations or market signals. They talked about belief.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>The phantastic object doesn't just look like a good investment. It feels, at a deep psychological level, like a love affair.</p></div><p>In a 2008 paper with Richard Taffler in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Tuckett gave this phenomenon a name.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> He called the objects of investment desire "phantastic objects": mental representations of something that, in an imagined scene, fulfils the protagonist's deepest wishes. A phantastic object promises to break the usual rules. It makes the impossible seem possible. It turns uncertainty into certainty and risk into reward. And critically, while the investor is in the grip of it, doubt and anxiety disappear. The phantastic object doesn't just look like a good investment. It feels, at a deep psychological level, like a love affair.</p><p>Tuckett's insight was that this isn't a metaphor. Investors don't just buy assets. They form emotional relationships with them. During the dot-com bubble, the phantastic object was the internet itself, not any particular company but the idea that a new technology had permanently changed the rules of business. Companies added ".com" to their names and saw their share prices jump, a phenomenon documented by Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau in 2001, regardless of whether they had any meaningful internet business.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> The suffix was a talisman. It signalled membership of the phantastic narrative.</p><p>When the narrative collapsed, as it did in 2000, the response was not proportionate reassessment. It was grief. Tuckett described investors moving through something that looked a lot like the stages of loss: denial, anger, a period of painful reckoning. The financial losses were bad enough. The psychological loss, the shattering of a narrative that had made the world feel predictable and rewarding, was in some ways worse. People don't just lose money when a bubble pops. They lose a story about themselves and their future.</p><p>This post, and the next in the series, are about those stories. About how financial narratives form, how they spread, why they're so hard to resist, and what happens to a country when the dominant narrative about its economy shifts beneath people's feet. The story of Britain since 2008 is, among other things, a story about stories: about who gets to tell them, how they spread, and who pays the price when they turn out to be wrong.</p><p>And it's about a shift that's happened in the last decade that changes the dynamics entirely. For most of the twentieth century, financial narratives were mediated by institutions: newspapers, regulators, professional advisers. Those institutions were imperfect, often captured by the interests they were supposed to scrutinise. But they existed. What's happened since 2015 or so is the collapse of that mediating layer for large sections of the population. The financial stories that reach a 24-year-old opening their first stocks-and-shares ISA are now more likely to come from someone with a TikTok account than from anyone with a regulatory obligation to tell the truth. That changes everything about how narratives form, how fast they spread, and how much damage they do.</p><div><hr></div><h2>How stories drive economies</h2><p>In 2019, the economist Robert Shiller published Narrative Economics, a book that took an observation most economists treated as peripheral and placed it at the centre of the discipline.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Shiller's argument was that economic fluctuations are driven, to a significant degree, by the stories people tell each other. Not by data alone, not by policy announcements alone, but by narratives that spread through populations the way diseases spread through bodies.</p><p>Shiller borrowed the SIR model from epidemiology to describe the process.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> In disease modelling, a population is divided into three groups: susceptibles (people who haven't encountered the disease), infectives (people who are carrying it and can transmit it), and recovereds (people who've had it and moved on). A narrative, like a virus, requires contact to spread. A person needs to hear the story from enough sources, with enough conviction, before they become "infected" and begin retelling it. When the contagion rate exceeds the recovery rate, the story goes viral. When it drops below, the narrative fades. The model is imperfect, as all models are. But it captures something that standard economics misses entirely: the idea that stories have their own transmission dynamics, and that those dynamics operate independently of whether the stories are true.</p><p>The housing bubble of the mid-2000s was, in Shiller's analysis, a narrative epidemic.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> The story was simple: house prices always go up, property is the safest investment, and anyone who doesn't get on the ladder is a fool. In the United States, the narrative was amplified by television shows like Flip That House, which made property speculation look easy and glamorous. In Britain, the same story took a slightly different form, filtered through a culture where property ownership is tied to identity and social standing in ways that go well beyond economics. But the underlying narrative structure was identical: a story about inevitable returns that made risk invisible.</p><p>What made the narrative powerful was not that it was false (house prices had, in fact, risen for years) but that it was incomplete. It left out the conditions under which the trend could reverse. It left out the leverage that amplified both gains and losses. And it left out the fact that the people most enthusiastically spreading the story, estate agents, mortgage brokers, property developers, had direct financial incentives to keep it going. The narrative spread because it felt true, because it was profitable for the people telling it, and because the evidence, right up until the moment it stopped being evidence, supported it.</p><p>George Akerlof and Shiller had laid the groundwork for this argument a decade earlier in Animal Spirits.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> They identified five forces that drive economic behaviour in ways that rational models can't explain: confidence, fairness, corruption, money illusion, and stories. The last of these, stories, was the one that connected all the others. Confidence is a story about the future. Fairness is a story about how costs and benefits should be distributed. Money illusion is a story about what numbers mean. Every economic decision is embedded in a narrative framework, and that framework shapes behaviour as powerfully as any interest rate or tax policy.</p><p>There's a moment in Shiller's book that I keep thinking about. He describes how, during the housing bubble, the narrative of inevitably rising prices was so widespread that it became, for many people, simply a fact about the world, like gravity. It wasn't experienced as a story at all. It was experienced as reality. And that, I think, is what makes narrative economics so different from the usual account of "irrational exuberance." The people buying overpriced houses in 2006 didn't think they were taking a gamble. They thought they were being sensible. The narrative had become so fully absorbed that it was invisible as a narrative. It was just how things worked.</p><p>I find Shiller's epidemic model useful but slightly too mechanical. Stories don't just spread through contact. They spread through trust. The financial adviser who tells you house prices will keep rising has a different credibility than the stranger on the internet saying the same thing. Or at least, they used to. One of the developments that makes the current moment different from anything Shiller analysed is the collapse of that credibility hierarchy. For now, the important point is simpler: economies run on stories, and when the story changes, behaviour changes with it, often faster and more violently than any economic model predicts.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The narrative that ate Britain</h2><p>In 2008, a story broke. A story that had been true for decades, or at least true enough, about financial markets as engines of prosperity, about deregulation as the path to growth, about Britain's place in a global economy powered by the City of London. The collapse of Northern Rock, the near-collapse of RBS and HBOS, the revelation that banks had been trading instruments they didn't understand, backed by assets they hadn't valued, guaranteed by models that didn't work: all of this shattered a narrative that had been running, largely unchallenged, since the late 1980s.</p><p>For a brief moment, the replacement narrative was clear. Banks had caused the crisis. Bankers had been reckless. The state had been forced to intervene with public money to prevent a complete collapse of the financial system. In October 2008, the UK government committed &#163;500 billion to a bank rescue package. RBS alone received &#163;45 billion of taxpayer money. The narrative was straightforward, and the public largely accepted it: banks broke it, the state fixed it, now the banks owe us.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>Then the narrative shifted. And the speed of the shift is the part that should bother you.</p></div><p>Then the narrative shifted. And the speed of the shift is the part that should bother you.</p><p>Within eighteen months, the dominant explanation for Britain's economic problems had moved from "the banks caused this" to "we spent too much." The facts hadn't changed. The bailout costs were the same. The banking failures were the same. The regulatory failures were the same. What changed was which version of the story got told, by whom, and through which channels.</p><p>Andrew Mullen, at Northumbria University, analysed 1,586 British newspaper articles published between 2008 and 2010. What he found, published in the journal Journalism in 2021, was that the political and economic elite dominated the sourcing of these articles, and that the issues and discourses featured reflected the elite perspective.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> The initial Keynesian framing of the crisis, the bailout as necessary emergency intervention, was reported factually. But over the following two years, the dominant story changed. By 2010, the narrative was no longer "banks broke the economy." It was "the state spent too much." The deficit, not the banking collapse, became the primary frame. And the solution shifted accordingly: from regulating banks to cutting public spending.</p><p>Mullen's analysis showed that this shift happened without serious interrogation by the media. The newspapers reported the new narrative as they had reported the old one: by relaying what elite sources said. The question of whether the deficit was actually the problem, or whether austerity was the right response, received far less scrutiny than the question of which spending would be cut. The narrative had changed, and the media had changed with it, and the people who would bear the cost of the new story, benefit recipients, public sector workers, users of local government services, had almost no voice in the coverage at all.</p><p>Steven Harkins documented the class dimension of this process. In research published between 2018 and 2020, Harkins analysed over 2,200 British newspaper articles about poverty spanning three decades.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> He found that journalists reported about poverty as depicted by political and economic elites, not as experienced by the people living through it. The framing was consistently top-down. The deserving and undeserving poor were categories imposed by commentators, not descriptions that mapped onto the reality of people's lives. During austerity, this meant that the people most affected by spending cuts were also the people least able to contest the narrative that justified those cuts.</p><p>Mark Blyth, at Brown University, placed this in a broader frame in his 2013 book Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Blyth argued that austerity is not merely a policy prescription. It is an ideology with a specific intellectual history, one that has been deployed repeatedly across centuries and has consistently delivered the same results: lower growth and increased inequality. His most useful observation was about the logic of collective austerity. It may make sense for any single country to try to cut its way to growth. It cannot work when all countries try it at the same time, because "all we do is shrink the economy." Austerity, Blyth argued, has been politically useful for elites because it shifts the cost of financial crises from the people who caused them to the people who didn't.</p><p>The book was selected among the Financial Times's best books of 2013, and Paul Krugman wrote a lengthy review in the New York Review of Books praising its account of how the theory of "expansionary fiscal contraction" had been constructed. But what struck me most about Blyth's argument was his analysis of the language. Austerity was sold to the British public using domestic metaphors: the household budget, the family credit card, the idea that the country had "maxed out."<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> These metaphors were wrong. A national economy is nothing like a household budget, for reasons that any first-year economics student could explain. But the metaphor worked as a story. It was simple, intuitive, and emotionally resonant. It connected a vast, abstract policy programme to something everyone understood: the anxiety of spending more than you earn. The narrative made the policy feel inevitable, even when the economics said it was optional.</p><p>I keep coming back to how quickly the narrative turned. In 2008, the British public was angry at banks. By 2010, the dominant political narrative was about belt-tightening and living within our means, language that framed a political choice as a household necessity. The speed of that shift tells you something about the power of narrative in economic life. The underlying facts hadn't changed. The banks had still caused the crisis. The bailout had still been paid for with public money. What changed was the story, and the story changed because the people with the loudest voices and the most media access wanted it to change. Shiller's epidemic model applies here, but with a modification: this wasn't a narrative that spread through random contact. It was a narrative that was actively promoted by people with the resources and platforms to amplify it.</p><div><hr></div><p>The austerity turn is the pattern to hold onto: the facts stayed still and the story moved, because the people with the loudest voices wanted it to. In the next part, the storytelling itself changes hands, from regulated advisers and broadsheets to whoever the algorithm favours, and the bill for believing lands on the people least equipped to check the story. More soon.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-new-storytellers">The new storytellers</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Tuckett, D. &amp; Taffler, R.J. (2008) Phantastic objects and precious illusions. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 89(4), pp. 915-932.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Cooper, M.J., Dimitrov, O. &amp; Rau, P.R. (2001) A rose.com by any other name. Journal of Finance, 56(6), pp. 2371-2388.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shiller, R.J. (2019) Narrative Economics. Princeton University Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shiller, R.J. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton University Press. SIR epidemic model applied to financial narrative transmission.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shiller, R.J. (2000, 2005, 2015) Irrational Exuberance. Princeton University Press. Documented the mid-2000s property narrative of inevitable returns.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Akerlof, G. &amp; Shiller, R.J. (2009) Animal Spirits. Princeton University Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mullen, A. (2021) Media framing of 2008 crisis. Journalism, 22(7), pp. 1731-1748.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Harkins, S. (2018-2020) Frames of poverty. 2,200+ newspaper articles.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford University Press. Analysis of how household budget metaphors reframed public spending as fiscal irresponsibility.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Furlough, the partial restoration]]></title><description><![CDATA[The one recent policy that rebuilt some trust, and what it means for yours]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/furlough-the-partial-restoration</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/furlough-the-partial-restoration</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 07:01:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/28259768-403e-40db-beb4-cfe6c156a3b7_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 10 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-three-layers-of-trust-and-what-broke-them">part 9</a> covered the three layers of trust, and how inflation broke them.</em></p><p>And then, briefly, something different happened.</p><p>In March 2020, as the pandemic shut down the economy, the UK government announced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme. The state would pay 80 per cent of furloughed employees' wages, up to a cap of 2,500 pounds per month. The scale was staggering: 11.7 million individual jobs were furloughed through the scheme, involving 1.3 million employers, at a total cost of approximately 70 billion pounds. At its peak on 8 May 2020, 8.9 million jobs were being supported simultaneously.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Nearly a third of the UK workforce was, temporarily, on the government payroll.</p><p>The initial public response looked remarkably like the wartime rationing response. Approval was high. People accepted the arrangement because it met the criteria that the fairness instinct demands: a collective threat, a universal response, a sense that the burden was being shared. The threat was visible, the virus was killing people on the evening news. The response was universal, applying to workers across industries and income levels. And the sacrifice was perceived as shared. Everyone was locked down. Everyone was disrupted.</p><p>For a brief period, the social contract felt operational again. The government was doing what people believed governments should do in a crisis: protecting ordinary people from forces beyond their individual control. The contrast with the austerity response to 2008 was stark, and people noticed. The speed mattered too. Furlough was announced within days of the lockdown. There was no long period of debate about whether intervention was justified, no argument about moral hazard or market distortion. The government acted, and it acted for ordinary workers, and the psychological effect was immediate. People felt held.</p><p>But the fairness framework did not hold. As the months passed, a K-shaped recovery became visible. Asset prices rose sharply. People who owned property and investments saw their wealth increase during a pandemic. People on furlough at 80 per cent of salary, capped at 2,500 pounds, watched their savings erode. Key workers who could not work from home faced daily exposure to the virus while earning the same or less than those safely furloughed at home.</p><p>The executive pay data made the fracture explicit. Research from the High Pay Centre found that CEOs at FTSE 100 companies which had used the furlough scheme to pay their workers received significantly higher increases in total pay than those at companies that had not used furlough. Bonus pay in 2021 and 2022 at furlough-using companies ran 51 per cent higher than pre-pandemic levels.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> The CEO-to-worker pay ratio, which had already been climbing, reached 118 to 1 by 2022, up from 79 to 1 in 2020.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Public money designed to protect workers' incomes was flowing through companies that simultaneously rewarded their executives at record levels.</p><p>HMRC's own evaluation found that fraud in the furlough scheme ran somewhere between 3 and 7.8 per cent of total spend.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Billions of pounds claimed by businesses that did not qualify, or that continued to require furloughed employees to work. The enforcement that had maintained the wartime fairness compact, the visible prosecution of black marketeers, had no equivalent in the furlough system. The fraud was discovered after the fact, and much of it was never recovered.</p><p>Compare the furlough experience with the wartime rationing experience and the difference is instructive. Both involved massive state intervention during a crisis. Both had broad initial public support. But rationing maintained its fairness framework for fourteen years through constant enforcement and visible equality. Furlough lost its fairness framework within months because the inequality of the recovery was too obvious to ignore.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>It is not enough for a policy to be fair at launch. The perception of fairness has to be maintained over time.</p></div><p>The furlough scheme reveals something important about how the fairness instinct works in practice. It is not enough for a policy to be fair at launch. The perception of fairness has to be maintained over time. The scheme began as a collective sacrifice, perceived as roughly equal. It ended as yet another episode in which public money flowed upwards while ordinary people absorbed the costs. The trust that was briefly restored by the initial response was eroded by the unequal recovery that followed.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png" width="1540" height="1672" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1672,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:134420,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;pull quote, clapping was in retrospect the cheapest substitute&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="pull quote, clapping was in retrospect the cheapest substitute" title="pull quote, clapping was in retrospect the cheapest substitute" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1Pvw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e0e9e3d-2940-4092-a18c-d5bd7b215ec3_1540x1672.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><h2>What this means for you</h2><p>The research across this part and the last points in a single direction. Your psychological response to financial hardship, whether caused by recession, inflation, benefit cuts, or a pandemic, depends less on the hardship itself than on whether the sacrifice feels fair.</p><p>Britons accepted strict rationing for fourteen years because the system was visibly equal. They rebelled against austerity that was objectively less severe because the burden fell on those who had not caused the problem. They supported furlough initially because it felt like shared sacrifice, then soured on it as the K-shaped recovery revealed that the sharing was an illusion.</p><p>The ultimatum game shows this is not simply a political preference. It is a measurable feature of human psychology. People will accept a worse outcome for themselves rather than tolerate a distribution they consider unfair. Fehr and Schmidt's model quantifies it. Cross-cultural research confirms it exists everywhere, calibrated differently in different societies but present in all of them.</p><p>This has practical implications for how you process financial crises. When a recession hits, when inflation spikes, when the government announces spending cuts, your brain is not simply calculating your personal loss. It is running a fairness assessment. Who caused this? Who is paying for it? Is the burden falling equally? And that assessment, often made quickly and emotionally rather than through careful analysis, will determine your psychological response more than the actual numbers on your bank statement.</p><p>Understanding this about yourself is the first step to managing it. When you feel disproportionately angry about a financial setback, it is worth asking whether the anger is really about the money or about the fairness. Often it is both, tangled together in ways that make the financial problem harder to solve because the emotional problem is absorbing all your cognitive energy. Separating the fairness grievance from the practical financial question does not make either one go away, but it lets you address them independently instead of letting one paralyse the other.</p><p>If the answers feel wrong, the psychological damage is multiplied far beyond what the objective numbers would predict. The research on austerity's impact on single mothers, the Edelman data on income-stratified trust, Wu's finding that inflation erodes trust in ways that do not reverse: all of it confirms that unfairness is not just morally offensive. It is psychologically destructive in ways that persist for years, sometimes generations.</p><p>The policy implication is uncomfortable for anyone trained in conventional economics. Crisis policy is typically designed by people who model human beings as self-interest maximisers. If the policy produces the best aggregate outcome, it is considered successful. But the evidence from eight decades of British financial crises says otherwise. A policy that produces moderate hardship distributed fairly will generate less psychological damage, less political instability, and less long-term institutional erosion than a policy that produces less total hardship distributed unfairly.