This is part 9 of Crisis Money, a Money Outsider series about what financial crises do to our minds, and what our minds do back. It stands on its own, but part 8 covered the fairness instinct.
There is an unwritten deal between citizens and the institutions that run their financial lives: Britons accepted fourteen years of rationing because the sacrifice was visibly equal, then watched the 2008 bailouts and the austerity that followed break that sense of fairness. This piece is about what that rupture did to trust.
Three layers of trust
Trust in economic institutions operates at three levels, and the period from 2007 onwards damaged all of them simultaneously.
The first layer is trust in banks. Northern Rock made the fragility visible, but the deeper erosion happened afterwards. Before 2008, most people understood intellectually that banks could fail, but treated it as a theoretical possibility, like an asteroid strike. After 2008, it became personal memory. The Edelman Trust Barometer tracked what happened next: UK institutional trust fell to 42 per cent in 2020, placing Britain second-to-last among developed nations, above only Russia. By 2025, the score had recovered to 43 per cent, a four-point improvement that still left the country in the bottom tier globally.1
The crisis did not just damage trust. It stratified it by income.
The recovery, such as it is, has not been evenly distributed. Edelman's data shows a persistent gap of 12 to 15 points between high-income and low-income respondents on institutional trust. In the business sector specifically, the gap reaches 15 points.2 People who came through 2008 with their wealth intact trust the system more than people who lost jobs, homes or savings. The crisis did not just damage trust. It stratified it by income.
The second layer is trust in government. The wartime social contract worked because people believed the government was asking everyone to sacrifice equally. Austerity broke that belief. The gap between executive pay at bailed-out banks and the benefits being cut from disabled claimants was too visible, too stark, for the "we're all in this together" narrative to survive contact with reality.
Government trust in the Edelman data tells a grim story. It remains the weakest of the four institutional categories they track, sitting at 43 per cent in 2025, with business the most trusted at 51 per cent. The inversion is notable: people trust corporations more than they trust the state. For a country that built the NHS, the welfare state, and a universal pension system on the basis of collective trust in government, this represents a quiet but significant shift.
The behavioural consequences of government distrust are more diffuse than bank distrust but potentially more corrosive. When people do not trust the government to manage the economy fairly, they stop believing that playing by the rules will be rewarded. Tax compliance becomes grudging rather than civic. Pension saving feels like a gamble on a system that might change the rules before you get there. The willingness to accept short-term sacrifice for long-term collective benefit, which is the foundation of every social insurance programme, erodes. You can see this in the polling on state pensions, where younger workers increasingly report that they do not expect the state pension to exist by the time they retire. Whether that expectation is accurate is almost beside the point. The belief itself changes behaviour.
The third layer is the most abstract and potentially the most consequential: trust in money itself. We rarely think about this because money functions precisely to the degree that we do not think about it. You accept a ten-pound note because you trust that someone else will accept it from you. You keep savings in a bank account denominated in sterling because you trust that those pounds will buy roughly the same amount of goods next year as they do today. This trust is so fundamental that when it breaks, the effects cascade through everything.
The interaction between these three layers is what makes the post-2008 period so psychologically damaging. If you lose trust in banks but still trust the government to regulate them, the damage is contained. If you lose trust in the government but still trust the currency, you can at least protect yourself through saving. But when all three layers are compromised simultaneously, people lose their orientation entirely. The ground beneath every financial decision becomes uncertain. Should you save? The bank might fail. Should you rely on government protection? The government cut your benefits. Should you hold cash? Inflation is eating it.
Sterling has had its crises: the 1967 devaluation, the 1976 IMF bailout, Black Wednesday in 1992. Each one temporarily shook public confidence in the currency. But the mechanism that most directly erodes trust in money for ordinary people is not a dramatic crash. It is inflation.
Inflation as trust betrayal
When UK inflation hit 11.1 per cent in October 2022, measured by CPI, it was the highest figure in forty years.3 Food prices were worse: they peaked at 19.1 per cent annual growth in March 2023.4 Core inflation, stripping out food and energy, reached 7.1 per cent in May 2023. For anyone under fifty, this was a new experience. For anyone over seventy, it was a horrible reminder.
The economic analysis of inflation focuses on causes: energy prices, supply chains, monetary policy, wage spirals. But the psychological experience of inflation is about something simpler. You had a deal. You worked, you saved, you spent carefully. The money in your account was supposed to hold its value. And now it does not. Every trip to the supermarket confirms that the deal has been broken, not by any visible villain, but by a process that feels both relentless and unaccountable.