</p><p>There is something I find personally unsettling about the cumulative picture these two parts have painted. We have a population that was asked to bail out the banks, then asked to accept austerity to pay for the bailout, then hit by inflation that eroded whatever savings they had left, then offered a furlough scheme that briefly felt fair before revealing itself as another mechanism for upward wealth transfer. Each episode on its own might have been absorbed. The sequence, taken together, represents a systematic dismantling of the belief that the economic system operates in the interests of ordinary people.</p><p>The dinner-party version of all this is straightforward. Next time someone tells you that the public just needs to accept tough economic medicine, ask them one question: who is taking it?</p><p>That institutional memory crossed borders. When the European Central Bank was established in 1998, its mandate was shaped more by German inflation trauma than by the economic conditions of the eurozone it would govern. The ECB's singular focus on price stability, modelled on the Bundesbank, reflected a specific national experience generalised into continental policy. During the eurozone debt crisis of 2010 to 2015, the ECB's reluctance to act as lender of last resort, its insistence on fiscal discipline as a precondition for support, can be read as institutional PTSD: an entire monetary system still flinching from a trauma that occurred a century earlier. The psychology of the Weimar collapse did not just shape German savers. It shaped the architecture of European monetary governance, with consequences that citizens of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland experienced as austerity imposed from Frankfurt.</p><p>In 1940, the British government asked every adult to accept one egg per week. The sacrifice was real and the deprivation was genuine. But the ration book did not ask how much you earned. A duke and a docker got the same allocation of cheese. That visible equality was what made the system work. Eighty-five years and several financial crises later, the question is not whether people will accept sacrifice. They will. The question is whether anyone in a position of power is willing to design a sacrifice that looks anything like fair.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png" width="1540" height="1078" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1078,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:73095,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Ultimatum game rejection rates&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Ultimatum game rejection rates" title="Ultimatum game rejection rates" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!bQsC!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1595fb4c-22d6-4bb1-8a4b-5a6aee86b888_1540x1078.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png" width="1540" height="1309" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1309,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:135153,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;UK institutional trust trajectory&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="UK institutional trust trajectory" title="UK institutional trust trajectory" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OZct!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76de3f0b-86b0-4909-88ce-f623f4f6c5ea_1540x1309.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><p>The deal is unwritten, but your brain enforces it anyway, and it keeps score for a long time. In the next part I turn to the stories we tell about financial crises, including the narrative that ate Britain, and why a good story moves an economy as surely as an interest rate does. Thanks for reading.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-stories-we-tell-ourselves">How stories drive economies</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>House of Commons Library / GOV.UK (2020-2021) CJRS Statistics. 11.7 million jobs furloughed; 1.3 million employers participated; total cost approximately &#163;70 billion; peak of 8.9 million on 8 May 2020.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>High Pay Centre / TUC analysis (2021) CEO Pay and Furlough Usage at FTSE 100 Companies. CEO bonus pay 51% higher than pre-pandemic in 2021-22.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>High Pay Centre (2024) CEO pay analysis. Ratio reached 118:1 in 2022, up from 79:1 in 2020.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>HMRC (2023) 'The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) Final Evaluation', July 2023. Error and fraud estimated at 3.0-7.8% of total spend (most likely 5.1%, approximately &#163;3.5 billion). Billions claimed by businesses that did not qualify or continued to require furloughed employees to work.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The three layers of trust, and what broke them]]></title><description><![CDATA[The unwritten deal, and what inflation betrayed]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-three-layers-of-trust-and-what-broke-them</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-three-layers-of-trust-and-what-broke-them</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:01:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/41feaa02-287b-400e-9224-c7a12e2d87b1_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 9 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-people-accept-some-sacrifices-but-not-others">part 8</a> covered the fairness instinct.</em></p><p>There is an unwritten deal between citizens and the institutions that run their financial lives: Britons accepted fourteen years of rationing because the sacrifice was visibly equal, then watched the 2008 bailouts and the austerity that followed break that sense of fairness. This piece is about what that rupture did to trust.</p><h2>Three layers of trust</h2><p>Trust in economic institutions operates at three levels, and the period from 2007 onwards damaged all of them simultaneously.</p><p>The first layer is trust in banks. Northern Rock made the fragility visible, but the deeper erosion happened afterwards. Before 2008, most people understood intellectually that banks could fail, but treated it as a theoretical possibility, like an asteroid strike. After 2008, it became personal memory. The Edelman Trust Barometer tracked what happened next: UK institutional trust fell to 42 per cent in 2020, placing Britain second-to-last among developed nations, above only Russia. By 2025, the score had recovered to 43 per cent, a four-point improvement that still left the country in the bottom tier globally.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p><div class="pullquote"><p>The crisis did not just damage trust. It stratified it by income.</p></div><p>The recovery, such as it is, has not been evenly distributed. Edelman's data shows a persistent gap of 12 to 15 points between high-income and low-income respondents on institutional trust. In the business sector specifically, the gap reaches 15 points.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> People who came through 2008 with their wealth intact trust the system more than people who lost jobs, homes or savings. The crisis did not just damage trust. It stratified it by income.</p><p>The second layer is trust in government. The wartime social contract worked because people believed the government was asking everyone to sacrifice equally. Austerity broke that belief. The gap between executive pay at bailed-out banks and the benefits being cut from disabled claimants was too visible, too stark, for the "we're all in this together" narrative to survive contact with reality.</p><p>Government trust in the Edelman data tells a grim story. It remains the weakest of the four institutional categories they track, sitting at 43 per cent in 2025, with business the most trusted at 51 per cent. The inversion is notable: people trust corporations more than they trust the state. For a country that built the NHS, the welfare state, and a universal pension system on the basis of collective trust in government, this represents a quiet but significant shift.</p><p>The behavioural consequences of government distrust are more diffuse than bank distrust but potentially more corrosive. When people do not trust the government to manage the economy fairly, they stop believing that playing by the rules will be rewarded. Tax compliance becomes grudging rather than civic. Pension saving feels like a gamble on a system that might change the rules before you get there. The willingness to accept short-term sacrifice for long-term collective benefit, which is the foundation of every social insurance programme, erodes. You can see this in the polling on state pensions, where younger workers increasingly report that they do not expect the state pension to exist by the time they retire. Whether that expectation is accurate is almost beside the point. The belief itself changes behaviour.</p><p>The third layer is the most abstract and potentially the most consequential: trust in money itself. We rarely think about this because money functions precisely to the degree that we do not think about it. You accept a ten-pound note because you trust that someone else will accept it from you. You keep savings in a bank account denominated in sterling because you trust that those pounds will buy roughly the same amount of goods next year as they do today. This trust is so fundamental that when it breaks, the effects cascade through everything.</p><p>The interaction between these three layers is what makes the post-2008 period so psychologically damaging. If you lose trust in banks but still trust the government to regulate them, the damage is contained. If you lose trust in the government but still trust the currency, you can at least protect yourself through saving. But when all three layers are compromised simultaneously, people lose their orientation entirely. The ground beneath every financial decision becomes uncertain. Should you save? The bank might fail. Should you rely on government protection? The government cut your benefits. Should you hold cash? Inflation is eating it.</p><p>Sterling has had its crises: the 1967 devaluation, the 1976 IMF bailout, Black Wednesday in 1992. Each one temporarily shook public confidence in the currency. But the mechanism that most directly erodes trust in money for ordinary people is not a dramatic crash. It is inflation.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Inflation as trust betrayal</h2><p>When UK inflation hit 11.1 per cent in October 2022, measured by CPI, it was the highest figure in forty years.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Food prices were worse: they peaked at 19.1 per cent annual growth in March 2023.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Core inflation, stripping out food and energy, reached 7.1 per cent in May 2023. For anyone under fifty, this was a new experience. For anyone over seventy, it was a horrible reminder.</p><p>The economic analysis of inflation focuses on causes: energy prices, supply chains, monetary policy, wage spirals. But the psychological experience of inflation is about something simpler. You had a deal. You worked, you saved, you spent carefully. The money in your account was supposed to hold its value. And now it does not. Every trip to the supermarket confirms that the deal has been broken, not by any visible villain, but by a process that feels both relentless and unaccountable.</p><p>Wu's 2025 study in the Canadian Review of Sociology provides the empirical backbone for what people experience intuitively.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Using cross-national panel data, Wu found that inflation causally damages social trust. The direction matters: it is primarily inflation that erodes trust, not low trust that causes inflation. And the damage does not reverse automatically. When inflation falls, the trust that was lost does not simply return. It has to be rebuilt, slowly, through demonstrated stability.</p><p>The psychological mechanism is straightforward. Inflation punishes the cautious. People who saved, who delayed gratification, who followed the conventional advice about building financial security, find their discipline rewarded with declining purchasing power. People who borrowed heavily, who spent freely, who took on debt, find that inflation erodes the real value of what they owe. The message is perverse: responsibility is penalised. Recklessness is subsidised.</p><p>The extreme case illustrates the principle. During Germany's Weimar hyperinflation of 1921 to 1923, people who had saved responsibly their entire lives watched their savings become worthless. A middle-class family's life savings might buy a loaf of bread. Meanwhile, those who had borrowed to buy physical assets found their debts evaporating. The trauma of that experience shaped German economic policy for a century. The Bundesbank's obsessive focus on price stability, inherited by the European Central Bank, is not abstract monetary theory. It is the institutional memory of what happens when a population loses faith in the value of its currency.</p><p>The UK's 2022-23 inflation episode was nothing like Weimar. But it operated on the same psychological register, at a much lower volume. People experienced it as a betrayal, not by any specific institution but by the system itself. The weekly shop cost 30 to 40 per cent more. Energy bills doubled. Wages did not keep pace. And the people who suffered most were, as always, those with the least: lower-income households spend a higher proportion of their income on food and energy, so the same headline inflation rate hit them harder in practice.</p><p>There is something self-fulfilling about inflation psychology that Wu's research touches on but does not fully develop. If people expect prices to rise, they spend sooner and demand higher wages, which causes prices to rise. Economists call this expectation anchoring and treat it as a technical problem of monetary policy communication. But the trust dimension adds a layer that technical solutions cannot reach. Once people believe that the institutions responsible for price stability have failed, or worse, that those institutions prioritise other goals over the purchasing power of ordinary people's savings, the expectation of inflation becomes entangled with a deeper suspicion about whose interests the system serves.</p><p>The Bank of England's response, raising interest rates from 0.1 per cent to 5.25 per cent over eighteen months, solved the inflation problem by creating a different one. Mortgage holders, many of them younger households who had stretched to buy property during the low-rate years, saw their monthly payments jump by hundreds of pounds. The cure for the erosion of trust in money was a direct financial hit to the people who had done exactly what the system told them to do: buy a house, get on the ladder, build wealth through property.</p><p>The same cohort that cannot afford to buy homes without parental help, that inherits financial anxiety from parents shaped by previous crises, now watched their first experience of inflation coincide with mortgage rate increases that made the homes they had finally managed to buy significantly more expensive to maintain. Each crisis layer compounds the one beneath it.</p><p>Wu's finding that lost trust does not automatically return when inflation falls should worry anyone who thinks about long-term institutional stability. The 2022-23 inflation episode, coming after the bailouts, after austerity, after a decade of stagnant real wages, did not land on a population with reserves of institutional goodwill. It landed on a population already running low.</p><div><hr></div><div><hr></div><p>Broken trust is not the end of the story. The next part turns to furlough, the one recent policy that briefly rebuilt it, and what that restoration was worth.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/furlough-the-partial-restoration">Furlough, the partial restoration</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Edelman Trust Barometer institutional trust. Source: Edelman (2020-2025) Trust Barometer, UK data. Institutional trust at 42% in 2020 (lowest recorded, second-to-last developed nation above Russia); 43% by 2025.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Edelman institutional trust gap by income. Source: Edelman (2020-2025) Trust Barometer, UK data. Persistent income-based trust gap of 12-15 points overall; 15 points in the business sector.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>UK inflation peak October 2022. Source: ONS (2022-2023) Consumer Price Inflation Statistics. CPI peaked at 11.1% in October 2022, the highest rate in 40 years.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Food prices inflation March 2023. Source: ONS (2023) UK Consumer Price Inflation data. Food prices peaked at 19.1% annual growth in March 2023.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Wu, C. (2025) Inflation and Social Trust. Canadian Review of Sociology.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why people accept some sacrifices but not others]]></title><description><![CDATA[Rationing was harsher than austerity, but only one of them felt fair]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-people-accept-some-sacrifices-but-not-others</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-people-accept-some-sacrifices-but-not-others</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 07:02:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a96063a2-b311-4370-bd61-5dd6980d8bf2_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 8 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-british-herd">part 7</a> covered the British herd.</em></p><p>In 1940, the British government asked its citizens to accept that from now on, every adult would receive exactly one egg per week. Four ounces of bacon. Two ounces of butter. Eight ounces of sugar. Two ounces of tea. The quantities were precise, printed on ration books, enforced by law. And the public response was not what you might expect.</p><p>Mass Observation, the social research organisation that had been recording British opinion since 1937, surveyed attitudes to rationing throughout the war. More than half of those surveyed approved. Only 14 per cent expressed dissatisfaction.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> This was not reluctant compliance with wartime necessity. People actively supported the system. They reported feeling that rationing was fair, that it bound the country together, that the duchess and the dustman were finally eating from the same menu.</p><p>Now jump forward seventy years. In 2010, a different government asks the British public to accept a different kind of sacrifice. Spending cuts, benefit reductions, frozen public sector wages, a squeeze on services. The stated reason is similar: the country faces an emergency, everyone must play their part. But the response is profoundly different. Instead of solidarity, there is anger. Instead of compliance, there is a slow-burning resentment that reshapes British politics for the next decade.</p><p>The gap between these two moments is not explained by the severity of the sacrifice. Rationing was objectively more restrictive than austerity. People had less food, less fuel, less freedom of choice about basic consumption. The gap is explained by something else entirely: whether the sacrifice felt fair.</p><p>This piece and the next are about the deal that exists between citizens and the institutions that govern their financial lives. It is about what happens when that deal holds, what happens when it breaks, and why the feeling of fairness matters more to your financial brain than the actual size of the loss. Along the way, we will pass through a bank run that was entirely rational, an ideology dressed up as arithmetic, an inflation crisis that damaged something deeper than purchasing power, and a government wage scheme that briefly restored a contract most people had forgotten existed.</p><p>This connects to what we have already seen. Fear makes you sell at the bottom. The herd pulls you towards whatever everyone else is doing. But underneath both of these, there is a more fundamental question: do you believe the system is fair? Your answer to that question determines how much damage everything else can do. It also shapes the narratives we construct to explain crises, the cognitive toll of financial pressure, the silence around money in British culture, the identity we attach to property, and the financial trauma we inherit from our parents.</p><p>We should start, though, with a laboratory experiment about splitting money with strangers.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The fairness instinct</h2><p>In 1982, three German economists named Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze published a paper that should have settled an argument. The experiment was simple. Two players. One gets a sum of money and proposes how to split it. The other can accept the split (both keep their share) or reject it (both get nothing). Rational self-interest predicts that the second player should accept any offer above zero. A pound is better than nothing. A penny is better than nothing.</p><p>That is not what happened. Offers below about 20 per cent of the total were rejected roughly half the time.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> People walked away with nothing rather than accept a split they considered unfair. The experiment has been replicated hundreds of times, in dozens of countries, with stakes ranging from pocket change to several months' salary. In one well-known set of studies, the stakes were equivalent to three months' income for the participants. Even then, the rejection rate for low offers remained high. The basic finding holds: human beings will pay a real financial cost to punish what they perceive as unfairness.</p><p>The cross-cultural variation is telling. When Joseph Henrich and his colleagues ran ultimatum games in fifteen small-scale societies around the world, they found striking differences.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Among the Machiguenga of Peru, offers averaged 26 per cent and were almost always accepted. Among the Lamalera whale hunters of Indonesia, offers regularly exceeded 50 per cent. The differences mapped onto each society's economic structure: communities with more market integration and more cooperative production made more generous offers and rejected low offers more often. Fairness norms are not hardwired at a single setting. They are calibrated by the economic world you grow up in.</p><p>In 1999, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt formalised this into a mathematical model.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Their paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics proposed that people experience two kinds of inequality discomfort. Being worse off than others hurts. But being better off than others also produces discomfort, just less of it. In their model, the pain of disadvantageous inequality is roughly twice as strong as the discomfort of advantageous inequality. The exact ratio varies across studies, from about 1.6 to 2.7 depending on the methodology, but the direction is consistent. We hate getting less than our fair share more than we feel guilty about getting more.</p><p>George Akerlof and Robert Shiller identified fairness as one of the five "animal spirits" driving economic behaviour.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Their argument was that mainstream economics had made a catastrophic error: modelling humans as pure self-interest maximisers, when actually the perception of fairness shapes every significant economic decision, from wage negotiations to consumer spending to responses to government policy.</p><p>What makes the ultimatum game so useful as a lens for crisis psychology is that it strips away every complicating factor. There is no ideology, no political party, no newspaper editorial telling you how to feel. There are just two people and a sum of money. And even in that bare setting, with real money on the table, people consistently choose to punish unfairness at a cost to themselves. They do it quickly, instinctively, without agonising over the decision. The fairness assessment comes first. The financial calculation comes second.</p><p>This matters for crisis psychology because it means people's willingness to accept financial hardship depends heavily on whether the sacrifice feels fairly distributed. When it does, compliance is high and psychological damage is limited. When it does not, the same objective hardship produces rage, political upheaval, and lasting institutional distrust. The size of the loss is not the variable that matters most. The distribution is.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Wartime, the fair sacrifice</h2><p>The British rationing system that began in January 1940 lasted, in various forms, for fourteen years. Bacon, butter and sugar were rationed first. Meat followed in March 1940, tea and margarine later that year. By mid-1942, practically everything edible was either rationed or subject to price controls. Bread, which had not been rationed during the war itself, was rationed from 1946 to 1948, a detail that still surprises people. The last item to come off rationing was meat, in July 1954. An entire generation grew up never knowing what it meant to walk into a shop and simply buy what you wanted.</p><p>The Mass Observation diaries from this period, held at the University of Sussex Special Collections, are full of complaints about specific items. People grumbled about the monotony, about queuing, about the quality of dried egg. But the complaints existed within a framework of broad acceptance. The system was considered fair because it was visibly equal. The ration book did not ask how much you earned. A duke and a docker got the same allocation of cheese.</p><p>This was not accidental. The government faced a genuine choice between price controls, which would have let the market allocate scarce goods to whoever could pay the most, and per-capita rationing, which guaranteed equal access regardless of income. They chose rationing. The economists advising the government understood that the system needed to feel fair to function. If wealthy households had been seen stockpiling while ordinary families went without, the entire cooperative structure would have collapsed.</p><p>Mark Harrison's research on wartime economic psychology shows that governments can persuade populations to accept reduced consumption, but only through specific mechanisms.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> Appeals to patriotism work. Appeals to fairness work. Appeals to shared sacrifice work. Appeals to abstract economic theory do not. The Rapid Transition Alliance's analysis of WW2 consumption patterns confirms the speed at which behavioural change happened once the public accepted the underlying fairness of the system. People did not just tolerate rationing. Many of them found it clarifying: the anxiety of competitive consumption was temporarily removed.</p><p>The enforcement dimension mattered too. Black market prosecutions were widely publicised. When people were caught cheating the system, the punishment was visible, reinforcing the message that the rules applied to everyone. Sentences could be severe: fines, imprisonment, public shaming in the local press. The fairness compact was maintained not just by voluntary compliance but by demonstrated consequences for those who broke it. This is a point that often gets lost in nostalgic accounts of wartime solidarity. The solidarity was real, but it was also policed. The government understood that one visible cheater could do more damage to public compliance than a month of deprivation.</p><p>Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska's history of the period documents how this fairness framework survived even the most severe deprivations.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> When bread was rationed after the war, at a point when people were exhausted and impatient for normality, the system held because the principle of equal sacrifice was already deeply embedded. People did not like it. But they accepted it as legitimate.</p><p>There is a telling detail in the Mass Observation data that often gets overlooked. When asked about rationing, people did not simply say they accepted it. Many expressed something closer to relief. The pre-war anxiety of keeping up appearances, of competitive consumption, of judging and being judged by what you could afford to put on the table, was temporarily suspended. Everyone had the same amount. The comparison game was, for a brief period, impossible to play. Several diarists described this as a kind of freedom. It was not freedom from want. It was freedom from the constant, grinding awareness of inequality.</p><p>The wartime experience established something that economists would spend decades trying to explain away: that human beings will accept enormous material deprivation, voluntarily and even with a degree of good grace, provided they believe the burden is shared equally. The sacrifice has to feel fair. Not optimal, not efficient, not economically rational. Fair.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The broken deal</h2><p>On 14 September 2007, customers began queuing outside Northern Rock branches across the north-east of England. The images, broadcast on every news bulletin, looked like something from a different era. A bank run in modern Britain. It seemed irrational, hysterical, a failure of public understanding.</p><p>It was none of those things. Hyun Song Shin's analysis in the Journal of Economic Perspectives reframes the Northern Rock episode entirely.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> The UK's deposit insurance scheme at the time guaranteed 100 per cent of the first 2,000 pounds in any account, and 90 per cent of the next 33,000 pounds. A depositor with 35,000 pounds in Northern Rock therefore stood to lose 3,300 pounds if the bank failed. Queuing for hours to withdraw your money was not panic. It was arithmetic. The Bank of England's Governor subsequently confirmed that the depositors' behaviour was entirely rational given the legal framework.</p><p>But the Northern Rock story matters for this chapter not because of what the depositors did, but because of what happened next. The government extended a full guarantee on all Northern Rock deposits, stopping the run. Then, in September 2008, the financial system cracked open properly. Royal Bank of Scotland received 45.8 billion pounds in public funds, giving the government an 84 per cent stake. Lloyds Banking Group got 20.3 billion pounds for a 43 per cent stake. The total government commitment to stabilising the banking sector reached approximately 137 billion pounds, though the eventual net cost was substantially lower, around 23 billion.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a></p><p>The public watched this happen. They watched the institutions that had caused the crisis receive the largest public subsidy in peacetime history. And then, in 2010, they were told that the country could not afford its current level of public spending and that ordinary people would need to accept cuts.</p><p>Mark Blyth's Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea traces the intellectual sleight of hand that made this possible.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a> The debts were originally private. Banks had made bad bets and lost. But through the mechanism of the bailout, private debt was transformed into public debt, and public debt was then used to justify public spending cuts. Blyth traces the austerity argument back through two centuries of economic thought, from Locke and Hume through the Austrian school and German ordoliberalism, and finds the same pattern repeating: austerity is presented as pragmatic necessity when it is actually ideological preference. And it consistently delivers low growth with increased inequality.</p><p>The human cost was documented by Vickie Cooper and David Whyte in The Violence of Austerity.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a> They compiled testimony from across the UK: disability benefit claimants found fit for work who later died, mental health services stripped to skeleton capacity, food bank use rising from tens of thousands to millions. A letter signed by 442 psychotherapists, counsellors and academics described what they were seeing as "anti-therapeutic practices" causing avoidable suffering and, in documented cases, avoidable deaths.</p><p>Research published in Social Forces in 2024 examined what happened to the families who bore the heaviest burden. Single mothers lost between 20 and 30 per cent of their household benefit income.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-12" href="#footnote-12" target="_self">12</a> The study tracked the consequences: increased financial worry, material hardship, deterioration in mental health, and measurable increases in adolescent socio-emotional difficulties. The children of austerity absorbed the stress of their parents' financial precarity in ways that will shape their own relationship with money for decades to come. Financial trauma transmits across generations. The children who watched their mothers counting coins at the supermarket checkout in 2013 are now entering the workforce with a set of money instincts that pre-date their first payslip.</p><p>The fairness rupture was not instant. In the immediate aftermath of 2008, public anger was directed at banks. But the narrative shifted. By 2010, the dominant framing, supported by most of the press, was that the country had been "living beyond its means." The crisis was recast from a banking failure to a public spending problem. The people who had caused the crisis paid bonuses. The people who had not caused it paid with their services, their benefits, and in some cases their health.</p><p>There is a useful thought experiment here. Imagine you are explaining the sequence of events to someone who knows nothing about British politics. You would say: the banks made catastrophic bets; the public bailed them out; the public was then told the country had no money; public services were cut; the banks paid bonuses; the people whose services were cut were told this was necessary because the country had been living beyond its means. Your listener would say: that cannot be what happened. But it is.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>The greatest trick austerity pulled was convincing ordinary people that the crisis was their fault.</p></div><p>The language matters. The phrase "living beyond our means" performs a specific rhetorical function. It implies collective responsibility for what was, in reality, a failure of financial regulation and banking judgment. The "our" does an enormous amount of work in that sentence. It distributes blame evenly across a population that was overwhelmingly blameless. And it was repeated so often, by so many political and media voices, that it became the accepted explanation. The greatest trick austerity pulled was convincing ordinary people that the crisis was their fault.</p><p>If you wanted to design a policy sequence that would destroy public trust in the fairness of the economic system, you could not improve on what actually happened between 2007 and 2015.</p><div><hr></div><p>Rationing held for fourteen years because everyone could see the burden was shared, while austerity collapsed that belief in a fraction of the time. In the next part: the three layers of trust that the post-2008 years wore down, and the furlough scheme that briefly made the old contract feel real again. Thanks for reading.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-three-layers-of-trust-and-what-broke-them">The three layers of trust, and what broke them</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mass Observation (1941) A Savings Survey and wartime financial diaries. University of Sussex Special Collections. More than 50% approved rationing; only 14% dissatisfied.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Guth, W., Schmittberger, R. &amp; Schwarze, B. (1982) An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4), pp. 367-388.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Henrich, J. et al. (2006) Costly punishment across cultures. Science, 312(5781), pp. 1767-1770.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Fehr, E. &amp; Schmidt, K.M. (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), pp. 817-868.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Akerlof, G. &amp; Shiller, R.J. (2009) Animal Spirits. Princeton University Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Harrison, M. (1988) 'Resource Mobilization for World War II: The USA, UK, USSR, and Germany, 1938-1945', Economic History Review, 41(2).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I. (2000) Austerity in Britain. Oxford University Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shin, H.S. (2009) Reflections on Northern Rock. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), pp. 101-119.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>HM Treasury / NAO financial intervention data (2008-2010). RBS: &#163;45.8 billion (84% stake); Lloyds: &#163;20.3 billion (43% stake); total commitment approximately &#163;137 billion; net cost approximately &#163;23 billion after asset disposals.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford University Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Cooper, V. &amp; Whyte, D. (eds) (2017) The Violence of Austerity. Pluto Press.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-12" href="#footnote-anchor-12" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">12</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Social Forces (2024) 'Families of Austerity: Benefit Cutbacks and Family Stress in the UK'. Single mothers lost 20-30% of household benefit income under austerity-era reforms.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The British herd]]></title><description><![CDATA[How a nation of queuers behaves when the running starts]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-british-herd</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-british-herd</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 07:01:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/cfd7976e-4c8c-485d-9304-06abc407d016_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 7 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-herd-goes-digital">part 6</a> covered the digital herd, and when crowds can be trusted.</em></p><p>On the morning of 14 September 2007, a queue formed outside a branch of Northern Rock in Kingston upon Thames. By mid-morning, queues had appeared outside branches across the country. Over the following three days, depositors withdrew approximately &#163;4.6 billion, roughly a quarter of the bank's retail deposits.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> It was Britain's first bank run in 150 years.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>The queue was the signal.</p></div><p>The facts of Northern Rock's situation were, at that point, publicly available. The Bank of England had announced an emergency lending facility. Deposits up to &#163;35,000 were covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The bank was still solvent in the technical sense. None of this mattered to the people standing in the rain outside branches in Kingston, Golders Green, and Cheltenham. What mattered was the queue. The queue was the signal.</p><p>Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham and Tanju Yorulmazer analysed the spillover effects in a 2010 paper for the Journal of Financial Services Research.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> They found that both the bank run and the subsequent bailout announcement had statistically significant effects on the wider UK banking system, measured by abnormal returns on bank stocks. Banks that relied heavily on wholesale market funding, as Northern Rock had, were disproportionately affected. The contagion wasn't irrational panic. It was a rational response to new information about the fragility of a particular funding model, amplified and accelerated by the physical visibility of the run. Alliance &amp; Leicester, Bradford &amp; Bingley, and HBOS all saw their share prices fall sharply in the days following the Northern Rock queues. The visible queue had become a signal that triggered wholesale-market herding, as institutional investors reassessed their exposure to banks with similar funding structures.</p><p>There is something very British about the Northern Rock story. Not the bank run itself, which followed classical patterns. But the mechanism of contagion: the orderly queue. People joined the queue not because they had analysed Northern Rock's balance sheet, but because other people were queueing. In Britain, a queue is both a social signal and a social obligation. If enough people are standing in line, the assumption is that there's a good reason. The Northern Rock queue was, in Bikhchandani's framework, a perfect information cascade made physical. Each person who joined confirmed the signal for the next.</p><p>The same dynamic, though less photogenic, played out during the pandemic panic buying of March 2020. Lorry Taylor, writing in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management in 2021, found that perceived scarcity drove purchasing decisions more than actual scarcity.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Social media amplified the signal: photographs of empty shelves circulated on WhatsApp and Twitter, creating a feedback loop in which the fear of running out caused the running out. Moinuddin Naeem, in a 2021 study, identified a specific social-media cycle in which images of empty shelves generated anxious posts, which generated more buying, which generated more images of empty shelves.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> The actual supply of toilet paper, pasta, and flour was, in most cases, adequate. The perceived supply, shaped by photographs that spread faster than delivery trucks could restock, was not. Once the herd started buying, not buying felt like negligence.</p><p>And then there is property. The British relationship with buy-to-let investment has all the hallmarks of herd behaviour. Research has found that the growth in private landlordism was driven not by professional investors with diversified strategies, but by small portfolio owners with little experience, attracted by paper profits and an almost religious cultural belief that house prices only go in one direction. Over half of landlords surveyed cited interest rates as a deciding factor, and 40 per cent said they were influenced by recommendations from intermediaries, brokers, and the same social networks that amplified every other herd signal described in this post.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> When prices rose, more people bought. When more people bought, prices rose. The circularity was self-evident to anyone standing outside it and invisible to anyone inside it.</p><p>The Investment Association's fund flow data tells the same story from a different angle. In 2020 and 2021, when UK equity markets were rallying, retail investors poured &#163;18.4 billion into equity funds. In 2022, when markets fell, they pulled out &#163;18.2 billion.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> The symmetry is almost comic. Money in at the top, money out at the bottom, driven by the same herding impulse that sent Newton back into South Sea Company stock and depositors into Northern Rock queues. The faces change. The pattern doesn't.</p><p>What makes the British version of herding distinctive is its social register. In America, herding is loud. The WallStreetBets crowd celebrated their trades publicly, performatively, with rocket emojis and screenshots of six-figure gains. In Britain, herding is quieter but no less powerful. It happens over dinner when a colleague mentions their buy-to-let yields. It happens at the school gate when another parent asks which platform you use for your ISA. It happens in the silent observation of what other people seem to be doing with their money, filtered through a culture that finds talking about money vulgar but finds keeping up with the neighbours essential. The British herd moves discreetly, which makes it harder to see, and harder to resist.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What this means</h2><p>The tempting conclusion from all of this is that herding is a flaw, a cognitive weakness that education and self-awareness can correct. If we just understood the mechanics of information cascades, recognised the brain's conformity signal, and remembered the lessons of every bubble from the South Sea to GameStop, we could resist.</p><p>That's too easy, and it probably isn't true.</p><p>Herding is not a character flaw. It is a species-level cognitive pattern with deep evolutionary roots. For most of human history, copying the behaviour of others was an excellent survival strategy. If everyone in your group started running, the smart move was to run first and ask questions later. The people who stopped to conduct independent analysis of whether the threat was real were, on average, the people who got eaten. Our brains are built to follow the crowd because, for the vast majority of our evolutionary history, following the crowd kept us alive.</p><p>The problem is that financial markets are an environment our brains did not evolve to navigate. The signals that were reliable on the savanna (if everyone is doing it, there's probably a good reason) are unreliable in a market (if everyone is buying it, the price is probably too high). The error-detection signal that Klucharev identified, the one that fires when you disagree with the group, doesn't distinguish between "the group has spotted a predator you haven't" and "the group is piling into a cryptocurrency they don't understand." The neural machinery is the same. The context is completely different.</p><p>And here is the part that makes this a systemic problem rather than a personal one. The system actively produces herding. Fund managers are benchmarked against each other, which rewards following the crowd and punishes deviating from it. Financial regulation assumes that individual investors make independent decisions, an assumption that every part of this series will challenge. Media coverage amplifies consensus and gives less airtime to dissenting views. Social media accelerates the feedback loop to the point where cascades form and collapse in hours rather than months.</p><p>The people who pay the highest price for herding are retail investors, the individuals with the least information, the strongest social-proof signals, and the fewest institutional protections. When a fund manager herds and loses money, they lose a performance bonus. When a pension holder herds and sells their equity holdings at the bottom of a crash, they lose years of retirement income that they may never recover. The career incentives that drive professional herding are a problem. The absence of any equivalent protection for retail investors is a bigger one.</p><p>Think about what this means in practice. A 58-year-old teacher in Leeds with a defined-contribution pension has no career incentive to herd. She has no career in investment management. She is not benchmarked against other teachers' pension decisions. She has, in theory, every reason to ignore what the crowd is doing and focus on her own time horizon, her own risk tolerance, her own retirement date. But she is also human. She watches the news. She sees colleagues moving their pensions to "safer" options after a market fall. She feels the brain's conformity signal telling her that disagreeing with the crowd is an error. And the pension platform she uses, with its daily valuation updates and its red-and-green performance indicators, is feeding her exactly the kind of real-time social information that makes herding irresistible. The system is designed as though she is a rational, independent decision-maker. She is a social animal watching the herd.</p><p>Newton, for what it's worth, never fully recovered from the South Sea Bubble. He forbade anyone from mentioning the company's name in his presence for the rest of his life. He had calculated the motions of the planets. He could not calculate the pull of the crowd. Three hundred years later, neither can we. The question is whether we can build financial systems that account for that fact, instead of pretending it doesn't exist.</p><div><hr></div><p>The herd is one half of the story of how crises move through a population. The other half is the deal we believe we have with the institutions that hold our money, and what happens when that deal breaks. That is where this series goes next, starting with wartime rationing and the fairness instinct.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-people-accept-some-sacrifices-but-not-others">Why people accept some sacrifices but not others</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Further reading:</p><ul><li><p>Savills (2024) UK Housing Market Research. Over-65s generating GBP 10.1 billion annually from buy-to-let; total housing wealth held by over-65s exceeding GBP 2.6 trillion.</p></li><li><p>Shiller, R. (2000, 2005, 2015) Irrational Exuberance. Princeton University Press. Three editions tracking the dot-com bubble, the housing bubble, and the bond market bubble. A masterclass in how herd behaviour creates asset price distortions.</p></li></ul><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shin, H.S. (2009) 'Reflections on Northern Rock', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), pp. 101-119. Approximately &#163;4.6 billion withdrawn, roughly 25% of retail deposits.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Goldsmith-Pinkham, P. &amp; Yorulmazer, T. (2010) Spillovers from firms. Journal of Financial Services Research, 36(2/3), pp. 145-161.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Taylor, L. (2021) Social media and scarcity perceptions. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Naeem, M. (2021) 'Social media role in panic buying amplification during COVID-19', Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services. Social media feedback loops created perceptions of scarcity that produced real shortages.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>English Private Landlord Survey (2021). 56% of landlords describe buy-to-let as long-term pension investment.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Investment Association (2022) Fund flow data. GBP 18.4 billion equity inflows 2020-21; GBP 18.2 billion outflows 2022.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The herd goes digital]]></title><description><![CDATA[The crowd that ruined Isaac Newton now moves in minutes rather than months, and it lives on your phone]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-herd-goes-digital</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-herd-goes-digital</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 07:03:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ee15e15f-92b2-4b72-babb-bbdf1b650ec4_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 6 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-we-follow-everyone-else-off-the-cliff">part 5</a> covered the pull of the herd.