Wu's 2025 study in the Canadian Review of Sociology provides the empirical backbone for what people experience intuitively.5 Using cross-national panel data, Wu found that inflation causally damages social trust. The direction matters: it is primarily inflation that erodes trust, not low trust that causes inflation. And the damage does not reverse automatically. When inflation falls, the trust that was lost does not simply return. It has to be rebuilt, slowly, through demonstrated stability.
The psychological mechanism is straightforward. Inflation punishes the cautious. People who saved, who delayed gratification, who followed the conventional advice about building financial security, find their discipline rewarded with declining purchasing power. People who borrowed heavily, who spent freely, who took on debt, find that inflation erodes the real value of what they owe. The message is perverse: responsibility is penalised. Recklessness is subsidised.
The extreme case illustrates the principle. During Germany's Weimar hyperinflation of 1921 to 1923, people who had saved responsibly their entire lives watched their savings become worthless. A middle-class family's life savings might buy a loaf of bread. Meanwhile, those who had borrowed to buy physical assets found their debts evaporating. The trauma of that experience shaped German economic policy for a century. The Bundesbank's obsessive focus on price stability, inherited by the European Central Bank, is not abstract monetary theory. It is the institutional memory of what happens when a population loses faith in the value of its currency.
The UK's 2022-23 inflation episode was nothing like Weimar. But it operated on the same psychological register, at a much lower volume. People experienced it as a betrayal, not by any specific institution but by the system itself. The weekly shop cost 30 to 40 per cent more. Energy bills doubled. Wages did not keep pace. And the people who suffered most were, as always, those with the least: lower-income households spend a higher proportion of their income on food and energy, so the same headline inflation rate hit them harder in practice.
There is something self-fulfilling about inflation psychology that Wu's research touches on but does not fully develop. If people expect prices to rise, they spend sooner and demand higher wages, which causes prices to rise. Economists call this expectation anchoring and treat it as a technical problem of monetary policy communication. But the trust dimension adds a layer that technical solutions cannot reach. Once people believe that the institutions responsible for price stability have failed, or worse, that those institutions prioritise other goals over the purchasing power of ordinary people's savings, the expectation of inflation becomes entangled with a deeper suspicion about whose interests the system serves.
The Bank of England's response, raising interest rates from 0.1 per cent to 5.25 per cent over eighteen months, solved the inflation problem by creating a different one. Mortgage holders, many of them younger households who had stretched to buy property during the low-rate years, saw their monthly payments jump by hundreds of pounds. The cure for the erosion of trust in money was a direct financial hit to the people who had done exactly what the system told them to do: buy a house, get on the ladder, build wealth through property.
The same cohort that cannot afford to buy homes without parental help, that inherits financial anxiety from parents shaped by previous crises, now watched their first experience of inflation coincide with mortgage rate increases that made the homes they had finally managed to buy significantly more expensive to maintain. Each crisis layer compounds the one beneath it.
Wu's finding that lost trust does not automatically return when inflation falls should worry anyone who thinks about long-term institutional stability. The 2022-23 inflation episode, coming after the bailouts, after austerity, after a decade of stagnant real wages, did not land on a population with reserves of institutional goodwill. It landed on a population already running low.
Broken trust is not the end of the story. The next part turns to furlough, the one recent policy that briefly rebuilt it, and what that restoration was worth.
Next in this series: Furlough, the partial restoration. If this was useful, subscribing gets you the rest of the series as it lands.
Edelman Trust Barometer institutional trust. Source: Edelman (2020-2025) Trust Barometer, UK data. Institutional trust at 42% in 2020 (lowest recorded, second-to-last developed nation above Russia); 43% by 2025.
Edelman institutional trust gap by income. Source: Edelman (2020-2025) Trust Barometer, UK data. Persistent income-based trust gap of 12-15 points overall; 15 points in the business sector.
UK inflation peak October 2022. Source: ONS (2022-2023) Consumer Price Inflation Statistics. CPI peaked at 11.1% in October 2022, the highest rate in 40 years.
Food prices inflation March 2023. Source: ONS (2023) UK Consumer Price Inflation data. Food prices peaked at 19.1% annual growth in March 2023.
Wu, C. (2025) Inflation and Social Trust. Canadian Review of Sociology.