</em></p><p>Herding runs from Isaac Newton, who lost a fortune buying back into the South Sea Bubble in 1720, to the fund managers whose careers reward losing money the same way as everyone else. Two ideas matter here: the information cascade, in which rational people suppress their own doubts because the crowd looks better informed, and the neuroscientist Vasily Klucharev's finding that the brain treats disagreement with a group as an error. The herd has since moved onto your phone.</p><h2>The digital herd</h2><p>On 11 January 2021, shares in GameStop, a struggling American video game retailer, were trading at around $20. Seventeen days later, on 28 January, the stock hit an intraday high of $483. Then it collapsed. By mid-February it was back below $50.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p><p>What happened in between was the most visible demonstration of digital herding in financial history. Members of the Reddit forum WallStreetBets, a community of roughly two million amateur traders at the time, had identified that several large hedge funds held significant short positions in GameStop. A short position is a bet that a stock will fall. If you can force the price up instead, the short sellers face theoretically unlimited losses and may be forced to buy shares to close their positions, pushing the price higher still. This is a short squeeze, and WallStreetBets decided to engineer one.</p><p>What made GameStop different from previous short squeezes was the mechanism of coordination. There was no central organiser. Nobody was issuing instructions. The subreddit functioned as a real-time information cascade, with users posting screenshots of their positions, celebrating gains, mocking hedge funds, and shaming anyone who suggested selling. The social dynamics were as important as the financial logic. Selling wasn't just leaving money on the table. It was betraying the group. The language of the forum, "diamond hands" for holders, "paper hands" for sellers, made conformity a badge of identity.</p><p>Long and colleagues, in a 2023 study in <em>The Financial Review</em>, analysed 10.8 million Reddit comments and found that sentiment on WallStreetBets directly affected GameStop's intraday returns at 5-, 10-, and 30-minute frequencies.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> A 2024 study found that positions initiated at peak WallStreetBets attention produced average holding-period returns of negative 8.5 per cent.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> The people who arrived at the peak of the herd's enthusiasm, which is to say the majority, lost money.</p><p>The GameStop saga was American, but the dynamics it demonstrated are running constantly in UK markets. The FCA's 2022 cryptoasset consumer research found that 4.97 million UK adults, roughly 9 per cent of the adult population, owned cryptocurrency.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Of those who held crypto, 34 per cent had first learned about it from friends or family. Fewer than half said they understood the underlying technology. And 45 per cent reported losses on their holdings. Bitcoin, the most widely held crypto asset, had fallen by roughly two-thirds from its November 2021 peak by the time the FCA survey was conducted in mid-2022.</p><p>Robert Cialdini described the mechanism in 1984 in his book <em>Influence</em>.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Social proof, the tendency to look at what other people are doing when deciding what to do yourself, operates most powerfully under two conditions: when you are uncertain what to do, and when the people you observe are similar to you. Both conditions were met perfectly during the UK crypto boom. People who knew little about blockchain watched their friends and colleagues making returns they couldn't ignore. Social media made the gains visible and the losses invisible. The cascade formed fast.</p><p>What separates digital herding from its historical predecessors is speed and transparency. In 1720, Newton watched the South Sea Bubble develop through conversations in coffeehouses and letters from friends, over weeks and months. In 2021, retail investors watched GameStop's price move in real time on their phones, with a live commentary thread explaining (or misexplaining) what was happening. The time between seeing the herd move and joining it has compressed from months to minutes. The information cascade that Bikhchandani described as a sequential process, one person watching the next, now happens simultaneously across millions of screens. The dynamics are the same. The speed is different. And speed, in financial markets, kills.</p><p>There is also a structural change that deserves attention. In Newton's time, and even in 2007, joining a financial herd required some friction. You had to contact a broker, or at least walk to a bank branch. That friction was, in a quiet way, protective. It gave people time to reconsider. Trading apps have eliminated that friction entirely. A 22-year-old in Birmingham can see a cryptocurrency surging on TikTok and buy it within ninety seconds without speaking to another human being. The time gap between herding impulse and herding action has collapsed to nearly zero. The brain's error-correction mechanisms, the ones Klucharev identified, don't have time to operate. The herd moves, and you move with it, before you've finished thinking about whether you should.</p><div><hr></div><h2>When the herd is wise, and when it isn't</h2><p>There is a version of the herding story that treats all crowd behaviour as pathological. That version is too simple.</p><p>In 2004, the journalist James Surowiecki published <em>The Wisdom of Crowds</em>, arguing that under certain conditions, the collective judgement of a group reliably outperforms the judgement of any individual member.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> His conditions were specific: the group needed diversity of opinion, so that members brought different information and perspectives; independence of decision, so that each person formed their own view without pressure to conform; decentralised knowledge, so that different people had access to different local information; and a mechanism for aggregation, so that individual judgements could be combined into a collective answer.</p><p>The jelly-beans-in-a-jar experiment is the classic illustration. Ask a hundred people to estimate the number of jelly beans in a jar. Most individuals will be wildly wrong. The average of all their guesses will be remarkably close to the true number. Prediction markets work on the same principle: when diverse, independent bettors trade on the probability of an event, the market price tends to be more accurate than any individual forecast.</p><p>The problem is what happens when any of Surowiecki's conditions breaks down. Herding, by definition, destroys independence. When people observe and mimic each other's choices, the diversity of information in the group collapses. You no longer have a hundred independent estimates. You have a hundred copies of the same few estimates, amplified by repetition.</p><p>In 2006, Matthew Salganik, Peter Dodds, and Duncan Watts at Columbia University ran an experiment that demonstrated this with uncomfortable precision.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> They created a website called MusicLab, where 14,341 participants could listen to songs by unknown bands and choose which ones to download. Some participants were assigned to an independent condition: they could see the songs but not how many times each had been downloaded. Others were assigned to social-influence conditions, where download counts were visible.</p><p>In the independent condition, quality predicted success. Better songs got more downloads. In the social-influence conditions, the same songs existed, but the results were profoundly different. Popular songs became more popular and unpopular songs became less popular, regardless of quality. Inequality between successful and unsuccessful songs increased. And, most disturbingly, the outcomes became less predictable. A song that topped the charts in one social-influence world might languish in obscurity in another. The initial random advantage of a few early downloads snowballed into permanent dominance, or didn't, depending on what the first few people happened to do.</p><p>A 2008 follow-up by the same team went further. They inverted the download counts, telling participants that the least popular songs were the most popular and vice versa. Even the songs with fabricated popularity benefited. Social influence was powerful enough to override quality signals entirely. The herd followed fabricated signals because the signal of "other people chose this" was more compelling than their own ears.</p><p>The parallel to financial markets should be obvious. When stock price movements become the primary signal that other investors watch (and they do), price itself becomes social proof. A rising price says "other people are buying this." A falling price says "other people are selling this." And those signals trigger the same conformity mechanisms that Klucharev identified in the brain, the error signal that fires when you disagree with the crowd.</p><p>This is where contrarian investing gets interesting, and where the data confounds intuition. If herding pushes prices away from their fundamental values, then going against the herd should, on average, produce excess returns. The evidence, broadly, supports this. Werner De Bondt and Richard Thaler showed in 1985 that stocks with the worst recent performance subsequently outperformed stocks with the best recent performance, a pattern they attributed to overreaction by herding investors.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny found in 1994 that value strategies, which are inherently contrarian, produced higher returns not because they were riskier but because they exploited predictable errors in crowd behaviour.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a></p><p>But contrarian investing requires a psychological tolerance that most people, including most professionals, do not possess. You are buying what everyone else is selling, or selling what everyone else is buying. Your brain is treating every trade as an error. Your colleagues think you've lost the plot. Your clients are calling. And if the position goes against you before it comes good, which it often does, the career risk identified by Scharfstein and Stein kicks in with full force. Being right eventually is cold comfort if you've been fired in the meantime.</p><p>This is the genuine difficulty at the heart of the herding problem. The crowd is sometimes wise and sometimes catastrophically wrong, and the conditions that determine which one you're in, Surowiecki's four criteria, are exactly the conditions that are hardest to assess from inside the crowd. If you could always tell whether you were in a wisdom-of-crowds situation or a bubble, there would be no bubbles.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>We have built markets that systematically disable the conditions under which crowd wisdom works, and then we express surprise when the crowd turns out to be wrong.</p></div><p>What Salganik's experiment really showed is that the same group of people, with the same information and the same preferences, can produce wildly different outcomes depending on whether they can see each other's choices. Remove social visibility and quality wins. Add social visibility and randomness wins. Financial markets, by design, are environments of maximum social visibility. Every price is a signal of what other people are doing. Every Bloomberg terminal, every trading app, every fund performance table is a mechanism for transmitting social information. We have built markets that systematically disable the conditions under which crowd wisdom works, and then we express surprise when the crowd turns out to be wrong.</p><div><hr></div><div><hr></div><p>The herd is global and the platforms are American, but a crowd still runs with a national accent. The next part turns to the British herd, and how a nation of queuers behaves when the running starts.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-british-herd">The British herd</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>GameStop/r/WallStreetBets episode, January 2021. Shares rose from approximately USD 17 to intraday high of USD 483, then collapsed below USD 50. SEC (2021) Staff Report on Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Long, C. et al. (2023) 'Reddit sentiments and GameStop intraday returns', Financial Review, 58(1), pp. 19-37. 10.8 million comments analysed; 5-30 minute price effects.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>International Review of Financial Analysis (2024) 'WallStreetBets attention and uninformed trading'. Positions opened at peak attention produced negative 8.5% average holding-period returns.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Financial Conduct Authority (2022) Cryptoassets Consumer Research. 4.97 million UK adults held cryptoassets; 9% ownership rate.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Cialdini, R. (1984) Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Surowiecki, J. (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds. Random House.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Salganik, M.J., Dodds, P.S. &amp; Watts, D.J. (2006) Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability. Science, 311(5762), pp. 854-856.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>De Bondt, W.F.M. &amp; Thaler, R.H. (1985) Does the stock market overreact? Journal of Finance, 40(3), pp. 793-805.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. &amp; Vishny, R.W. (1994) Contrarian investment extrapolation and risk. Journal of Finance, 49(5), pp. 1541-1578.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[British bureauctivity]]></title><description><![CDATA[Britain has quietly built a world-beating industry out of compliance. The one time it paused, the economy shrank.]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/british-bureauctivity</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/british-bureauctivity</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 08:04:12 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f09c4217-7f87-4c7c-aca7-b2494985fc95_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Richard Hammond has made a career out of going faster. This month he met the one thing in Britain that cannot be hurried. As reported in <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/article/b35389db-de33-42e6-8b83-52bb513058b3?shareToken=3f895cdc0a13208d29af64a3f64100b9">The Times</a>, the former Top Gear presenter&#8217;s plans for the Georgian manor he bought on the edge of Abergavenny (a heritage-style showroom for his thirty cars, a library, a memorabilia gallery, a padel court where the tennis court now stands) are in the slow lane on account of bats.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Three dusk surveys conducted between June and August found eight species using the 21-acre estate to hunt and roost, among them the soprano pipistrelle and Leisler&#8217;s bat. Footage taken by the bat surveyor, showing bats flying out of an old stone barn that Hammond intends to turn into a bar, can be admired on Monmouthshire council&#8217;s planning portal. To proceed, he may have to fit bat boxes and design dedicated roosting voids into the renovated buildings. A man who once crashed a jet car at 288mph now waits on a mammal that weighs less than a pound coin.</p><p>Anyone who has tried to get something done in a developing country recognises classic bureaucracy: drudging between offices to get various documents signed and stamped, only to be told you must first go somewhere else to get a different document signed and stamped. Weeks go by as you sit and wait in drab offices whilst your inner voice ponders &#8220;to bribe or not to bribe&#8221;.</p><p>Britain is regularly pilloried as a nation in decline, and the charge sheet writes itself. The heavy industries have gone. We no longer invent new technologies; instead, we just <em>implement</em> those pioneered in San Francisco and Hangzhou. Universities are merging and cutting courses to stay solvent. Potholes go unfilled. I bring good news. We have quietly developed a new home-grown form of world-leading economic activity. I call it bureauctivity (<strong>bureauc</strong>[racy] [product]<strong>ivity</strong>): bureaucracy so thorough and well executed that it has become a productive industry in its own right.</p><blockquote><p><strong>bureauctivity</strong> /bj&#650;&#601;&#716;r&#594;k&#712;t&#618;v&#618;ti/ <em>noun</em> [mass noun]</p><p>economic output generated by the performance of regulatory compliance to a professional standard; the conversion of administrative obligation into measurable production: <em>the survey, conducted over four nights by five licensed ecologists with thermal-imaging equipment, was a triumph of bureauctivity</em>.</p><p>ORIGIN blend of <em>bureaucracy</em> and <em>productivity</em>.</p></blockquote><p>Consider what happens when someone wants to knock down a barn and build houses on the site. In the amateur bureaucracies of the world, this is where the stamping and shuttling begins, at the end of which nothing exists except frustrated developers and richer officials. Not so in Britain. Here a bat survey will be conducted. This is no mere formality or sinecure. Ecologists with degrees, accredited by their own chartered professional institute and operating under a survey licence from Natural England, will attend in teams as the sun goes down.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> They work to the Bat Conservation Trust's published methodology, now in its fourth edition, which specifies how many surveyors a building of given complexity requires and how many dusk emergence surveys must be spread across the May-to-September season.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Thermal-imaging kit supplements the human eye: the favoured instrument for the job, the Pulsar Telos XP50 monocular, retails at &#163;2,529.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Echolocation calls are recorded, the bats identified to species and a full report written, with sonogram appendices running into the double digits.</p><p>Elsewhere, a bribe disappears into a pocket and produces nothing. Here, there is genuine industrial activity. High Speed 2 is spending more than &#163;100 million on a much-maligned kilometre-long curved structure in Buckinghamshire so that bats never need meet a train.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Construction is underway, and whilst HS2 is perennially in doubt, that bat tunnel will certainly be completed. And it will be built to last. No other nation on earth could produce a hundred-million-pound bat tunnel. The national accounts record it as output, because it is.</p><p>In <em>Yes Minister</em> Sir Humphrey Appleby explains how the nations of Europe would greet a proposed European regulation: "The Germans will love it, the French will ignore it, and the Italians and the Irish will be too chaotic to enforce it. Only the British will resent it."<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a></p><p>But on this rare occasion Sir Humphrey was wrong. The British don&#8217;t resent such regulations; we thrive on them. Whitehall even has an official term for implementing European rules more rigorously than Brussels asked: &#8220;gold-plating&#8221;, a practice the government solemnly promised to abolish in 2010.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> In truth, post-Brexit, this segment has flourished.</p><p>Consider our rivers, or rather, the paperwork beside them. Under nutrient neutrality rules, derived from European habitats law we chose to keep and then applied with fresh vigour, housebuilders in affected catchments must demonstrate, calculation by calculation, that their development will add not one gram of nitrogen or phosphorus, depending on the catchment, to the local watercourse. While, at the 2023 peak, roughly 145,000 homes queued behind this arithmetic, an entire secondary market sprang up: mitigation credits, generated by taking farmland out of production and building wetlands, bought and sold so that the spreadsheet balances.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> Soil surveys, water sampling, nutrient modelling, laboratory invoices: real scientists doing real work for real money. The homes may not exist, but the economic activity certainly does.</p><p>The closest approximation the statisticians offer to what I mean by bureauctivity is a category called professional, scientific and technical activities, which is not a perfect fit, but it is where the bat reports, the nutrient budgets and the compliance reviews get filed. In 2024, while the economy as a whole managed growth of about 1 per cent, that sector grew 3.2 per cent, the strongest performance of any services sector.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> A sector not far off a tenth of the economy, growing at three times the national rate.</p><p>In the three months to October 2025, that same sector contracted by 1.6 per cent, the largest negative contributor to services output. GDP promptly fell by 0.1 per cent, the first three-monthly decline in nearly two years.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a> Industrial production had been shrinking for six consecutive quarters and nobody noticed a thing. The paperwork professions paused for one season and the whole economy went backwards. I am not sure any single statistic better captures modern Britain: we can survive without making cars, but not without writing reports about the implications of making cars.</p><p>The OECD has long rated Britain one of the least regulated economies in the developed world on paper.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a> That is the exquisite part. Much of this compliance is not strictly required by legislation. Much of the modern British bureauctivity relies on &#8220;industry best-practice&#8221;, &#8220;guidelines&#8221;, &#8220;standard operating procedures from a Local Authority planning teams&#8221;. Health and safety, safeguarding, procurement compliance, planning consultancy: each has its own institute, its own accreditation ladder, its own awards evening and its own conference season at a Midlands hotel. When Parkinson observed in 1955 that "work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion"<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-12" href="#footnote-12" target="_self">12</a> he meant it as satire. The UK made it our principle industrial strategy.</p><p>Whatever else you say about these jobs, they are done superbly. Other countries have bureaucracy the way they have potholes, as a symptom of neglect. We have it the way the Swiss have watchmaking: precise, credentialed, admired by connoisseurs and increasingly the thing propping up GDP.</p><p>It is a true British success story. Hammond will get his bar in the end, and the survey reports will be immaculate.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>The Times (2 September 2026) &#8220;Bats leave Richard Hammond&#8217;s mansion renovation in the slow lane&#8221;, David Brown. thetimes.com. Three dusk surveys between June and August 2026 found eight species, including common and soprano pipistrelle, brown long-eared and Leisler&#8217;s bats; the planning application was submitted in August and the public consultation closes on 16 September 2026.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Survey licences for disturbing protected species are issued by Natural England (bat survey class licences CL17-CL20, gov.uk); the professional body is the Chartered Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management, chartered by Royal Charter in 2013. cieem.net.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Bat Conservation Trust (2023) Bat Surveys for Professional Ecologists: Good Practice Guidelines, 4th edition. bats.org.uk/resources/guidance-for-professionals.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Bat Surveys for Professional Ecologists, 4th edition, strongly recommends night-vision aids (thermal or infrared) on emergence surveys, and surveys omitting them must justify the omission; see NHBS, "Thermal Imaging and Bat Surveys" (nhbs.com/blog), which names the Pulsar Telos XP50 as "excellent for bat surveys". Priced at &#163;2,529 at CleySpy (cleyspy.co.uk), August 2026.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>BBC News (November 2024) "Bat safety barrier will cost &#163;100m - HS2 chairman". Sir Jon Thompson on the 1km curved Sheephouse Wood bat protection structure, Buckinghamshire; 8,276 consents required for phase one; a bored tunnel and re-routing were among the more expensive alternatives considered. bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3dep92x054o.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Lynn, J. &amp; Jay, A. (1980) Yes Minister, series 1 episode 5, "The Writing on the Wall", BBC. Sir Humphrey Appleby, on the proposed Euro-pass identity card.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>"Government ends 'gold-plating' of European Regulations", Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, gov.uk, 15 December 2010.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Planning Resource (2023) "Housebuilders claim that number of homes blocked by nutrient neutrality rules has soared to 145,000", reporting Home Builders Federation figures; the HBF's current campaign material puts the figure at the height of the issue at 160,000. Natural England's Nutrient Mitigation Scheme (launched March 2023) sells credits generated from wetland creation and taking land out of production.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>ONS (2025) Index of Services, UK: December 2024. Services output rose 1.3% in 2024; professional, scientific and technical activities rose 3.2%, the strongest annual growth of the services sectors. Whole-economy growth of 1.1% in 2024 (revised from 0.9%): ONS quarterly national accounts. The sector was 8.6% of UK gross value added in 2024 (ONS GDP(o) low-level aggregates).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>ONS (2025) GDP monthly estimate, UK: October 2025. GDP fell 0.1% in the three months to October 2025, the first three-monthly fall since December 2023; professional, scientific and technical activities fell 1.6%, the largest negative contributor to services; production output fell for a sixth consecutive three-month period.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>OECD Product Market Regulation indicators, in which the UK has long ranked among the least restrictive economies in the OECD. oecd.org.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-12" href="#footnote-anchor-12" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">12</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Parkinson, C.N. (1955) "Parkinson's Law", The Economist, 19 November 1955.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why we follow everyone else off the cliff]]></title><description><![CDATA[Isaac Newton lost a fortune in the South Sea Bubble, and the mechanism that took his money is still running in your brain]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-we-follow-everyone-else-off-the-cliff</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-we-follow-everyone-else-off-the-cliff</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 07:02:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/dc9911fb-769e-48e8-bc33-a21744a11731_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 5 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/selling-at-the-bottom">part 3</a> covered what financial fear does to ordinary savers.</em></p><p>In the spring of 1720, Isaac Newton sold his shares in the South Sea Company for a profit of roughly &#163;7,000. It was a sensible decision. The stock had risen sharply on little more than speculative enthusiasm and a vaguely defined monopoly on trade with South America. Newton, who held the position of Master of the Royal Mint and was by any measure one of the most analytically gifted people alive, had looked at the numbers, assessed the risk, and taken his money off the table.</p><p>Then he watched the price keep climbing.</p><p>Over the following weeks, Newton's friends, colleagues, and social circle continued to buy. The talk in London coffeehouses was of fortunes being made overnight. People who had never previously traded stocks were mortgaging property to invest. By June, with the share price still rising, Newton bought back in, this time with a much larger position. He invested close to &#163;26,000, a sum that represented the vast majority of his personal wealth.</p><p>By December the bubble had burst. South Sea Company shares, which had peaked at over &#163;1,000, fell below &#163;200. Newton's losses came to roughly &#163;20,000, equivalent to several million pounds today. The mathematician Andrew Odlyzko, who reconstructed Newton's trades from surviving records in a 2019 paper for Notes and Records of the Royal Society, calculated a capital loss of around 77 per cent.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Newton is said to have remarked afterward that he could calculate the motions of heavenly bodies but not the madness of people. (The quote, as Odlyzko notes, cannot be reliably traced to Newton's own writings. It was first attributed to him decades after his death. But its popularity tells us something about how much we want to believe that intelligence protects us from crowd behaviour. It doesn't.)</p><p>What happened to Newton is not a historical curiosity. It is a pattern that repeats with remarkable consistency across centuries, currencies, and asset classes. A person makes a rational assessment. The crowd moves in a different direction. The person holds their position for a while, then joins the crowd, often at the worst possible moment. The sequence played out in the South Sea Bubble of 1720, the dot-com mania of 1999, the sub-prime mortgage frenzy of 2006, the cryptocurrency surge of 2021, and the pandemic-era meme stock explosion. The technology changes. The asset class changes. The underlying human behaviour does not.</p><p>This post is about why. Why do intelligent, informed, otherwise rational people abandon their own judgement and follow the crowd? The answer involves economics, neuroscience, career incentives, social media algorithms, and a British cultural habit of watching what the neighbours do before making any decision about money. It also involves a harder question, one that most writing about herd behaviour avoids: what if, sometimes, following the crowd is actually the right thing to do?</p><p>And it involves Newton, who is often held up as proof that even geniuses are helpless against market manias. That framing is too flattering. Newton didn't fail because he was human. He failed because being intelligent didn't protect him from the specific psychological mechanism, the pull of the herd, that this post will describe. Intelligence is no defence against conformity. If anything, intelligent people are better at constructing post-hoc justifications for following the crowd, which makes the problem worse, not better.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The mechanics of herding</h2><p>In 1992, three economists published a paper in the Journal of Political Economy that gave herding a formal structure. Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch described what they called an information cascade: a sequence in which individuals, acting rationally, observe the choices of those ahead of them and conclude that the crowd's collective behaviour reveals information worth following, even when their own private information suggests something different.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a></p><p>The logic is surprisingly clean. Imagine you are deciding whether to invest in a new company. You have done your own research and you're mildly sceptical. Then you watch ten people ahead of you, each with their own analysis, all invest. You don't know what their individual analyses said. But the collective signal, ten out of ten choosing to invest, is hard to ignore. At some point, a rational person concludes that whatever the crowd has seen probably outweighs what they've seen alone. So they invest too. And the eleventh person, watching, reaches the same conclusion. The cascade has started.</p><p>This is what makes information cascades so different from simple peer pressure. The person joining the cascade is not being irrational. Given what they can observe, following the crowd is a reasonable inference. If ten informed people have all reached the same conclusion, the probability that they're all wrong is, on the face of it, low. The difficulty is that those ten people may each have been following the same logic: watching the person before them and suppressing their own doubts. The collective signal looks strong. The information underneath it may be thin.</p><p>Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch made two observations about information cascades that are worth holding onto. The first is that cascades are self-reinforcing. Each new person who follows the crowd adds to the signal that future observers will use. The crowd gets bigger, the signal gets stronger, and the cost of dissenting increases. The second observation, which receives far less attention, is that cascades are fragile. Because each person in the chain is suppressing their own information, the whole structure can collapse the moment a single credible contrary signal appears. One person with convincing evidence that the crowd is wrong can shatter the cascade entirely. The speed of both formation and collapse is part of what makes financial bubbles so violent in both directions.</p><p>A 2024 review confirmed that the core dynamics Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch identified have replicated consistently across thirty years of laboratory experiments and real-world market data. The model is one of the most robust in behavioural economics.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>But information cascades describe a process. They don't explain why it feels so uncomfortable to stand apart from a group, even when your own reasoning tells you to. For that, you need a brain scanner.</p><p>In 2009, Vasily Klucharev and his colleagues at the Donders Institute in the Netherlands published a study in the journal Neuron that opened a window onto the neural machinery of conformity.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> The study design was simple. Participants rated the attractiveness of a series of faces while lying in an fMRI scanner. After each rating, they were shown the average rating from a group of peers. Sometimes the group agreed with them. Sometimes it didn't.</p><p>When the participant's rating diverged from the group's, two things happened inside their brain. Activity spiked in the rostral cingulate zone, a region of the posterior medial frontal cortex that is associated with detecting errors. It's the same area that lights up when you make a mistake on a cognitive task and realise you've got the wrong answer. Simultaneously, activity changed in the ventral striatum, a reward-processing region. The brain was, in effect, treating disagreement with the group as a mistake and agreement as a reward. The amplitude of these signals predicted whether the participant would change their rating to match the group's in a follow-up session thirty minutes later. The stronger the error signal, the more likely they were to conform.</p><p>What Klucharev had found was that the brain has, in effect, a built-in conformity enforcer. It doesn't just notice social disagreement. It codes it as an error, the same way it codes a wrong answer on a maths test. And the strength of the coding predicted behaviour. People whose brains generated stronger error signals were more likely to change their minds to match the group. Conformity wasn't a choice. It was a neural reflex, operating below conscious awareness.</p><p>This was correlation. To establish causation, Klucharev and colleagues ran a follow-up experiment in 2011, published in the Journal of Neuroscience.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> This time they used transcranial magnetic stimulation to temporarily suppress activity in the posterior medial frontal cortex, the region that had generated the error signal. When they did, conformity dropped. Participants whose error-detection region had been dampened were less likely to shift their ratings toward the group's. The relationship was causal: reduce the brain's error signal for social disagreement, and people become more willing to stick with their own judgement.</p><p>The implications for financial markets are uncomfortable. Herding is not just a product of rational inference, as the cascade model suggests. It is also wired into neural architecture. The brain treats going against the group as a mistake, at a level below conscious deliberation. A fund manager who holds a contrarian position isn't just taking a financial risk. Their brain is generating a steady, low-grade error signal, telling them something is wrong. Holding that position requires overriding that signal, continuously, for as long as they remain the outlier. Most people can't do it for very long.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png" width="1540" height="1232" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1232,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:81180,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Neural response to social disagreement&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Neural response to social disagreement" title="Neural response to social disagreement" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-W9n!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2fcb7e41-cb02-47bc-836e-be7246c4af64_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><h2>Career herding</h2><div class="pullquote"><p>Nobody ever got fired for losing money the same way everyone else did.</p></div><p>There is a joke among fund managers that nobody ever got fired for buying IBM. The equivalent in investment management is that nobody ever got fired for losing money the same way everyone else did.</p><p>In 1990, David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein published a paper in the American Economic Review that formalised this intuition.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> They showed that when investment managers are evaluated against their peers, a powerful asymmetry emerges. If you follow the crowd and the crowd turns out to be wrong, you're one of many. The explanation is easy: "Nobody saw it coming." The reputational damage is shared across the entire industry, and individual careers survive. But if you break from the crowd and you turn out to be wrong, you're alone. You made a bet nobody else made, and you lost. The explanation required is personal. <em>You</em> got it wrong. <em>Your</em> career may not survive.</p><p>Scharfstein and Stein's model predicted that professionals with the best information, the ones most likely to know the crowd is wrong, would also face the strongest incentive to follow it. The better your private information, the more conspicuous your deviation from consensus, and the greater the career risk if the deviation doesn't pay off. The result is an industry in which the people best equipped to challenge herd behaviour are the least likely to do so.</p><p>Consider how this works in practice. A fund manager at a large UK asset management firm in early 2007 might have had private intelligence suggesting that mortgage-backed securities were mispriced. She might have been right. But if she reduced her fund's exposure while every competitor maintained theirs, and the market continued rising for another six months (which it did), her fund would underperform. Her quarterly review would be uncomfortable. Her clients might withdraw money. Her boss, who was being benchmarked against the same competitors, would ask difficult questions. The rational career move was to stay with the herd, even if her analysis said the herd was heading for a cliff. When the crash came, she would lose money, but so would everyone else, and "everyone got it wrong" is a survivable narrative in a way that "I got it wrong while everyone else made money" is not.</p><p>John Maynard Keynes saw this clearly in 1936, though he expressed it differently. In <em>The General Theory of Employment,</em> <em>Interest and Money</em>, he compared the stock market to a newspaper beauty contest in which readers were asked to pick the prettiest faces from a set of photographs.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> The prize went not to whoever picked the objectively prettiest face, but to whoever picked the face that received the most votes. The winning strategy, Keynes argued, was not to assess beauty at all but to assess what other people would find beautiful. And then to go a level deeper: what other people thought other people would find beautiful. The result was that prices reflected not value, but expectations about expectations.</p><p>A 2020 study in the <em>International Review of Financial Analysis</em> found that UK mutual fund managers exhibit herding behaviour driven by investor sentiment.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> When clients are optimistic, managers pile into the same trades. When clients turn fearful, they exit together. The study measured herding intensity across different market conditions and found it strongest during periods of high uncertainty, precisely when independent analysis would be most valuable. Fund managers are not stupid. They are responding rationally to career incentives that punish independent thought and reward consensus.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png" width="1540" height="1463" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/de97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1463,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:68185,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;UK retail fund flows&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="UK retail fund flows" title="UK retail fund flows" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!sjcd!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde97a892-dde2-4c81-8953-1284db797b00_1540x1463.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The cost of this dynamic falls disproportionately on the people furthest from the decision. When UK equity fund managers herd into the same positions during a boom, they push prices higher than fundamentals justify. When they herd out during a crash, they push prices lower. Investment Association data shows the pattern with painful clarity: &#163;18.4 billion of inflows to UK equity funds during the 2020-21 rally, followed by &#163;18.2 billion of outflows in 2022.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> Money arriving at the top and leaving at the bottom. The fund managers are following their career incentives. The cost is borne by the pension holders, ISA savers, and retail investors whose money moves in and out at exactly the wrong times.</p><p>Keynes's beauty contest, written nearly ninety years ago, remains the most accurate description of how professional investment actually works. The question is not "what is this asset worth?" The question is "what does everyone else think this asset is worth, and will they still think it tomorrow?" When enough people are asking that question instead of the first one, markets stop being mechanisms for price discovery and become mechanisms for the amplification of consensus.</p><div><hr></div><p>Newton followed the herd on the strength of coffeehouse talk and letters from friends, and it took months to ruin him. The modern herd moves in minutes, on screens, with the whole crowd visible at once. In the next part: GameStop, the UK crypto boom, the Northern Rock queue, and the awkward question of when the crowd is actually right.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-herd-goes-digital">The herd goes digital</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Further reading: Mackay, C. (1841) Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. The original study of financial manias, still readable and still relevant nearly two centuries later.</p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Odlyzko, A. (2019) 'Newton's financial misadventures in the South Sea Bubble', Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, 73(1), pp. 29-59.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. &amp; Welch, I. (1992) Information Cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), pp. 992-1026.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>2024 review of information cascades. Source: Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. &amp; Welch, I. (1992, reviewed 2024) 'A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades', Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), pp. 992-1026. Over 30 years of successful replication.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Klucharev, V. et al. (2009) Reinforcement learning signal predicts social conformity. Neuron, 61(1), pp. 140-151.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Klucharev, V. et al. (2011) Downregulating the posterior medial frontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(31), pp. 11193-11200.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Scharfstein, D. &amp; Stein, J. (1990) Herd Behavior and Investment. American Economic Review, 80(3), pp. 465-479.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Keynes, J.M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>International Review of Financial Analysis (2020) UK mutual fund herding behaviour driven by investor sentiment during high uncertainty periods.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Investment Association (2022) Fund flow data. GBP 18.4 billion equity inflows 2020-21; GBP 18.2 billion outflows 2022.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Selling at the bottom]]></title><description><![CDATA[What stress hormones do to ordinary savers when markets fall]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/selling-at-the-bottom</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/selling-at-the-bottom</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 07:01:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/527585cb-bdf1-4ed0-8370-a812113078ea_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 4 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It (hopefully) stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/fear-and-the-body">part 3</a> covered what fear does to the bodies of professional risk-takers.</em></p><h2>Fear in the body</h2><p>The same hormonal machinery exists in every person with a pension, an ISA, or a savings account. The cortisol response is triggered by a letter from your pension provider showing a 25 per cent decline or an email from your bank about your mortgage rate or a conversation with a colleague who mentions they&#8217;ve &#8220;moved everything to cash&#8221;. Whilst the trader has a risk manager, a compliance team and colleagues who have survived crashes before, the retail investor has an echo-chamber on social media and a sense that something terrible is happening to their future.</p><p>The FCA's Financial Lives 2024 survey is the most comprehensive picture we have of financial wellbeing in the UK. It surveyed 17,950 people and found that 13.1 million UK adults, 24 per cent of the population, had what the regulator classifies as "low financial resilience."<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> These are people who have missed a payment, are struggling to meet their financial commitments, or lack sufficient savings to weather a difficulty. One in ten had no savings at all. A further 21 per cent had less than &#163;1,000. In the twelve months to January 2024, 43 per cent of adults, roughly 22.7 million people, reported anxiety or stress caused by the rising cost of living. A year earlier, at the peak of the energy price shock, that figure had been 54 per cent.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png" width="1540" height="924" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:924,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:69251,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;UK financial resilience snapshot&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="UK financial resilience snapshot" title="UK financial resilience snapshot" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!464X!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb20a67ec-a843-45f8-9f5b-d6149d7029f7_1540x924.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Pair that with the Mental Health Foundation's 2023 polling of 6,000 UK adults, which found that one in three said worries about paying bills had made them anxious in the preceding two weeks.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> Or with research from St James's Place in 2024, which found that 47 per cent of UK adults said financial worries had affected their mental health. Among 18-to-34-year-olds, the figure was 66 per cent.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>These are not small effects in a marginal group. They describe a country in which financial anxiety is a mass experience, touching nearly half the adult population and two thirds of its youngest working adults. Between 2022 and 2024, tens of millions of people experienced a level of financial stress that would be considered a mental health risk factor. The cost-of-living crisis was not a sudden market crash of the kind that makes newspaper front pages. It was a slow squeeze, playing out over utility bills and supermarket receipts. It produced anxiety levels comparable to those seen during the 2008 crash itself.</p><p>The clinical literature confirms what the surveys suggest. The Money and Mental Health Policy Institute found that approximately 46 per cent of people in problem debt have a mental health condition.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Causation runs in both directions, making the relationship harder to untangle but no less devastating in practice. A 2024 population-based cohort study found that people experiencing financial hardship had significantly elevated risks of insomnia, poor sleep quality, and failure to meet sleep duration guidelines.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> Psychosocial factors, worry and rumination in particular, explained about 40 per cent of the link between financial difficulty and insomnia. A separate UK study found that students with high financial stress experienced poor sleep quality that then degraded their dietary choices, their physical health, and their academic performance.</p><p>Sleep matters more than it might seem in a piece about money. Working memory, emotional regulation, and decision-making quality all decline with sleep loss. A person who lies awake at 3am worrying about their overdraft is, the following morning, measurably less equipped to make good decisions about that same overdraft. It is a feedback loop running downhill: anxiety disrupts sleep, poor sleep impairs judgment, impaired judgment leads to worse financial choices, and worse financial outcomes generate more anxiety. The cycle is self-reinforcing, and it operates below the level of conscious control.</p><p>The cardiovascular evidence is grimmer still. A 2023 study found that economic uncertainty is associated with increased mortality from circulatory diseases, ischaemic heart disease, and cerebrovascular disease.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> Research using the UK Household Longitudinal Study found that increased economic insecurity was linked to adverse levels of HDL cholesterol, triglycerides, and C-reactive protein, all biomarkers for cardiovascular risk. The pathway from financial shock to cardiac event runs through chronic stress, inflammation, and the wear of sustained cortisol elevation on the vascular system.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png" width="1540" height="1232" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/dc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1232,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:72631,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;pull quote, financial crises don't just break banks&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="pull quote, financial crises don't just break banks" title="pull quote, financial crises don't just break banks" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzDR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc77335d-2772-4ad8-aa6d-135cf8dca82a_1540x1232.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>There is something unsettling about laying all of this out in sequence: the hormonal loop on the trading floor, the cortisol-driven paralysis, the insomnia cascade, the cardiovascular damage. Each mechanism has been studied independently, published in a specialist journal, and discussed within its own academic silo. What no one seems to have done is stand back and look at the full picture. The financial fear response is not a single phenomenon. It is a system, running from the endocrine glands through the prefrontal cortex to the cardiovascular system, activated by the same stimulus: a threat to your financial security. And every part of the system makes every other part worse.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Selling at the bottom</h2><p>In 1985, Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman identified a pattern they called the disposition effect.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> Investors hold on to losing investments too long, hoping to avoid the pain of crystallising a loss, and sell winning investments too early, to lock in the pleasure of a gain. Loss aversion and the disposition effect are not the same thing, but they're related: the disposition effect is what happens when loss aversion meets a brokerage account.</p><p>In 1998, Terrance Odean tested the theory against real trading records.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> He analysed seven years of data from 10,000 individual accounts at a large US discount brokerage. The disposition effect was large and consistent. The stocks people sold for a gain went on to outperform the stocks they stubbornly held at a loss by 3.4 per cent over the following twelve months. In December, the pattern reversed slightly, as investors sold losers for tax purposes. The rest of the year, it held firm. People were paying a measurable cost for their inability to face up to a loss.</p><p>In normal market conditions, the disposition effect is a drag on returns. It's expensive but not catastrophic. People hold their losers too long, sell their winners too soon, and underperform the market by a few percentage points a year. It's the financial equivalent of a persistent low-grade fever: uncomfortable, costly over time, but survivable.</p><p>During a full-blown crisis, something different happens. The disposition effect breaks.</p><p>Nicholas Barberis, a Yale finance professor, documented the psychological sequence of the 2008 crash in a paper published in 2012.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> In the early months, from summer 2007 through the first half of 2008, loss aversion actually prevented selling. The FTSE 100 was down, pension statements were bad, but people couldn't bring themselves to crystallise a 20 per cent loss. They held. The disposition effect was doing what the disposition effect does: making people cling to losing positions.</p><p>Then Lehman Brothers collapsed on 15 September 2008. The losses steepened. Through October and November, markets fell further and faster. By early 2009, portfolios that had been down 20 per cent were down 40 per cent. And somewhere in that decline, a threshold was crossed. The pain of watching the number fall further exceeded the pain of realising the loss. The psychological dam broke. Paralysis gave way to capitulation. Investors sold in volume, at the worst possible prices, because the emotional cost of continuing to hold had become unbearable.</p><p>The FTSE 100 hit its crisis low of 3,512 on 3 March 2009. It had peaked at 6,731 in October 2007, a fall of almost 48 per cent.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a> To put that in personal terms: a pension pot worth &#163;200,000 in October 2007 (if invested in the FTSE 100) would have been showing roughly &#163;104,000 by March 2009. For someone approaching retirement, looking at that number on a screen, the emotional response is not academic.</p><p>An investor who sold at that moment and moved to cash would have missed the recovery that took the index back above 5,000 by the end of 2009 and above 7,000 by 2015. <strong>The same &#163;200,000 pot, left untouched, would have recovered its full value within two years and doubled within six</strong>. But "left untouched" requires a level of emotional composure that the cortisol research tells us is biologically difficult for most people to maintain during a sustained market downturn.</p><p>The Investment Association's fund flow data captures the pattern in aggregate. UK retail investors were net sellers of equity funds through the worst of the crisis, pulling money out at precisely the moment prices were cheapest.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-11" href="#footnote-11" target="_self">11</a> They then began re-investing months later, after the recovery was already well under way. They sold low and bought high. Every piece of financial guidance in existence tells you to do the opposite. Loss aversion made them do it anyway.</p><p>The 2022 cost-of-living crisis produced a related pattern, though the mechanism was different. The Investment Association recorded a record annual net outflow from UK retail funds of &#163;25.7 billion, the first full-year net outflow in its data history.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-12" href="#footnote-12" target="_self">12</a> Funds saw outflows in ten out of twelve months. This was not panic selling driven by market fear. It was forced selling: people liquidating their ISAs and investment accounts because they needed cash to cover rent, energy bills, and food. The contrast with the previous two years was stark. In 2020 and 2021, UK retail investors had put in near-record inflows of &#163;30.8 billion and &#163;43.6 billion respectively. The reversal was total, and it was driven not by fear of the market but by the material pressure of rising prices on household budgets.</p><p>In both cases, the selling happened at the wrong time. In both cases, it fell hardest on people without financial buffers, without access to professional advice, and without the luxury of simply waiting.</p><p>There is a bitter irony in the Investment Association data. The same system that encourages people to invest for the long term, through workplace pensions, ISAs, and platform advertising that shows thirty-year performance charts, provides no mechanism to protect them from their own biology when a crisis arrives. The auto-enrolment system gets people into the market. Nothing in the system's design helps them stay there when their cortisol is elevated, their sleep is broken, and every instinct in their body is telling them to run.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The gender question</h2><p>Chris Dawson's 2023 study in the British Journal of Psychology approached the gender gap in financial risk-taking from an angle that most financial research avoids.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-13" href="#footnote-13" target="_self">13</a> Instead of asking people hypothetical questions about gambles, he used data from 13,575 respondents to the UK British Household Panel Survey and measured loss aversion through real-world income changes: how much does a &#163;1 drop in household income affect your psychological wellbeing, compared with a &#163;1 gain?</p><p>His findings were clear on the surface. Women reported a lower willingness to take financial risks than men. Fifty-three per cent of that gap was explained by higher levels of loss aversion among women. A further 3 per cent was attributable to lower levels of financial optimism. Income losses were more psychologically painful for women than for men. Income gains felt roughly the same to both sexes.</p><p>Set alongside the Coates research, a picture forms. The testosterone-driven feedback loop that produces bull market overconfidence is predominantly a male phenomenon. Women's risk preferences are more stable across market conditions. Women may take less risk during booms, missing some upside, but they also tend to avoid the worst excesses of the bust. Coates argued that a more gender-diverse financial system would be a less volatile financial system. Dawson's data suggests he might be right, at least about the loss aversion half of the equation.</p><p>But the picture has complications that deserve honesty rather than a neat conclusion.</p><p>A 2024 meta-analysis on gender and loss aversion found that the answer depends entirely on how you define and measure it.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-14" href="#footnote-14" target="_self">14</a> Under one common experimental definition, women are more loss-averse. Under another, there's no gender difference at all. Under two further definitions, women are actually less loss-averse than men. The finding that women are "more risk-averse" may be partly an artefact of how questions are framed, which samples are recruited, and which definition of loss aversion the researchers happen to use. A 2022 replication study found no significant gender difference in financial risk aversion, contradicting earlier work.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-15" href="#footnote-15" target="_self">15</a></p><p>I don't think the research is mature enough to draw clean conclusions from. What it does tell us, usefully, is that loss aversion is not a universal constant. It varies between individuals, between genders, between age groups, and between economic contexts. The 2.5x ratio from Kahneman and Tversky is a population average. Some people experience losses at 1.5x intensity. Some at 4x. The variation matters more than the average, because the average obscures precisely the people who are most at risk during a crisis.</p><p>If you are a 28-year-old woman with a workplace pension she rarely checks, loss aversion during a downturn may barely register. If you are a 62-year-old man three years from retirement, checking his SIPP daily on his phone while the market drops, the same biological machinery is running at full intensity. Same brain architecture. Wildly different exposure to the fear response. Any system that treats these two people identically, which is to say, the system we currently have, is designed around an abstraction rather than a reality.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What this means</h2><p>Financial fear is not a character flaw. It is not a sign of financial illiteracy or emotional weakness. It is a physiological response, operating at every level of the human system: hormonal, with cortisol flooding the bloodstream and testosterone amplifying your worst instincts; cognitive, with loss aversion distorting judgment in direct proportion to the stakes; physical, with disrupted sleep, elevated inflammatory markers and measurable cardiovascular damage; and behavioural, with the reliable pattern of selling at the worst moment and hoarding cash that should be deployed.</p><p>This response has been documented in every significant financial event in modern British history. The people who queued outside Northern Rock in September 2007 were not irrational. They were making a calculation under extreme uncertainty, and for those who had deposits above the guaranteed limit, they were right to queue. But millions of other people, across the months and years that followed, made decisions driven by a fear response that their conscious, rational minds could not override. They sold their equities at the bottom. They pulled their pensions into cash. They stopped contributing to investments that would have recovered. The cost, measured in retirement income lost, runs into the billions.</p><p>Understanding that the fear response is biological, not moral, is the first step toward managing it. The second step, as Benartzi and Thaler demonstrated three decades ago, is absurdly simple: stop checking your portfolio so often. Every time you open that app and see a red number, you pull the trigger on the loss aversion machinery. The machinery does not care about your thirty-year time horizon. It does not care about average annual returns. It cares about the threat directly in front of it, right now.</p><p>And the financial system, far from helping, actively makes this worse. Pension dashboards show daily fluctuations. Investment platforms send push notifications when markets move. Fund factsheets report monthly returns to three decimal places. Workplace pension statements arrive with graphs that make a temporary decline look like the edge of a cliff. The entire architecture is built as if the humans using it are rational agents who process information calmly and act in their long-term interest. They are not. They have amygdalas. They have cortisol receptors. They have the same fight-or-flight wiring as every other mammal on the planet.</p><p>The cost of pretending otherwise falls hardest on those with the smallest financial buffers and the least access to the professional advice that might, in the moment of panic, talk them back from the edge. A wealthy investor with a financial adviser will get a phone call during a crash telling them to hold steady. A care worker with an auto-enrolled workplace pension worth &#163;8,000 will get an app notification showing her pot is down 22 per cent, and no one to explain why that number, frightening as it looks, is a temporary feature of a long-term investment. The biology is the same. The support is not and the system is designed as though neither exists.</p><div class="pullquote"><p>Whether we are, in the end, frightened animals making financial decisions has only one honest answer. We are.</p></div><p>John Coates left Wall Street to find out why his body overruled his brain. What he found was that the same hormonal machinery runs in every person with a financial stake in an uncertain world. The trader on the Deutsche Bank floor in 1998, hands steady during the boom and shaking during the crash, was not an outlier. He was a preview. His body was doing what all our bodies do when the numbers on the screen start falling. The question he asked in that laboratory in Cambridge, whether we are, in the end, frightened animals making financial decisions, has only one honest answer. We are. The financial system just hasn't caught up with that fact.</p><div><hr></div><p>The fear this piece describes plays out inside a single body, one nervous system at a time. Crises spread between bodies too, through watching what everyone else does and doing the same, and that is where this series goes next. Even Isaac Newton, the most rational man of his age, could not resist following the crowd into the South Sea Bubble.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/why-we-follow-everyone-else-off-the-cliff">Why we follow everyone else off the cliff</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Financial Conduct Authority (2024) Financial Lives 2024 Survey: Key Findings. 17,950 respondents; 24% classified as having low financial resilience.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Mental Health Foundation (2023) Money and Mental Health Survey. 6,000 UK adults, one in three anxious about paying bills.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>St James's Place (2024) Financial Wellbeing Research. 47% of UK adults reported financial worries; 66% among 18-34 year-olds.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Knapp, M. et al. (2012) 'Debt and mental health', in Personal Debt &amp; Mental Health. London: Royal College of Psychiatrists/BMJ. 45% with problem debt have mental health conditions.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Sinha, S. et al. (2024) 'Financial hardship and sleep outcomes: a population-based cohort study', Sleep Health, 10(2), pp. 145-153.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Wersing, C. et al. (2023) 'Economic uncertainty and circulatory disease mortality', PLoS Medicine. Association with ischaemic heart disease and CVD.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shefrin, H. &amp; Statman, M. (1985) Disposition effect. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Odean, T. (1998) Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? Journal of Finance, 53(5), pp. 1775-1798.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Barberis, N. (2012) 'Psychology and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008', Yale School of Management Working Paper.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>London Stock Exchange historical market data. FTSE 100 fell from 6,731 (October 2007 peak) to 3,512 (March 2009 trough), a decline of 47.8%.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-11" href="#footnote-anchor-11" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">11</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>The Investment Association (2023) annual fund flow statistics. Net sellers of equity funds during 2008 crisis.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-12" href="#footnote-anchor-12" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">12</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>The Investment Association (2023) '2022 ends with a record annual outflow from retail funds of GBP 25.7 billion', Press Release, 9 February 2023.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-13" href="#footnote-anchor-13" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">13</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Dawson, C. (2023) 'Gender differences in optimism, loss aversion and attitudes towards risk', British Journal of Psychology, 114(4), pp. 928-944.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-14" href="#footnote-anchor-14" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">14</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Bouchouicha, R., Deer, L., Eid, A.G. et al. (2019) 'Gender Effects for Loss Aversion: Yes, No, Maybe?', Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 59, pp. 171-184. Four definitions of loss aversion produced four contradictory gender effects. See also Georgalos, K. (2024) 'Gender effects for loss aversion: A reconsideration', Journal of Economic Psychology, 105.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-15" href="#footnote-anchor-15" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">15</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Giannikos, C.I. &amp; Korkou, E.D. (2025) 'Are Women More Risk Averse? A Sequel', Risks, 13(1), 12. Replication of Jianakoplos &amp; Bernasek (1998) using 2022 US Survey of Consumer Finances data with refined wealth measurement. Found no significant gender difference in financial relative risk aversion.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Frightened Animals - fear and the body]]></title><description><![CDATA[Loss aversion and what financial dread does to you]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/fear-and-the-body</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/fear-and-the-body</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 07:01:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/36544cf1-faa6-43da-9e85-9142c934f8e1_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 3 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It (hopefully) stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-through-line">part 2</a> covered why the same crisis psychology returns, decade after decade.</em></p><p>In 1998, a derivatives trader at Deutsche Bank in New York noticed something odd about his own body.</p><p>During a bull run his hands were steady, his thinking quick, his appetite for risk almost physical. He slept well, ate well and felt &#8220;invincible&#8221;. Then the Russian government defaulted on its debt and the mood on the trading floor changed in a way that no pricing model could have predicted. His fingers hesitated over the keyboard. His sleep broke apart. His stomach clenched each morning before the opening bell. His colleagues, among the most analytically trained people on Wall Street, were making decisions that <em>looked</em> like the behaviour of frightened animals.</p><p>The trader's name was John Coates. He had spent thirteen years on Wall Street, working derivatives desks at Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and finally Deutsche Bank, where he ran a trading operation specialising in the tails of probability distributions (extreme outlier events). With a PhD from Cambridge, he was not short of analytical training, yet the question he couldn't shake was disturbing: what if they actually <em>were</em> frightened animals? What if the decisions being made on trading floors during a financial crisis had less to do with spreadsheets and pricing models and more to do with cortisol, testosterone and the ancient mammalian fear response?</p><p>In 2004, Coates left Wall Street and returned to Cambridge to find out. He started collecting saliva samples from City of London traders, twice a day, measuring their hormone levels while they worked. He would arrive on the trading floor early and then return in the afternoon. He did this for weeks at a time, in conditions ranging from quiet, profitable markets to the kind of volatility that made grown men swear at screens.</p><p>What he discovered over the following decade would reframe how we understand financial risk. His findings should unsettle anyone who believes that markets are driven by rational calculation. They certainly unsettled the traders and the academic economists who reviewed his papers. And they should unsettle you, because the same biological machinery that Coates measured in City traders is running, right now, in the body of every person in Britain who has a pension, a mortgage or a savings account.</p><p>Before looking at Coates findings, we need to start with a more fundamental question: why do human beings experience financial losses so much more intensely than financial gains? The answer takes us to a psychology laboratory in Jerusalem, in 1979, and to a pair of researchers whose work would change how we understand decisions about money, risk, and everything that connects them.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The asymmetry</h2><p>Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky spent years asking people to make simple choices between gambles. Would you rather have a guaranteed &#163;500, or a 50/50 chance of winning &#163;1,000? Most people took the sure thing. Would you rather lose &#163;500 for certain, or take a 50/50 chance of losing &#163;1,000? Most people gambled. The expected value is identical in each case, yet the choices people made were not. The pattern was consistent across thousands of subjects and it violated everything that classical economics assumed about how rational agents weigh outcomes.</p><p>In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky published <em>Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk</em>.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> The paper would eventually help win Kahneman the Nobel Prize in Economics. Its central insight was deceptively simple: people don't evaluate outcomes in absolute terms. Instead, they evaluate them relative to a reference point, usually whatever they currently have. The function is not symmetrical: the pain of losing &#163;100 is more intense, psychologically, than the pleasure of gaining &#163;100.</p><p>How much more intense? Kahneman and Tversky's original experiments suggested a ratio of about 2 to 2.5 times. A loss feels roughly twice as bad as an equivalent gain feels good. They called this asymmetry loss aversion and it offered a tidy explanation for a cascade of financial behaviour that economists had been labelling "irrational" for decades.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png" width="1540" height="1617" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1617,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:89406,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Loss aversion curve&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Loss aversion curve" title="Loss aversion curve" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YYWc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93118cf7-082b-4a91-9a83-4b27d87bdc61_1540x1617.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>During the financial crisis in 2008, UK pension holders watched their retirement pots drop by 30 or 40 per cent over a period of months. If losses are felt at twice the intensity of gains, a 30 per cent fall doesn't feel like the mirror image of a 30 per cent rise. It feels closer to a 60 per cent hit. Brain imaging studies have since shown that financial losses activate the anterior insula and other neural circuits associated with physical pain and disgust.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> The 2008 pension losses weren't just disappointing. For the people experiencing them, they were physically painful in a way that neuroscientists can now measure on a scan.</p><p>In 1995, two economists at the University of Chicago, Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler, built on Kahneman and Tversky's work with an observation that still hasn't properly filtered through to the people who design pension systems. They called it myopic loss aversion.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> Their insight was straightforward: people check their portfolios too often. When you evaluate your pension fund's performance monthly rather than annually, you encounter more periods showing a loss, because stock markets are volatile in the short term even when they trend upward over decades. Each encounter with a negative number triggers the loss aversion response: a small chemical jolt of distress; tightening in the chest; a thought, conscious or not, that maybe you should move to something safer.</p><p>Benartzi and Thaler ran simulations to quantify the effect. The probability of seeing a loss on a diversified equity portfolio on any given trading day is roughly 46 per cent. Check monthly, and it drops to about 38 per cent. Check once a year, and it's around 27 per cent. Check every five years and losses become rare. The underlying asset is the same in every case. Only the frequency of emotional exposure changes. Their simulations showed that investors behave as if they're operating with a time horizon of about one year, even when their actual investment horizon is twenty or thirty years. <strong>The result is that frequent checkers end up holding far less in equities than infrequent checkers and they earn lower returns over their lifetimes as a consequence.</strong></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png" width="1540" height="1001" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1001,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:74254,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Probability of seeing a loss by checking frequency&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Probability of seeing a loss by checking frequency" title="Probability of seeing a loss by checking frequency" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F5ov!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F420955ac-4207-40c7-874f-52f16de06e4e_1540x1001.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Rather than a flaw in either the market or  the investor, this is a flaw in the interface between the two. Every push notification from a trading app, every monthly statement email from an investment platform, every red number on a portfolio dashboard is a trigger. The information is accurate. The emotional response it provokes is, from an investment perspective, counterproductive. The more accessible investing has become, the worse the problem. In 1995, when Benartzi and Thaler published their paper, checking a portfolio meant calling your broker or waiting for a quarterly statement. In 2025, it means opening an app on the device in your pocket, which most people do dozens of times a day. The frequency of emotional exposure has increased by an order of magnitude. The loss aversion machinery hasn't changed at all.</p><p>Now here's where the picture gets more complicated, and more interesting.</p><p>In 2024, Lukasz Walasek, Matthew Mullett, and Neil Stewart published a meta-analysis in the Journal of Economic Psychology that re-examined the loss aversion evidence from scratch.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> They collected every study that had fitted prospect theory's loss aversion parameter, known as lambda, to individual choices between risky gambles. The sample turned out to be surprisingly small for such a famous finding: just 17 published studies comprising 19 data sets. And the mean loss aversion coefficient they calculated was 1.31, with a 95 per cent confidence interval from 1.10 to 1.53. That is a long way from Kahneman and Tversky's original estimate of 2.0 to 2.5. Much of the available data, the authors noted, was of poor quality, making precise estimates difficult.</p><p>Separately, a 2023 study in Judgment and Decision Making found that loss aversion doesn't reliably appear for small stakes at all. It emerges only weakly and only for losses above roughly $40.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a></p><p>I want to be careful with this, because the headline version of the meta-analysis, "loss aversion is weaker than we thought" misses the point that matters for this series. What the evidence actually shows is that loss aversion scales with stakes. Small, everyday financial decisions may not trigger it. Lose &#163;5 on a bet and you'll barely notice the asymmetry. But the kinds of losses people experience during a genuine financial crisis, where pension pots drop by tens of thousands of pounds over weeks, where house prices fall by 15 per cent in a year, where a lifetime of savings shrinks visibly on a screen, these are precisely the conditions under which loss aversion hits hardest. A 2020 global replication study, spanning 19 countries and 13 languages, confirmed that prospect theory's core predictions hold, particularly in the domain of large losses under uncertainty.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a></p><p>So the picture that emerges is more nuanced than the textbook version, and more useful. Loss aversion is not a fixed constant baked into every human brain at the same intensity. It is a response that scales with the magnitude of what you stand to lose. Financial crises, by definition, are the moments when the stakes are highest. Which means they are the moments when loss aversion dominates most completely.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The hour between dog and wolf</h2><p>The title comes from the French phrase l'heure entre chien et loup, the twilight hour when you can no longer tell the dog from the wolf. John Coates uses it as a metaphor for the moment when a rising market tips into mania, or a falling market tips into panic: the moment when your body crosses a hormonal threshold, and confidence becomes recklessness, or caution becomes paralysis. It is also the title of his 2012 book which laid out a single uncomfortable argument that the financial industry has mostly preferred to ignore.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a></p><p>To understand why the argument mattered, we need to understand what a trading floor feels like during a crash. Coates described it in interviews with the vividness of someone who had lived through it repeatedly. During the good times, a floor has a particular energy: loud, competitive, almost athletic. Traders shout, joke, take on positions they wouldn't normally consider. They eat more. They sleep well. They feel sharp. During a downturn, the same room becomes a different place. People go quiet. They stare at screens without acting. Lunch goes uneaten. Conversations turn short and defensive. The confidence that seemed like competence six months earlier has evaporated, and what replaces it is something that looks and feels a lot like clinical anxiety. Coates wanted to know whether these observations were just anecdote or whether there was a measurable biological process driving them.</p><p>In 2008, Coates and Joe Herbert published their answer in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> They had measured testosterone and cortisol levels in the saliva of 17 male traders on a City of London trading floor, sampling twice daily over eight consecutive business days. </p><div class="pullquote"><p>A trader&#8217;s morning testosterone level predicted his day&#8217;s profitability. On high-testosterone mornings, traders made significantly more money.</p></div><p>First: a trader's morning testosterone level predicted his day's profitability. On high-testosterone mornings, traders made significantly more money. Fourteen out of seventeen subjects showed higher profits and losses on days when their testosterone was elevated. Testosterone increases confidence and appetite for risk. In a rising market, this creates something insidious: success breeds testosterone, which breeds more risk-taking, which breeds more success, which breeds more testosterone. A biochemical positive feedback loop, invisible to risk management systems, inflating the bubble from inside the bodies of the people running it.</p><p>Second: cortisol rose with both the volatility of the market and the variance of the trader's own results. During calm, profitable periods, cortisol stayed low. When volatility spiked, as it did violently in the autumn of 2008, cortisol surged. A brief cortisol spike is useful. It sharpens focus and quickens reactions. But sustained elevated cortisol, the kind that builds over days and weeks of market turmoil, does something different.</p><p>Narayanan Kandasamy, working with Coates and others, published the follow-up in PNAS in 2014.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> Using a double-blind, placebo-controlled, cross-over protocol, they raised cortisol levels in volunteers over eight days, to levels comparable to those observed in traders during a market crash. They then tested financial risk preferences. The result: participants' certainty equivalent (the guaranteed sum they'd accept in place of a risky gamble) fell from &#163;25 to &#163;14. A 44 per cent drop. They became profoundly risk-averse. They wouldn't take bets that were obviously favourable. Their bodies had overridden their arithmetic.</p><p>This is the mechanism behind the question that puzzles every market commentator during a downturn. Prices are cheap and yet money sits in cash, in gilts, in anything that feels safe. The Kandasamy study offers a biological explanation. The investors who should be buying at the bottom are running cortisol levels that make them physically incapable of bearing risk. Their rational minds may know the market is cheap. Their endocrine systems are vetoing the trade.</p><p>Coates also observed that these hormonal feedback loops are not distributed equally. <strong>The testosterone-driven cycle of escalating confidence was significantly stronger in younger men.</strong> <strong>Women's risk preferences were more stable across market conditions. </strong>The cortisol-driven risk aversion hit both sexes, but the bull-market overconfidence cycle was predominantly male. Coates argued, provocatively but with data to support him, that a more gender-balanced trading floor might produce a more stable market: fewer euphoric highs during the boom, fewer paralytic lows during the crash.</p><p>His conclusion was uncomfortable for an industry that had spent decades building risk management infrastructure on the assumption that the people operating it were rational agents making calculated bets. The financial system, Coates argued, is not just psychologically unstable. It is endocrinologically unstable. The models assume the trader is a computer. The trader is a human. And the human&#8217;s hormone levels are moving in sync with the very market the models are trying to predict.</p><div><hr></div><p>Coates found this chemistry in professional traders, people who are paid to live with risk. The machinery he describes is standard issue, and that is where this series goes next: what cortisol does to ordinary savers, and why so many of us sell at the exact bottom.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/selling-at-the-bottom">Selling at the bottom</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Kahneman, D. &amp; Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-292.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Brain imaging studies showing financial losses activate the anterior insula and neural circuits associated with physical pain. Source: Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Benartzi, S. &amp; Thaler, R. (1995) Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1), pp. 73-92.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Walasek, L., Mullett, M. &amp; Stewart, N. (2024) Meta-analysis of the loss aversion coefficient. Journal of Economic Psychology.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Gal, D. &amp; Rucker, D.D. (2023) 'Loss aversion is not robust: A re-examination', Judgment and Decision Making, 18, e15.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Ruggeri, K. et al. (2020) 'Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk', Nature Human Behaviour, 4, pp. 622-633. 19-country study, 13 languages.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Coates, J. (2012) The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk-Taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology of Boom and Bust. Fourth Estate.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Coates, J. &amp; Herbert, J. (2008) Endogenous steroids and financial risk-taking on a London trading floor. PNAS, 105(16), pp. 6167-6172.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Kandasamy, N. et al. (2014) Cortisol shifts financial risk preferences. PNAS, 111(9), pp. 3608-3613.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The through-line]]></title><description><![CDATA[War, crash, pandemic, inflation: each crisis arrives wearing different clothes. The machinery underneath does not change.]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-through-line</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-through-line</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 07:00:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2a68bcd8-b088-4e6e-919a-a7e13a93b2f2_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 2 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-queue">part 1</a> covered the queue outside Northern Rock.</em></p><p>Every financial crisis in modern British history has triggered the same set of psychological responses in how people handle their money. War, financial crash, pandemic, inflation: each crisis arrives wearing different clothes, but the underlying mental machinery does not change. The brain that made a wartime housewife hoard tinned food is the same brain that made a millennial panic-sell their ISA in March 2020. The same patterns repeat because they are features of human cognition, not products of any particular economic era: </p><ol><li><p>Fear response</p></li><li><p>Herding instinct</p></li><li><p>Narrative contagion</p></li><li><p>Cognitive narrowing</p></li></ol><p>Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff studied financial crises across 66 countries over eight centuries. Their central finding, published as <em>This Time Is Different</em> in 2009, is that every generation believes its crisis is unprecedented.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Policymakers and investors convince themselves that the old rules no longer apply, that new financial instruments or regulatory frameworks have made the system safe, that the lessons of the past are irrelevant to the present. They are always wrong. The crises recur because the human psychology driving them has not changed.</p><p>What makes this a British series, rather than a behavioural economics textbook, is that the UK occupies a peculiar position. It has experienced every major category of financial crisis in the past century: world wars, depression, devaluation, stagflation, a housing crash, a banking collapse, a pandemic, a cost-of-living crisis and now the impact of the war in Iran. It has also produced some of the most influential research on how people actually behave with money, as opposed to how economic models assume they behave. For example, the UK Behavioural Insights Team, created in 2010 was the world's first government institution dedicated to applying behavioural science to policy. The UK has pioneered the pension auto-enrolment system that nudged over ten million people into retirement saving by changing a single default setting.</p><p>Britain is also a country with a particular and sometimes peculiar relationship to money. The class system, the importance on property ownership, the culture of financial silence, the specific shape of British shame about debt and poverty (particularly with older generations): all of these filter the universal psychological responses through a distinctly national lens. Any account of financial crisis psychology that ignores the cultural context is only telling half the story.</p><p>Scattered insights existed for decades before the discipline of behavioural economics coalesced. Charles Mackay wrote <em>Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds</em> back in 1841.  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published <em>Prospect Theory</em> in 1979. However, behavioural economics did not become mainstream until after 2008. The financial crisis made it impossible to ignore the gap between how economic models assumed people would behave and how they actually did, the crisis made the old models look foolish. Richard Thaler won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2017 for his work on how cognitive biases affect economic decisions. The discipline went from academic curiosity to policy tool in less than a decade.</p><p>There is a reason the discipline accelerated in Britain specifically. The UK financial sector is enormous relative to the size of the economy. The City of London processes trillions of pounds in transactions daily. British household wealth is more concentrated in housing than in almost any other developed country, which means that property market fluctuations hit personal psychology with unusual force. And the UK welfare state, while more generous than America's, is considerably less protective than those in Scandinavia or continental Europe. British citizens are more exposed to financial shocks than their French or German counterparts. </p><div><hr></div><h2>The psychological toolkit</h2><p>This series maps eight psychological forces that shape how we handle money during crises. Some are <em>individual</em>: the fear response in your body, the bandwidth tax that poverty imposes on your thinking, the money scripts your parents passed to you by osmosis. Others are <em>collective</em>: the herd instinct that makes us follow everyone else off the cliff, the narratives that spread through populations like viruses, the fairness perception that determines whether we accept sacrifice or revolt against it. And some are distinctly <em>British</em>: the silence around money, the identity politics of property ownership.</p><p>Over the coming weeks, this series will work through each force in turn. Fear and the body, starting with loss aversion and the hormonal cascade that financial dread triggers in your physiology. Herding, from career herding in the City to the digital herd on social media. The deal: fairness, trust, and why people accept some sacrifices but not others, from wartime rationing to the austerity response. Financial narratives, how they form, how they spread, and why the story you tell yourself about a crisis matters more than the data. The bandwidth tax: how scarcity itself degrades your cognitive function, making financial decisions worse at precisely the moment they matter most. The British silence around money, the class-inflected shame that prevents people from talking about their finances even when talking would help. Property and identity, why the British treat their houses as extensions of themselves and what this does to financial decision-making. And the intergenerational transmission of financial trauma, from Depression babies to the children of austerity.</p><p>The cumulative argument is that financial crises are not primarily economic events that happen to have psychological side effects; instead they are psychological events with economic triggers. The trigger might be a fall in asset prices, a bank failure, a spike in inflation or a pandemic&#8230;but the crisis itself (the part that actually damages people's lives, their sleep, their relationships, their health, their capacity to make good decisions) is psychological. And because it is psychological, it follows psychological rules that we can understand and (hopefully!) counteract.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Why this series now</h2><p>There is much talk about the whether the AI Tech Bubble is about to burst - reproducing (but perhaps on a bigger scale) the 2000 Dot Com Crash. If this were the case, the UK would already be battle-weary from the unusually compressed sequence of financial crises we&#8217;ve weathered in the past two decades. The 2008 banking collapse, a decade of austerity, Brexit uncertainty, the pandemic, the 2022-23 cost-of-living crisis triggered by the Ukraine War and now the 2026 oil price fluctuations due to the Iran War. Each of these following in quick succession has not had the recovery gap that previous generations could rely on. The FCA's 2022 <em>Financial Lives Survey</em> found that 12.9 million UK adults, one in four, had low financial resilience. That figure was up from 10.7 million just two years earlier. In the north-east of England, 31 per cent of adults were classified as having low financial resilience. For Black adults, the figure was twice the national average.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png" width="1540" height="1001" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/de79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1001,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:87832,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Timeline, UK financial crises 2007-2023&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Timeline, UK financial crises 2007-2023" title="Timeline, UK financial crises 2007-2023" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Dpa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde79a343-1b01-460d-b729-bacbadcd387e_1540x1001.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>These are not just economic statistics. They describe a population whose financial psychology has been shaped by crisis after crisis, each one layering new anxieties on top of old ones. The Bank of England has described consumers as "scarred" by the sequence of shocks. The generational wealth data tells a similar story from a different angle: research from the Institute for Fiscal Studies shows that the difference in typical wealth between someone in their early 60s and someone in their early 30s has more than doubled in real terms since the mid-2000s. Only 36 per cent of people born in the 1980s were homeowners by age 30, compared with over 60 per cent for those born in the 1950s and 1960s. Mike Brewer's 2025 Gresham College analysis puts the wealth gap between the top end and middle Britain at &#163;1.27 million - 17 per cent more than in 2006.</p><p>The compressed nature of these crises matters psychologically. Previous generations had recovery periods between shocks. For example the post-war generation had two decades of growing prosperity before the 1970s stagflation hit. The current generation has had no such breathing room. The Bank of England's observation about "scarred" consumers is more than metaphor. Each crisis leaves psychological damage: lower trust, higher anxiety, changed spending habits&#8230;and that damage has not healed from one crisis before the next one arrives.</p><p>Ulrike Malmendier's research at UC Berkeley puts hard numbers on this effect. People who live through a major economic downturn remain more risk-averse in their financial decisions for decades afterwards. The effect is strongest for those who experienced the crisis during their formative years, roughly ages 18 to 25. A generation that came of age during the 2008 crash, then entered the workforce during austerity, then lived through a pandemic, carries a psychological profile that no previous British generation has matched. They are not just financially poorer than their parents at the same age. They are psychologically different in their relationship with money, more cautious, less trusting of institutions, more anxious about the future.</p><p>There is a large and growing portion of the British population for whom the financial system feels less like a structure that supports them and more like a set of forces that happen to them. Understanding the psychology of that experience is not an academic exercise. It is, for millions of people, a daily reality.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What this series is not</h2><p>My intention in this Crisis Money series is not to provide a personal finance guide on where to invest or how to budget. Although I&#8217;m intending to draw on history extensively, I&#8217;m not seeking to provide a complete history of British financial crises. The research in behavioural economics has sometimes been used to justify paternalism, but I won&#8217;t be an argument that people are irrational and need to be protected from themselves.</p><p>My aim is to provide something closer to &#8220;a field guide&#8221;. If we understand the psychological forces that act on us during a financial crisis, then we are better equipped to recognise them when they arrive. We cannot eliminate loss aversion or the herding instinct, but we can learn to notice when they are operating. Optimistically, that awareness, by itself, changes the decisions we make. Perhaps not always and not perfectly, but hopefully in ways that the research can quantify.</p><p>In this series we will be discussing some arguments about system design. If the people using the financial system are predictably affected by fear, herding, cognitive overload, shame and fairness perception, then surely the system itself should be designed with those realities in mind, rather than assuming they do not exist. The auto-enrolment pension success showed what is possible when system designers take human psychology seriously. The Northern Rock deposit insurance failure showed what happens when they do not. The gap between those two examples is where most of British financial policy still sits.</p><p>And the speed at which that gap matters is accelerating. In 2007, Northern Rock's run played out over about a week. In March 2023, Silicon Valley Bank in the United States lost $42 billion in deposits in a single day. Cookson and colleagues at the FDIC called it the first Twitter-fuelled bank run.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> The herding instinct, the narrative contagion, the fear response: they all still work the same way. They just work faster now. It will not be the orderly queue outside Northern Rock in September 2007. The next version of that queue will not be visible. It will happen in seconds, across millions of screens.</p><div><hr></div><p>Next time: what financial dread actually does to your body. A derivatives trader noticed his own hands shaking during the 1998 Russian default, left Wall Street, and spent the next decade measuring what fear does to the people who move markets. His findings apply to anyone who has ever stared at a falling balance.</p><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/fear-and-the-body">Fear and the body</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Reinhart, C. &amp; Rogoff, K. (2009) This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton University Press. The definitive study of recurring financial crises across 66 countries.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Cookson, J.A. et al. (2023) "Social Media as a Bank Run Catalyst." FDIC Working Paper. Documents the role of Twitter in the Silicon Valley Bank collapse; essential for understanding how herding now operates at digital speed.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The queue]]></title><description><![CDATA[What a bank run in Kingston upon Thames reveals about what crises do to our financial brains]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-queue</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-queue</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 08:42:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/716a3fb5-3b4b-4880-813c-86ff1dae9b2c_1456x816.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 1 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. New parts land weekly.</em></p><p>On the morning of Friday 14 September 2007, a queue formed outside the Northern Rock branch in Kingston upon Thames. It was the first run on a British bank in a hundred and fifty years. By the time BBC camera crews arrived, the line stretched along the pavement and around the corner. Similar scenes were playing out at Northern Rock branches across the north-east of England and beyond: in Golders Green, in central Newcastle, in small towns where the building society had been a fixture of the high street for decades.</p><p>The people in those queues were mostly older. They had saved carefully, in many cases for decades. They were not speculators or traders, instead they were retired teachers, former factory workers and couples who had put their life savings into an institution they trusted because of its building society heritage and physical branch network. Some brought folding chairs. Some brought flasks of tea.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csv28m" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png" width="648" height="493" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:493,&quot;width&quot;:648,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:397971,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csv28m&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/209649148?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5VYP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7393e712-fbcf-47cf-9736-785e7594ed0a_648x493.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p></p><div class="pullquote"><p>Barbara Williams, a retired depositor, told reporters: </p><p><em>"I didn't initially panic but the more you watch the news and read you think maybe we ought to do it as well. We thought we would do what everyone else is doing."</em></p></div><p>That sentence contains, in miniature, almost everything this series is about. The herd instinct. The role of media narratives. The contagion of financial fear. The gap between rational calculation and emotional response.</p><p>The images from that Friday went around the world. They looked like something from the 1930s. But they were misleading in an important way. Hyun Song Shin's analysis in the Journal of Economic Perspectives showed that the branch queues were partly an artefact of Northern Rock's business model.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> The bank had only 72 branches, most with just two counter positions. The physical queue was dramatic precisely because the infrastructure was small. The majority of Northern Rock withdrawals were actually made online and by telephone. Approximately one billion pounds left the bank on Friday and Saturday alone, and most of it vanished electronically, without anyone standing in line.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png" width="1540" height="1085" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1085,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:55711,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;pull quote, people were behaving rationally&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="pull quote, people were behaving rationally" title="pull quote, people were behaving rationally" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IaYp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F097b6930-7ad1-4d88-8900-b91b126ad377_1540x1085.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The depositors were not irrational. The UK's deposit insurance scheme at the time guaranteed 100 per cent of the first &#163;2,000 and only 90 per cent of the next &#163;33,000. Someone with &#163;35,000 in Northern Rock stood to lose &#163;3,300 if the bank failed. The Bank of England's Governor later confirmed that the depositors' behaviour was entirely rational given the legal framework. The queue was not a failure of public understanding. It was a perfectly reasonable response to a badly designed insurance system.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png" width="1540" height="1997" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:false,&quot;imageSize&quot;:&quot;normal&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:1997,&quot;width&quot;:1540,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:172262,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;Northern Rock deposit guarantee structure&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="Northern Rock deposit guarantee structure" title="Northern Rock deposit guarantee structure" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RYcV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4f2c85ba-36a0-4eb8-8d8e-9643523e6355_1540x1997.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>And the Northern Rock run was only the beginning. Over the next fifteen years, the British public would be subjected to one financial shock after another, each one activating the same psychological machinery in slightly different configurations:</p><ol><li><p>The 2008 crash.</p></li><li><p>Austerity.</p></li><li><p>Brexit.</p></li><li><p>The pandemic.</p></li><li><p>The cost-of-living crisis.</p></li><li><p>Closure Strait of Hormuz.</p></li></ol><p>Each time, for individuals it created the same fear responses, the same herding patterns, the same narrative battles and the same cognitive overload. Whilst each crisis was happening contemporary discussion focussed on the practical ramifications, and predicting the next progression in the crisis. The economics and politics were debated and analysed endlessly, but the psychology of what was happening was largely ignored.</p><p>For personal, selfish, reasons I began reading research on how we react in the UK to financial crisis. As more of the financial and mainstream press are discussing the potential for the AI Tech Bubble to burst on a bigger scale even than the 2000 Dot Com Crash, I&#8217;ve been thinking &#8220;how would I react to that&#8221;.  I decided to better structure my own thoughts by writing this Crisis Money series. </p><p>Crisis Money is about what happens inside (particularly British) people's heads during financial crisis. Specifically, not the macroeconomics or policy debates, but the cognitive and emotional experience of watching your financial security come under threat, and the <em>predictable</em> ways our brains responds. I use the word predictable deliberately. The responses feel chaotic from the inside, intensely personal, as if your particular anxiety about your particular mortgage is yours alone. But the research, drawn from neuroscience, psychology, behavioural economics, and decades of crisis data, tells a different story. Our anxiety follows patterns. Our decisions during a crisis are shaped by forces that have been documented, measured, and in some cases exploited. Understanding those forces does not make the anxiety disappear, but it can change our relationship with it. </p><div><hr></div><p><em>Next in this series: <a href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-through-line">The through-line</a>. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Shin, H.S. (2009) "Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), pp. 101-119. The best analysis of the Northern Rock run, reframing it as rational behaviour within a badly designed system.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Hardship Gap: How UK Universities Distribute Emergency Funding Between Home and International Students]]></title><description><![CDATA[UK universities receive billions of pounds each year from international student tuition fees.]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-hardship-gap-how-uk-universities</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/the-hardship-gap-how-uk-universities</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 08:30:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>UK universities receive billions of pounds each year from international student tuition fees. They also set aside hardship funds for students in financial crisis. But our data shows that the relationship between these two things is not straightforward, and that how universities divide hardship support between home and international students varies enormously.</p><p>A Money Outsider investigation, based on Freedom of Information responses from 102 UK universities, reveals a significant and widening difference in hardship fund approval rates for UK versus international students.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Money Outsider! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><h2>The headline numbers</h2><p>In 2020/21, international students who applied for hardship support were approved 94.9% of the time, a higher rate than UK students (86.3%). By 2024/25, those positions had reversed: UK students were approved at 80.6%, while international students had fallen to 70.0%.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/a124c695-da72-4a0a-893e-fe73b7452060" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic" width="1456" height="694" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:694,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:87762,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/heic&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/a124c695-da72-4a0a-893e-fe73b7452060&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/188831310?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6uNy!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d8fc216-51ed-4619-b657-d03e17baff33_2516x1200.heic 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The crossover happened between 2021/22 and 2022/23. Before that point, international students were more likely to be approved. After it, they were less likely, and the gap has continued to widen.</p><p>There are possible explanations. The COVID year saw specific emergency funding streams, some of which may have been particularly accessible to international students. As those wound down, universities may have reverted to hardship criteria that favour home students, whether by design or effect. Some government-funded hardship pots are explicitly restricted to UK students.</p><h2>Fee income versus hardship spending</h2><p>International students pay significantly higher tuition fees than home students, and at many universities they contribute the majority of total fee revenue. As those fees have to be funded without the aid of UK Government student loans, the assumption is that most international students have more substantial personal or family wealth; therefore, a lower need for hardship funds. </p><p>We compared each university&#8217;s international share of tuition fee income with its international share of hardship fund spending for 2023/24.</p><p>At the vast majority of universities, the international share of hardship spending is lower than the international share of fee income. This does not necessarily indicate unfairness: fee income and hardship eligibility are separate things, and many hardship funds are drawn from sources ring-fenced for home students. But the scale of the gap at some institutions is notable.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/770731bd-fce5-4080-99a1-4e4f8248b701" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic" width="1456" height="722" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:722,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:202802,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/heic&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/770731bd-fce5-4080-99a1-4e4f8248b701&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/188831310?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!d_fY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5aea42da-9aac-49c2-b92b-42c3c89a97e1_2514x1246.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Six universities (Exeter, Royal Holloway, Bangor, Royal Academy of Music, Cranfield, and Keele) spend proportionally as much or more on international hardship as international students contribute in fees.</p><h2>Hardship spending per student</h2><p>Another way to look at the data is to calculate how much each university spends on hardship per UK student versus per international student. The variation is large.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/02807d6e-0f43-4003-9652-3d945c15517d" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic" width="1456" height="1118" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1118,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:77837,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/heic&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/02807d6e-0f43-4003-9652-3d945c15517d&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/188831310?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" title="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!azm9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9556305-23e0-4321-983a-c631ccfefc67_1894x1454.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>At De Montfort, the university spends &#163;41 on hardship per UK student and 17 pence per international student. At the other end, Exeter spends roughly twice as much per international student as per UK student. The range is enormous.</p><h2>Some universities awarded zero international grants</h2><p>At a small number of universities, every single international hardship application was refused, presumably on the grounds of policy. Leeds Beckett rejected all 67 international applications in 2022/23, and all 53 in 2023/24. The Royal Veterinary College has awarded zero international grants in three consecutive years. These may reflect eligibility rules rather than discretionary decisions, but the pattern is striking.</p><h2>Context and caveats</h2><p>This data does not tell us <em>why</em> these gaps exist, and there are several legitimate explanations.</p><p>Many university hardship funds are drawn from sources that are restricted to home students by regulation, not by university choice. The Office for Students&#8217; hardship funding, for example, is ring-fenced for UK students. Several universities told us this explicitly in their FOI responses.</p><p>International students also have different financial profiles. They must demonstrate funds before receiving a visa, which may make them less likely to meet hardship criteria even when they are struggling. Conversely, international students do not have access to the UK welfare system, maintenance loans, or many of the other safety nets available to home students, which could mean their need is underreported rather than lower.</p><p>It is also worth noting that fee income and hardship spending are fundamentally different things. Tuition fees go into the university&#8217;s general revenue. Hardship funds are typically a separate, much smaller pot. There is no established principle that hardship spending should be proportional to fee contribution.</p><p>What the data does show clearly is that the gap is large, it is widening, and it varies enormously by institution. Whether that reflects appropriate policy or a structural problem is a question the sector has not yet publicly addressed.</p><p></p><div><hr></div><p></p><p><a href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/uni-hardship-funds-2025">The full dataset behind this investigation is available here</a>, including charts and raw data tables. </p><p>This dataset is compiled from responses to Freedom of Information requests made to UK Universities. Money Outsider have not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of the disclosed information. Money Outsider have attempted to reprocess data from different formats to allow comparison. No warranty is given as to fitness for purpose. Use of this dataset is at your own risk. Attribution to MoneyOutsider.com is appreciated.</p><p>Where applicable, re-use of information is intended to be consistent with the Open Government Licence.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Money Outsider! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Over £300 Million in Five Years: The Rise and Fall of University Hardship Funds]]></title><description><![CDATA[Over the last five academic years, UK universities have distributed more than &#163;305 million in hardship funding to their students.]]></description><link>https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/over-300-million-in-five-years-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.moneyoutsider.com/p/over-300-million-in-five-years-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Basil Choudhry]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 14:57:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the last five academic years, UK universities have distributed more than &#163;305 million in hardship funding to their students. They have processed almost half a million applications. And the trajectory tells a clear story: a COVID-era peak, a cost-of-living surge, and then a retreat.</p><p>Money Outsider sent Freedom of Information requests to every university in the UK. The 101 that responded with comparable data gave us a detailed picture of how hardship funding has changed since the pandemic.</p><h2>The five-year arc</h2><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/40de889f-4ceb-41fc-81d2-9c2e5163ad57" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic" width="1456" height="739" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:739,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:65003,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/heic&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/40de889f-4ceb-41fc-81d2-9c2e5163ad57&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/188798948?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZK4W!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b25aecc-ae23-4edd-9dd7-f89ba3cb6f5e_1924x976.heic 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>In the COVID year of 2020/21, fuelled by emergency government funding, universities paid out &#163;79 million. By 2024/25, that had dropped to &#163;46 million, a fall of 42%.</p><p>But it is the 2022/23 cost-of-living crisis year that deserves the most attention. That year saw the highest number of applications in the entire dataset: 116,373. More students asked for help than at any point during the pandemic. Yet total spending (&#163;66.7 million) was 16% below the COVID peak. The money was being spread thinner: more students receiving smaller amounts.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/0ee8d091-86f5-4b7c-85dc-7b5909c4517f" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic" width="1456" height="811" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/cde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:811,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:53087,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/heic&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/0ee8d091-86f5-4b7c-85dc-7b5909c4517f&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/188798948?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nyzu!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcde0787e-a648-409f-af30-846ed2cea50e_1914x1066.heic 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2>The shrinking grant</h2><p>The average hardship grant has fallen consistently. In 2020/21 a typical grant was worth &#163;958. By 2023/24 it had dropped to &#163;702, a 27% decline in nominal terms.  The 2024/25 figures show a partial recovery in average grant size to &#163;785, but total spending continues to fall because fewer applications are being received. Adjusted for inflation over the same period, the real-terms cut would be significantly larger.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/7fdac463-349a-4b69-8578-1ed2a8073af5" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic" width="1456" height="719" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/def60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:719,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:53869,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/heic&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:&quot;https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/7fdac463-349a-4b69-8578-1ed2a8073af5&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.moneyoutsider.com/i/188798948?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RDz_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdef60791-52d8-4ce9-a0dc-1378d6f9f22a_1940x958.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h1>Number of hardship applications is falling</h1><p>In 2024/25 3.4% of students applied to their university&#8217;s hardship fund. The drop in hardship applications from their 2020/21 peak of 5.4% is one of the few pieces of encouraging news in an otherwise bleak landscape for student finances in the UK.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/embed/chart/b0b02920-b110-4a8c-a104-891add2763bd" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic" width="1456" height="814" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!w1yX!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F003cacaf-5cbc-4ce7-9179-f1d31307f7ed_1932x1080.heic 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p></p><h2>The broader student finance picture</h2><p>The maintenance loan system, for all its faults, does appear to be doing the basic job of keeping students afloat while they study. The fact that hardship applications have come down from their cost-of-living crisis peak suggests that the worst of the acute funding emergency may have passed, at least for home students who can access the full loan package.</p><p>But the real sting comes after graduation. The student loan repayment system has come under intense criticism in recent months, and the numbers are stark. The total outstanding student loan book now stands at &#163;267 billion. In the last tax year, &#163;15.2 billion in interest was added to loans, but only &#163;5 billion was repaid. The average graduate who finished in 2024 left with roughly &#163;53,000 of debt.</p><div><hr></div><p></p><p><a href="https://data.moneyoutsider.com/uni-hardship-funds-2025">The full dataset behind this investigation is available here</a>, including charts and raw data tables. </p><p>This dataset is compiled from responses to Freedom of Information requests made to UK Universities. Money Outsider have not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of the disclosed information. Money Outsider have attempted to reprocess data from different formats to allow comparison. No warranty is given as to fitness for purpose. Use of this dataset is at your own risk. Attribution to MoneyOutsider.com is appreciated.</p><p>Where applicable, re-use of information is intended to be consistent with the Open Government Licence.</p>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>